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The primary objective of this ~esearch was to assess the equity 
and efficiency of in-kind income transfers. The analytical framework 
employed incorporated key concepts of the utility interdependence para-
digm from economic welfare theory. This paradigm views income trans-
fers as social goods and suggests that social as well as private be-
nefits may be derived from the redistribution of income. This study 
attempted to assess some of the empirical implications of the utility 
interdependence argument through the investigation of the low-income 
housing and Food Stamp programs in Multnomah County, Oregon for FY 
1973. 
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Data were drawn from agency files, published statistics and docu-
ments, interviews with program administrators, and a survey of the re-
cords of 498 Non-Public Assistance Food stamp households. The private 
and social benefits and costs of the programs were estimated. The 
program r ,~ticipation rates and the socio-economic characteristics of 
recipient households were ascertained. Particular attention was de-
voted to an evaluaLion of the efficacy of in-kind transfers in induc-
ing substitu~ion effects or producing social benefits through the al-
teration of the consumption patterns of the target population. In ad.-
dition to an economic analysis of in-kind transfers, the political en-
vironment of welfare legislation was detailed. 
The results of this research suggest that in-kind income trans-
fers are an inefficient and inequitable method of redistributing income. 
All programs investigated were characterized by high administrative 
costs. The administrative share of the public program budget ranged 
from 20% in the Food Stamp Program to over 50% in P~)lic Housing. All 
programs were found to be inequitable in that households with similar 
socio-economic characteristics did not receive similar benefits. 
Housing programs discriminate among the equally needy by restricting 
supply. In -the Food Stamp Program, a complex income determination 
formula, which is used to calculate program benefits, results in a con-
siderable variation in the subsidies provided to households of equiva-
lent size and income. 
The low-income housing and Food Stamp programs were also found to 
be ineffective in producing those social benefits which are specifically 
related to changes in the consumption patterns of the target population 
as a whole. While housing programs were found to induce substitution 
effects by furnishing large subsidies to a small number of households, 
only 5% of the eligible received benefits. Programs which leave the 
vast majority of the poorly housed untouched were judged unlikely to 
significantly diminish the external diseconomies presumed to be asso-
ciated with the housing expenditure patterns of the entire population 
of eligible. In contrast, the Food stamp Program provides less gene-
rous subsidies to all eligible applicants. Food stamp subsidies 
were found to be insufficient to generate substitution effects; the 
food consumption patterns demanded of recipient households were not 
different from the food expenditure patterns of comparable households 
with income entirely in cash. 
While the distribution of benefits in the housing and Food stamp 
programs strongly favors the poor, large numbers of non-poor are offi-
cially eligible for assistance. It was estimated that 37% of the 
3 
households in the country were eligible for low-income housing and ap-
proximately 46% were eligible for food stamps. While the tight sup-
ply of housing transfers limits the growth of program participation, an 
enormous expansion of participation in the open-ended Food Stamp Program 
is possible. 
The economic analysis of in-kind transfer programs emphasized 
their deficiencies as redistributive mechanisms. However, the poli-
tical potency of in-kind programs was found to be considerable. Poli-
cy-makers appear to be responsive to pressures to perpetuate and expand 
established programs, rather tha~ to empirically validate the assump-
tions ~which they are based. In view of the political popularity of 
4 
in-kind transfers and the public antipathy to transfers of cash, it 
is probable that transfers in-kind will command an increasing share of 
the welfare budget. 
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CHAPTER I 
THE AMERICAN WAY OF WELFARE 
Introduction 
The American welfare system pleases neither the taxpayer nor 
the intended beneficiaries of public income transfers. Taxpayers 
grumble about cost escalation, inefficiency, and fraud while those 
eligible for benefits complain of inequities, inadequate payment 
levels and stigmatization. The swift escalation of expenditures 
and glaring malfunctions in several public needs-tested income 
transfer programs have stimulated considerable debate about the 
"welfare crisis". While the term welfare is most commonly asso-
ciateQ with the cash Public Assistance programs, the welfare system, 
consists of a plethora of programs, many of which provide benefits 
in the form of specific goods and services. These "in-kind" programs 
like low-income housing, medicaid and food stamps, have groWTl drama-
tically since the mid-1960·s. Table I charts the increases in ex-
penditures for four of the most rapidly expanding public transfer 
programs and reveals that the rate of growth in medicaid and food 
stamps has far exceeded that of Aid for Families with Dependent 
Children (AFDC), the most popular target of public criticism. 
Table I also indicates how rapidly small-scale experimental pro-
grams, like food stamps, c c:_ come to command a significant share of 
the public budget. Table II reveals that by Fiscal Year (FY) 1973, 
the budget for needs-tested transfer programs was $30.7 billion 
and demonstrates that in-kind transfer programs had ballooned so ra-
TABLE I 
EXPENDITURES IN PUBLIC NEEDS-TESTED INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS, SELECTED YEARS+ 
(expenditures in thousands of dollars) 
FISCAL YEAR PERCENT INCREASE 
PROGRAM 1966 1969 1972 1973 1966-1973 
Food Stamps 70,500 251,000 1,916,900 2,606,600 3597 
Public Housing 256,673 391,611 889,114 1,101,810 329 
Hedicaid 369,600 4,165,765 8,137,653 9,110,552 2365 
AFDC cash payments 
to beneficiaries 1,735,000 3,091,803 6,553,599 6,954,554 301 
lDerived from The Budget of the ~ Government, Appendix, F.Y. 1968, pp. 133, 488, and 523; 
F.Y. 1971, pp. 146, 437, and 482; FY 1974, pp. 208, 442, and 499; FY 1975, pp. 203-205, 440-442, 
494, and 808, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1967, 1970, 1973, and 1974). 
Includes federal, state and local expenditures. 
N 
TABLE II 
EXPENDITURES AND PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC NEEDS-TESTED INCOME TRANSFER PROGRAMS, F. Y. 19731 
(expenditures in thousands of dollars) 
PROGRAM TOTAL 
EXPENDITURES 
FEDERAL STATE AND LOCAL NUMBER OF RECIPIENTS 
CASH PROGRAMS 
Public Assistance 
AFDC 6,954,554 * * 10,979,630 
Adult Categories 2 3,365,732 
* * 3,158,781 
State and Local 
Administration 923,910 * * 
Total Public 
Assistance 11,244,498 6,341,264 4~962":9322 
veterans and Survivors 
Pensions 2,574,498 2,574,498 0 2,322,579 
T rOTAL CASH g,818,694 8,915,762 4,902,932 
IN-KIND PROGRAMS 
Social Services 3 2,143,260 1,607,445 535,815 6,700,000 
Medicaid 9,110,552 4,997,686 4,112,866 25,527,000 
w 
Food stamps4 
Ch "ld "" 5 1. Nutr1.t1.on 
" 6 Hous1.ng Programs 
Public Housing 
Rent Supplement 
Section 235 
Section 236 
TOTAL IN-KIND 
TOTAL CASH AND IN-KrNi)--
(In-kind as a percent of 
total cash and in-kind) 
2,649,863 
1,345,700 
1,101,810 
108,143 
278,416 
171,902 
16,909,646 
30,728,349 
(55) 
TABLE II 
(continued) 
2,495,600 
1,345,700 
1,101,810 
108,143 
27B,416 
171,902 
12,106,702 
21,022,464 
(58) 
154,263 12,150,680 
* 25,000,000 
o 1,047,000 
o 118,184 
o 411,670 
o 191,261 
4,802,944 
9,705,876 
(49) 
1Derived from The Budget of the £. §.:... Government, Appendix, FY 1975, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Go-
vernment Printing Office, 1974), pp. 203-205,440-442, 292, and 80B. 
2Inc1udes Aid to the Par·tia11y and Totally Disabled (APTD), ;Hd to the Blind (AB), Old Age Assis-
tance OM, and Emergency Assistanclil. 
3Federa1 and state and local shares are e.',timated based on the required 75/25 match. ~ 
4 
TABLE II 
(Continued) 
Estimate for state and local expenditures was obtained by projecting from Oregon da-ta. 
5Includes School Lunch, Scho':)l Breakfast and Special Milk programs. 
6pigures in the Number of Recipients column represent the number of dwelling units for 
housing programs. 
* Unavailable. 
lJ1 
6 
pidly that by FY 1973 they dominated cash transfers in the welfare 
budget. 
Cri·ticism of welfare programs have not been confined to the ac-
celeration of costs. Equ.ally crl.! . ;ial are judgements that the welfare 
system is in ~1 :"tate of administrative chaos and that a perverse struc-
ture of incentives had iuadvertently been created. The dynamics of 
the welfare crisis were clearly outlined in hearings regarding the ad-
ministration of welfare before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of 
the Joint Economic Committee in the Spring of 1972. Witnesses ranged 
from John G. Veneman, Under Secretary of HEW, to other prominent federal 
officials, to state welfare administrators, to local welfare supervi-
sors, to caseworkers in Atlap.ta, New York and Detroit. Those testi-
fying were unanimous in their condemnation of the present system; not 
a single witness suggested that welfare programs were functioning ade-
quately. Most would agree with veneman that the problems with welfare 
were so fundamental that minor modifications would fail to solve them. 
Veneman informed the committee that 
Many, if not most, of the problems your investigation 
will uncover are the direct result of a failing system 
with overwhelming structural weaknesses that cannot be 
solved under existing law. l 
1 
u.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy, Problems in Administration of public Welfare Programs: Hear-
ings Before the Subcommittee ~ Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government printing Office, 1972), p. 67. 
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ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES 
Diffusion of Responsibility and Variations in Standards 
Responsibility for public welfare programs is diffused horizon-
tally within a single level of government and vertically between le-
vels of government in the federal system. Local welfare agencies are 
compelled to administer a mUltiplicity of programs whose eligibility 
criteria and operating procedures are uncoordinated at best and have 
conflicting objectives and requirements at worst. Programs targeted 
for the poor fall under the jurisdiction of the Department of Labor 
(manpower programs), the Department of Agriculture (food stamps and 
child nutrition programs), the Department of Health, Education, and 
Welfare (public assistance and medicaid), and the Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (housing programs) • Each of these federal de-
partments have their bureaucratic arms at the state and local levels. 
To further complicate matters, welfare legislation is fed through a 
variety of Congressional committees. In the House, welfare legisla-
tion may land in Ways and Means, Veterans Affairs, Agriculture, Educa-
tion.and Labor, or Banking and Currency. The senate counterparts are 
Finance, Veterans Affairs, Labor and Public Welfare, Agriculture and 
2 
Forestry, and Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs. 
state governments have a similar array of welfare bureaucracies 
and legislative committees. While some transfer programs like food 
2U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommi'ttee on Fiscal 
Policy, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No.2, Handbook of Public In-
~ Transfer Programs, (Washington;-D.C.: u.s. Government printing--
Office, 1972), pp. 5-7. 
8 
stamps have national standards, many like AFDC and medicaid relegate 
be;'lefit and eligibility determination to the states. This has resul-
ted in a very substantial interstate variation in the benefits avail-
able to recipients with essentially the same income and family charac-
teristics. For example, in January, 1974, the average monthly AFDC 
payment per recipient ranged from $14.36 in Mississippi to $91.83 in 
3 
Wisconsin. On the local level, welfare is administered by 1,153 
't 4 autonomous un~ s. In sum, welfare legislation originates at many 
distinct points in the federal system. There are few incentives for 
the responsible agencies and committees to coordinate their efforts. 
As a result of the system as a whole has conflicting parts which create 
administrative headaches and inequities in the treatment of recipients. 
Local officials and federal administrators all complain that they 
lack sufficient power to bring order to the system. Those responsible 
for administering welfare programs on the local level complain that fe-
deral regulations exhibit a lack of understanding of local conditions 
and that the complexity and conflicts inherent in the system stem from 
the separation of responsibility for day-to-day program operations 
from rulemaking. Local officials testified that many programs are 
virtually unadwinisterable in their present form. Federal officials 
3 
u.s. Congress, House of Representatives, Subconuni"ttee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, Departments of Labor and Health, Educa-
tion and Welfare Appropriations for 1975, Part 6, Department of Health, 
Education, and Welfare, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1974), pp. 25-26. 
4U•S• Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy, Problems ••• , ~ cit., p. 68. 
9 
in turn, bemoan their lack of control over local agencies and claim 
that they leave few realistic sanctions to employ against recalci-
trant local administrators. S 
Complexity, Error and Fraud 
Sharon Galm, staff legal counsel for the Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy, after conducting an extensive analysis of welfare administra-
tion, sunmtarized,"Because of the nature of present eligibility and 
budget criteria, accurate application procedures are not feasible, and 
feasible procedures are not accurate."6 The extreme complexity of 
eligibility and payment formulas imposes a high cost on both case-
workers and applicants. While Galm was primarily concerned with the 
functioning of the AFDC program, many in-kind transfer programs are 
also characterized by extremely complex formulas. 
Complexity stems from several sources. Some is a function of 
the diffusion of responsibility for rulemaking between and within le-
vels of government as discussed above. Some complexity is the product 
of the determination to keep welfare costs down by screening the "un-
worthy" poor out of the system. The categorical aid system ~stablished 
in the Public Assistance programs testifies to the salience of recipi-
ent character.istics other than income. For example, the AFDC program 
6Sharon Galm, Studies in Public welfar~,paper No. S(Part 1), ~­
~~n Welfare Administration: Welfare ~ Administrative Nightmare, 
prepared for the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee 
on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1972), p.l. 
10 
is aimed at poor mothers with dependent children, not at the equally 
poor intact family or single individual. 
Another, quite different impulse has also contributed to comple-
xity. This is the effort to humanize the system by taking into ac-
count the individual circumstances of applicants. Most welfare pro-
grams reflect an effort to consider individual cases on their own me-
rits in the adoption of involved income and assets determination pro-
cedures. However, the specific procedures adopted are not uniform 
across programs: legitimate "hardship" deductions from gross income 
under Food stamps may not be allowed under AFDC or public housing and 
vice versa. Handler and Hollingsworth note that the proliferation of 
rules intended to personalize the system leaves the caseworker with 
considerable discretion in the determination as to precisely who is 
eligible and what they will receive. While this discretion may as 
frequently benefit the client as harm him, it does mitigate against the 
equal treatment of equals. Inevitable inequities creep into the 
system. 7 
The plethora of rules and regulations increases administrative 
costs as the time required per case is a function of complexity. 
Local welfare agencies are supposed to follow direc-
tives which may fill a bookshelf 4 feet wide ••• 
To process one welfare applicant in Atlan-ta requires 
as many as 27 different forms; Detroit food stamp 
7Joe1 F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, The "Deserving 
Poor": A study of Welfare Administ:r.ation, Institute for Research on 
Poverty !<tonograph Series, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1971). 
workers are responsible for using about 4Q different 
forms. 8 
11 
Efforts to streamline procedures have been unsuccessful because of the 
failure of all the relevant parties to cooperate. 
The basic structure of the system contributes to a high-rate of 
error in the determination of eligibility and payment levels. That 
errors abound in the AFDC program has been verified by GAO and H~l 
investigations. In April-September, 1973, nationally, errors were in 
41.1% of AFDC cases. Of these, 10.2% of the cases involved payments 
to ineligibles, 22.8% concerned overpayments and 8.1% involved under-
payments. The cost of these errors amounted to 14.6% of total program 
9 
payments. It is probably that large administrative errors are also 
characteristic of other complex transfer programs, but the principle 
target of investigation to date has been AFDC. 
In contrast to administrative error, a very small percentage of 
cases are investigated for fraud and an even smaller number are refer-
red to law enforcement agencies. The amount of undetected fraud is an 
unknown quantity as welfare agencies are generally too overburdened to 
pursue more than a few token cases. Many caseworkers testified before 
the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy that they felt severly constrained 
in dealing with claims that they suspected to be fraudule~t. A combi-
8 
Sharon Galm, ~ cit., p. 5. 
9U•S. Congress, House of Representatives, Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations, ~ cit., p. 29. 
12 
nation of Supreme Court rulings and the increased militancy of welfare 
recipients has made it necessary to undertake expensive and lengthy 
litigation to prove fraud. Even if fraud is proven, the probability 
of collecting from households with few financial resources is small. 
Most potential fraud cases are buried because caseworkers have other 
priorities and officials have concluded that there is little to be 
10 gained by pressing charges. 
Staff Shortages and High Turnover 
public welfare agencies are chronically understaffed and suffer 
from high rates of turnover. Heavy caseloads are common and frequent 
schedule updates add to the burdens of welfare workers. Increases in 
benefit and/or eligibility levels, which are made periodically to keep 
pace with the cost of living, require reviews of the entire caseload. 
The need for such reviews has accelerated recently as benefit levels 
have been altered more frequently as the rate of inflation has increas-
ed. Rule changes unrelated to benefit levels or definitions of the 
eligible population also appear habitually. In many cases, these 
reflect deep Congressional dissatisfaction with the operation of the 
welfare system which has spurred tinkering with its structure in an 
effort to make it work. Another source of administrative burden is 
the irregular income characteristic of the welfare population. Changes 
in income require recalculations of benefits just as do changes in 
10 . t . C . tt S b· . u.S. Congress, Jo~n Econo~c omml.. ee, u conunl..ttee on Fl..scal 
Policy, Problems •.• , ~ cit., pp. 191-193. 
11 benefit schedules or other rules. 
The workers being asked to assume this administrative load are 
typically young, inexperienced, and poorly trained. Most casework-
13 
ers are young college graduates who do not intend to remain in welfare 
work for very long. Training is minimal and primarily of the on-the-
12 
job variety. considering the complexity of what needs to be learn-
ed and retraining of all staff required by changes in policies and 
procedures it is not surprising that there is a high rate of admini-
strative error. 
PERVERSE INCENTIVES 
Barriers !£ the Participation of the Eligible: High 
Participation and Transaction Costs 
In addition to the purposeful discrimination among the poor in-
herent in the categorical aid system, the welfare structure inadver-
tently and inequitably favors the mobile, aggressive and persistent 
eligible over the immobile, the meek and the tired, but equally eligi-
ble poor. The testimony before the Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy of 
Bobbie Poussaint, Director, Community Social Services Program, Depart-
ment of Social Services, New York City Human Resources Administration 
enumerates the high participation costs imposed on some intended bene-
ficiaries. 
11 
Sharon GalIn, ~ ~ 
l2 Ibid., pp. 32-34. 
Joel F. Handler and Ellen Jane Hollingsworth, ~ cit., pp. 
49-51. 
We found that it requires a high degree of sophistication 
and courage on the part of recipients and constnners to enable 
them to obtain benefits to which they are entitled. 
14 
Many such persons have difficulty in even obtaining infor-
mation regarding which benefits are available and what they 
must do in order to obtain them. Many have extreme difficulty 
in negotiating the system after learning about available bene-
fits. 
For example, many of the aged poor find it impossible to take 
advantage of t~e food stamp program because of the extensive and 
expensive traveling involved in order to become eligible for 
this program. Many persons have difficulty utilizing medical 
services under Medicaid for a variety of reasons, primarily, 
due to the location of vendors and the difficulties encoun-
tered in getting to these vendors. 
Many heads of households, particularly one-parent families 
encounter a lack of synchronized effort between child care 
programs, vocati :-~:ll tr.,,!.ining programs, and the income main-
tenance programs. Frequently, they are interested in train-
ing and employment; however they become discouraged when 
either of the aforementioned components becomes dysfunctional. 
The result is a loss 6f interest and increased hostility. 13 
These high participation costs help explain why many welfare programs, 
with no legal limit to the number of recipients, enroll only a frac-
tion of those eligible. 
Work Disincentives: High Marginal Tax Rates and Notches 
While Congress has consistently voiced strong support for work 
incentives for welfare recipients, the actual impact of some indivi-
dual programs and many program packages is precisely the opposite of 
Congressional intent. Policies for individual programs are typically 
considered in isolation from other programs serving the same popula-
tion. This failure to simultaneously consider groups of programs has 
13 C . t . . b' '1 u.s. ongress, JOlon Economloc COIIIIDlottee, su commlottee on Flosca 
Policy, Problems ••• , op~cit., pp. 143-144. 
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led to some bizarre results. For example, increases in Social Secu-
rity benefits may lead to an income loss rather than a gain for in-
tended beneficiaries when such increases lead to reductions in bene-
fits under other programs such as food stamps and/or medicaid. 
Lerman shows that marginal tax rates for individual programs 
typically range from 24-35%; each extra dollar earned is worth only 
65-76 cents -to t.~e recipient because of benefit reductions associated 
with earnings increases. 14 Hausman indicates that combinations of 
programs have much higher rates. An AFDC mother of three benefiting 
from food subsidies, medicaid and public housing faces a marginal tax 
rate of up to 76% on earnings; each additional dollar is worth only 
15 
24 cents. storey notes that a hOl1sehold receiving AFDC, food 
stamps, and public housing faces a marginal tax rate of 85% on earn-
16 
ings. Aaron concurs that marginal tax rates in excess of 67% are 
_"I-' • 17 common for program CO'I~~nat~ons. 
14Robert I. Lerman, "Incentive Effects in Public Income Transfer 
Programs, "Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No.4, Income Transfer 
Programs: ~ They ~ the ~, prepared for the U. S. Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), pp. 1-78. 
l5Leonard J. Hausman, "Cumulative Tax Rates in Alternative Income 
Maintenance Systems," Ibid., pp. 111, 113. 
16 James R. Storey, Studies in public Welfare, Paper No.1, Public 
Income Transfer Programs: The Incidence of Multiple Benefits and the 
Issues Raised Ex. their Receipt, prepared for the U.S. Congress, Joint 
Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 8. 
17Henry J. Aaron, Why is Welfare ~ Hard to Reform?, (Washington, 
D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 33-35. 
16 
At some earnings levels the marginal rate of taxation exceeds 
100% and a "notch" occurs. A notch is a point at which the income 
of a household is actually reduced by increases in earnings because 
losses in program benefits are greater than increments in earnings. 
Notches are common when eligibility for one program is linked to 
another or when program benefits fail to vary with income once eligi-
bility has been ascertained. For example, a one dollar increase in 
earnings may make a household inelgible for medicaid ~lhich may be 
worth $1000 in benefits. In this case, the family loses $999 as a 
result of a small improvement in earnings. Or households which be-
come ineligible for AFDC may suddenly lose benefits from a range of 
other programs if eligibility for the non-AFDC progrru~s is contingent 
upon eligiblity for AFDC. 
While rational analysis of the ab?ve tax structure might lead 
, 
many a program participant to avoid work, Aaron notes that the comple-
xity of the system may inhibit the preception of the high tax rates 
which prevail. "A system with high, but obscure, marginal tax rates 
may deter work less than a system with lower, but clearly visible, tax 
18 
rates." In addition, the link between the perception of various ra-
tes and actual behavior is unclear. However, it may be concluded that 
Congressional attention to individual programs rather than to the combi-
ned impact of program packages has created a formal structure which does 
not strongly reward work effort. This outcome is in direct contradic-
18 
Ibid., pp. 37-38. 
tion to the publically e)~ressed priorities of most Congressmen. 
Work Disincentives: High Potential Benefit Levels 
Benefit levels under the present system may ~xceed full-time 
earnings at the minimum wage. While the typical welfare recipient 
is probably not so fortunate, individuals in states with generous be-
nefits or individuals able to benefit from several programs may enjoy 
17 
incomes well above those of many workers. A staff study for the Sub-
committee on Fiscal Policy analyzed the benefits available from com-
binations of welfare programs in 100 counties for different family ty~' 
pes. These benefit combinations were compared with earnings from 
full-time employment at the minimum and median wage levels in those 
counties. Table III depicts the results of the study for a male-
headed family of four in Multnomah County, Oregon (Portland), in Suf-
folk County, Massachusetts (Boston), a high benefit county, and in 
Bolivar County, Mississippi, a low benefit rural county. 
Table III demonstrates that welfare benefits in high benefit 
counties like Multnomah and Suffolk may exceed earnings at the minimum 
wage, and may even exceed the median county income for males in suf-
folk County. In the 100 counties surveyed, only three southern 
counties had benefit schedules which unambiguously rewarded work ef-
fort across all family types. Table III also illustrates the large 
interstate variations in the treatment of households of identical in-
come and st.ructure. 
TABLE III 
ANNUAL BENEFITS FOR HOUSEHOLD WITH &~LOYABLE HEAD, BY WOIDe STATUS (Ai OF JULY, 1972), HUSBAND, WIFE AND 
TWO CHILDREN, SELECTED COUNTIES 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
COUNTY .lillD WORK UNEMP. TOTAL GENERAL NET CASH 
STATUS OF HEAD EARNINGS INSUR. LuI) TAXES AFDC-U ASSIST. INCOME 
Mu~tnomah, Oregon 
No , .. ork, U.I. benefits 0 1092 0 1458 366 2916 
No work or U.I. benefits 0 0 0 2916 0 2916 
Works 40 hrs. @ $2.00 4000 0 208 0 0 2792 
Earns male median income 7968 0 1168 0 0 6800 
Suffolk, Massachusetts 
No work, U.I. benefits 0 1350 24CR2 1712 721 3807 
No work or U.I. benefits 0 0 24CR2 4075 0 4099 
Works 40 hrs. @ $2.00 4000 0 184 0 0 3816 
Earns male median income 6946 0 869 0 0 6077 
Bolivar, Mississippi 
No \'lork, U. I. benefi ts 0 832 0 0 0 832 
No work or U.I. benefits 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Works 40 hrs. @ $2.00 4000 0 208 0 0 3792 
Earns male median income 3643 0 189 0 0 3454 
~ 
(Xl 
( 7) 
FOOD STAMPS OR 
COMMODITIES 
900 
900 
708 
0 
595 
595 
S95 
o 
1284 
1344 
492 
636 
(8) 
SCHOOL 
LUNCHES 
63 
63 
63 
0 
54 
54 
54 
o 
54 
54 
54 
54 
(9) 
WORK 
EXPENSES 
0 
0 
684 
684 
o 
o 
684 
684 
o 
o 
684 
68,1 
TABLE II! 
(continued) 
(10) 
NET CASll, FOOD AND 
PUBLIC HOUSING 
5057 
505:7 
5604 
7114 
5701 
5972 
5953 
6077 
2170 
1398 
4338 
4144 
(11) 
DISCRETIONARY 
INCOME (10-9) 
5057 
5057 
4920 
6430 
5701 
5972 
5269 
5393 
2170 
1398 
3654 
3460 
(12) 
GROSS TAXlI.BI..E 
EQUIVALENT 
5561 
5561 
5388 
7555 
6345 
6692 
5799 
6131 
2304 
1484 
3881 
3674 
I Derived from Studies in Eublic vlelfare, Paper No. 15, vlelfare in the 70's: A National study of 
Benefits Available in 100 Local Areas, A staff study for the U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committ·ee, 
Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy, (vlashingtoI:, D.C.: U.S. Government printing Office,1974), Tahles 43,53,and 
~6. 
~CR indicates a tax credit. 
..... 
~ 
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It should be noted that Table III indicates the hypothetical 
benefits available in different local areas, rather than the actual 
benefit payments. A crucial question is the extent to which multiple 
program participation prevails among the eligible. In 1973, the Sub-
committee on Fiscal Policy conducted a study of the actual incidence 
of welfare benefits in six of the sites \<1hich the Census Bureau has 
designated as "low income." Of the 1,758 households surveyed, 40% 
received no benefits, 60% received benefits from 1 or more programs, 
40% received benefits from 2 or more programs, 26% received benefits 
from 3 or more programs, 17% received benefits from 4 or more programs, 
11% received benefits from 5 or more programs, and 7% received bene-
19 fits from 6 or more programs. 
While the nationwide incidence of actual benefits received may 
not be generalized from this sample, the results of the subco~nittee's 
study suggest that few households receive all of the benefits to which 
they are entitled. The potentially high benefit levels shown for 
Mu1tnomah and Suffolk Counties in Table III are a result of the cumu-
lative effects of six programs. In the low income areas studied by 
the subcommittee, only 7% of those sampled were actually receiving this 
large number of transfers. In sum, while potential benefits in some 
states are very high, actual benefits are not, on the average. Two 
factors are undoubtedly important in explaining why the eligible fail 
19studies in Public Welfare, Additional Material for Paper No.6: 
How Public Welfare Benefits are Distributed in LO~-Income Areas, A 
Staff study for the u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcom-
mittee on Fiscal Policy, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973), p. 95. 
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to participate in particular programs. One is that the supply of 
some public transfers like public housing is severely limited. Other 
factors, discussed above, are the high information and transaction 
costs imposed on the eligible by complex, uncoordinated programs. 
FamHy Break-Up 
The economic incentive for a family to break-up varies with 
family size, family earnings, arid the number and structure of welfare 
benefits available in particular local areas. Family splitting in-
centives are especially marked in states where AFDC payments are re-
stricted to female-headed households. While about 50% of the states 
permit cash payments to families with unemployed male heads, Public 
Assistance benefits are unavailable to households headed by employed 
males. Thus the "working poor" intact family is excluded from cash 
benefit programs, although such households are eligible for many in-
k " d 20 ~n programs. As is the case with the work issue, the overt ob-
jectives of public policy are diametrically opposed to the incentives 
created by the actual structure of programs. 
EXPLANATION FOR CHAOS? WELFARE POLITICS 
While there is widespread agreement on the desirability of wel-
fare reform, consensus disintegrates when particular proposals for 
20Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 15, Welfare in the 70's 
~ National Study of Benefits Available in 100 Local Areas, A staff 
study for the U.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee 
on Fiscal Policy, (vlashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1974), p. 39. 
change are introduced. In a lengthy analysis of the failure on the 
Nixon Administration's proposed Family Assistance Plan, Moynihan dis-
cusses the quite opposite attitudes of those who are equally appalled 
21 
by the existing system. While some denounce the current system as 
ungenerous and demeaning to recipients, others find it outrageously 
expensive and "soft" on the poor. Those generally labeled "conser-
vative" demand work requirements, fraud investigations, tough eligi-
bility teste, and modest benefits. "Liberals" request higher bene-
fit levels, liberalized eligibility requirements, eligibility deter-
mination by self-declaration rather than investigation, respect for 
the privacy of program participants, and flexible work-requirements, 
if any. 
22 
This range of opinion is reflected in Congress where substantive 
compromises are essential to avoid paralysis. The process of nego-
tiation between parties in such fundament.::tl disagreement leads to 
programs which are flawed from their inception. The blurring of ob-
jectives and the contradictory provisions required to obtain consensus 
create enumerable administrative difficulties. Once begun, programs 
develop their own momentum and are rarely subject to rigorous evalua-
tion. Pressure to maintain existing benefits are very strong from 
the "public" attached to on-going programs. A program's "public" in-
cludes not only its direct beneficiaries, but its bureaucracy and sym-
21naniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of ~ Guaranteed Income: The 
Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan, (New York: Vin-
tage Books, 1973). 
23 
pathetic pressure groups as well. David A. stockman, who is Execu-
tive Director of the Republican Conference in the U.s. House of Re-
presentatives, contends that Congressmen become coopted by the programs 
they are ostensibly charged with evaluating. The political advantages 
of having benefits to distribute "back home" transform' Congressmen 
into lobbyists for ever greater social welfare budgets. Even Congress-
men initially opposed to a particular program, tend to scramble for 
benefits for their districts and encourage program expansion once the 
22 
program is established. In SUnl',. the political environment of wel-
fare inhibits the rationalization of public transfer programs despite 
the strong consensus that exists that major reform is essential. 
22 
David A. stockman, "The Social Pork Barrel," The Public In-
terest, XXXIX, (Spring, 1975), pp. 3-30. 
CHAPTER II 
WELFARE THEORY AND THE IMPLICATIONS OF UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE 
Introduction 
The political and administrative pressures mitigating against 
the equitable and efficient operation of the welfare system have been 
detailed in ChRpter I. This chapter will outline some of the major 
controversial theoretical issues regarding redistribution that have 
plagued welfare economists. Standards for measuring the efficacy 
of public policies with redistributive objectives have generally been 
phrased in terms of elusive abstractions such as "equity", "the pub-
lic interest," and "social justice" which are rarely operationalized. 
The rigorous evaluation of public welfare programs has lagged behind 
the evaluation of other governmental endeavors, in part, because of 
the uncertainty over appropriate objectives in the area of redistri-
bution. How much should be transferred to whom, from whom, under 
what conditions, and in what form, are the fundamental questions that 
welfare theory must add:cess. Welfare theory has not provided un-
ambiguous normative responses to these questions, nor has it offered 
a well-developed positive theory to explain the observed amount and 
form of redistribution. 1 
IHarold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Utility Interdepen-
dence and Income Transfers through Charity," in Kenneth E. Boulding, 
Martin Pfaff and Anita Pfaff, editors, Transfers in ~ Urbanized 
Economy: ~eories and Effects of the Grants Economy, (Belmont: 
Wadsworth Publishing Co., Inc., 1973), pp. 63-77. 
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FROM THE SOCIAL "WELFARE "FUNCTI.ON TO UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE 
Economists have traditionally viewed allocation and distribution 
as conceptually distinct functions of the public sector. 2 Alloca-
tional decisions were characterized as fundamentally technical, while 
distributional choices were seen as normative. Thus efficie~cy and 
equity determinations were divorced from one another. The widely 
accepted benchmark for measuring the efficiency of allocational op-
tions is the Paretian rule. A change in economic conditions is jud-
ged "Pareto Optimal" (efficient\good) if, and only if, the welfare of 
some individual is improved without the welfare of anyone else being 
diminished. Despite the efforts to separate efficiency criteria 
from ethical issues, the Paretian rule is not value-free. It posits 
that everyone count and that, therefore, no one ought to be made worse 
off. other value premises would lead to other rules. The efficien-
cyjequity dichotomy has also been weakened by the growing acknowledg-
ment that public policies which ostensibly have only allocational re-
percussions frequently alter the distribution of resources between in-
dividuals or groups as well. 
Transfers which redistribute resources from some members of so-
ciety to others have traditionally been viewed as confiscatory; one 
man's gain necessitated another man's loss. The utility functions of 
individuals were specified as independent of one another in line with 
2Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgrave~ Public Finance in 
Theory and practice, (New York: Mc Graw-Hil1, Inc., 1973), pp. 6-14. 
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the classical characterization of ueconomic man II as selfish in his 
motivation and behavior. While the self-interested actions of in-
dividuals in the market were presunted to have socially beneficial re-
sults, the utility of individual A did not enter into the utility func-
tion of individual B or vice versa. Therefore, transfers could not 
be fitted into the Paretian schema since the donor would presumably be 
made "worse off" by his donation. 
To explain transfers, and to guide redistributional decisions, 
welfare economists resorted to a social welfare function. The social 
welfare function specifies the weights which should be given to the 
welfare derived by various individuals -- it identifies society's 
"winners" and "losers". As such, the social welfare function demands 
interpersonal comparisons of utility and requires a collective rather 
than an individualistic conceptualization of society.3 Determination 
of the "best" social welfare function remains beyond the boundaries of 
micro-economic theory which is based on consumer sovereignty. Self-
interested trade in the competitive market is presumed to benefit all; 
the specification of trade-offs between the welfare of individuals is 
alien to this tradition and cannot satisfy the Paretian criterion. As 
a result, most economists have treated the social welfare function as 
exogenous in their analyses of efficiency in the provision of public 
goods. The specification of the social welfare function was viewed as 
essentially a philosophical or political matter rather than an econo-
3Francis m. Bator, uThe Simple Analytics of Welfare Maximization," 
The American Economic Review, XLVII, (March, 1957), pp. 22-59. 
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mic issue. 
Some elegant models of voting behavior and political parties 
have been developed by Arrow, Downs, and Buchanan and Tullock in an 
effort to solve the problem of aggregating individual preferences into 
. 4 
a social welfare funct~on. However, the opportunities for strate-
gic behavior (the masking of preferences), the costs of political 
participation and the ambiguity or intransitivity of results in large 
group multi-issue representative political systems have precluded a 
definitive solution to the problem of moving from the individual to 
the collective. In the end, political analysts have generally re-
sorted to a logrolling model to describe the public policy-making pro-
cess in formally da~ocratic nations. While conflicts between indi-
viduals or groups may make it impossible to reach consensus on specific 
issues, considered in isolation, vote trading permits agreernent on 
packages of issues. vote trading allows variations in the intensity 
of preferences on particular issues to be reflected in the political 
process. However, precisely what is maximized through the political 
system r~~ains un~lear. The search for more ~ffecti ve >'lays of aggre-
gating demand con-tinues. 
Welfare theory fowldered for many years in an effort to reconcile 
the collectivist requirements of a social welfare flAnction with t.he 
4Kenneth J. Arrow, pocial Cheice and Individual Values, 2nd ed., 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 19631. 
James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent, 
(Ann Arbor: The universityofMichiganPress,-1963). 
Anthony DOwns,~_ Economic Theory of Democracy, (New York: 
Harper and Row, 1957). 
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individualistic basis of the rest of economic theory. Hochman and 
Rodgers ~de a major effort to break the bottleneck. In exploring 
the possibilities of utility interdependence, they attempted to inte-
gra·te redistribution into micro-theory and erase the divisions be-
tween allocation and distribution, efficier.cyand equity.5 They de-
monstrate how the Paretian schema may require redistribution if indi.-
vidual utility functions are benevolently interdependent. In con-
trast to the Robin Hood view of transfers which has dominated econo-
mics, Hochman and Rodgers indicate that redistribution may not be a 
zero-sum game. In a two-person economy, redistribution may improve 
everyone's position if two individuals, we.a+thy Mutt and indigent Jeff 
(to use the authors' examples) derive satisfaction from both their own 
income and each others' income. 
(2) = fJ(Y ,Y ) 
M J 
In other words, 
where UM and YM are Mutt's utility index and income, and UJ and YJ 
are the corresponding values for ~ff. In this model the income of 
f.lutt is treated as an ext.ernality for Jeff and vice versa. As such, 
the specification of trade-offs between the welfare of individuals 
(the social welfare function) becomes unnecessary. Mutt will volun-
tarily agree to transfer to Jeff up to the point where the marginal 
increase in f.1utt' s utility derived from an increase in Jeff's income 
5Harold M.Hoclunan andJamesD.Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redis-
tribution,1I The American EconomicRevie~l, LIXr [September, 1969), pp. 
542-557. 
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equals the narginal increase in Mutt's utility derived from increases 
in his mm income. 
As with other social goods, when consideration turns from the 
two-person to the n-person case, government action is required to 
circumvent the IIfree rider ll problem and compel transfers. Presumably 
Mutt's utility would increase if Jeff's transfer originated in some 
other wealthy Mutt's pocket, rather than in his own. Therefore, it 
would be to Mutt's advantage to conceal his preferences for transfers 
and to IIfree ride. 1I In addition, if there are many poor Jeffs, Mutt 
will undoubtedly recognize the futility of significantly improving the 
welfare of the poor through his contribution alone. Thus the Mutts 
would rationally elect to compel themselves to make redistributive 
transfers through ~~eir government. 
Hochman and Rodgers' assumption of benevolent utility interdepen-
der~ce has some empirical support from the existence of private charity 
(about $12 billion per year).6 It is reasonable to assume that there 
is a declining marginal utiljty of income and that at some high con-
sumption level, increments in another's income may be willingly substi-
tuted for increments in one's own consumption. In an inter-urban in-
vestigation, Hochman and Rodgers found sig'nificant positive correlations 
between charitable contributions in a city with the city's income and 
the city's ir,come dispers~otl'~ 7 
6Richard Musgrave, "Pareto Optimal Redistribut.ion: Com:nent/IlThe 
Americ~ Economic:: Ravi.ew, LX, (December, 1~701, pp. 991-993. 
7Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Utility Interdependence 
and Income Transfers through Charity," ~ cit. 
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GOODS-SPECIFIC UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE: THE CASE OF '.MERIT GOODS 
Hochman and Rodgers initially considered only cash transfers, 
but in a later comment, they indicated that their analysis could ap-
propriately be applied to merit goods. 8 Merit goods 'are public goods 
unlike "pure" social goods, in that they entail neither joint consump-
tion nor exclusion difficulties. They are goods which could be pro-
vided by the market, but, if left to the market, are undersupplied or 
underconsumed because soci~l benefits exceed private benefits. For 
example, an individual may elect not to invest in education but the so-
ciety has an interest in compelling him to do so. In an effort to 
internalize these sorts of externalities, particular goods and services 
(i.e. food, education, medical care) may enler the public sector 
through subsidy, regulation and/or public provision. 
Merit goods are something of an anomaly in economic theory, al-
though in real life they are an extremely popular form of transfer. 
Musgrave notes that micro-theory based on assumptions of consumer 50-
vereignty has a difficult time incorporating the merit good concept 
since the explicit purpose of a merit good is to interfere with consu-
9 
mer choice. Economists have attempted to cope with merit goods in 
several ways. Merit g09ds' may be considered as the imposition'of elite 
8Harold M. Hochman and James D. Rodgers, "Pareto Optimal Redis-
tribution: Reply,',' ~ American Economic Review, LX (December, 1970), 
pp. 997-1002. 
9Richard A. Musgrave, "Provision for Social Goods," in public 
Economics, ~ cit., pp. 124-144. 
Richard A. Musgrave and Peggy B. Musgravei~cit., p. 81. 
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preferences concerning the appropriate consumption patterns on the 
rest of the world or merit goods may be justified as a protection for 
the individual who may not be informed about the consequences of his 
actions. In these cases, individual welfare and consumption prefer-
ences are not identical. IO In addition, certain population sub-groups 
such as the senile or insane may be judged incompetent to make their 
own decisions. These kinds of explanations for merit goods are es-
sentially paternalistic and remain outside of micro-theory with its 
individualistic assumptions. 
If merit goods are viewed in the context of utility interdepen-
dence, then they may be incorporated into traditional economic analysis 
in which the efficient allocation of goods is related to individual 
choice. Buchanan concludes that individualistic norms are consistent 
with transfers in-kind (merit goods) and that general cash transfers 
are not politically viable. 
The evidence seems to indicate that general redistribution 
of purchasing power, or even general change in the relative 
levels of well-being is not widely desired. Instead members 
of the public want and express through their behavior patterns, 
relief for specific spending patterns. 
This expression of individual preferences can be brought 
within the general analysis of externalities. The mere fact 
that some members of the community are poor does not, in and 
of itself, normally impose an external diseconomy on many of 
the remaining members. What does impose such an internal 
diseconomy is the way that certain persons behave when they 
are poor. It is not the low income of the family down the 
street that bothers most of us; it is the fact that the 
family lives in a dilapidated house and dresses its children 
in rags that imposes on our sensibilities. And we are 
willing to pay something to remove this external effect; it 
10Abram Bergson, "On Social Welfare Once More", in'Essays in Nor-
mative Economics, Abram Bergson, editor, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press, 
1966), pp. 51-90. 
is relevant for behavior. Ordinary citizens are pro-
bably quite unwilling ·to finance substantial transfers 
of general purchasing power to the poor in their com-
munities. But they are probably willing to finance 
specific transfers, either directly as income-in-kind 
or indirectly in purchasing power that is earmarked 
for specific items of spending (vouchers}.ll 
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Buchanan's position is supported by the emphasis on in-kind transfers 
in public welfare programs discussed in Chapter I. Further evidence 
of the popularity of in-kind transfers is provided by Daly and Giertz 
who observe that charitable institutions receive their income pri-
marily in cash, but redistribute it largely in the form of illiquid 
d " 12 commo ~ t~es. Moynihan also provides extensive documentation of 
the public resistance to cash income redistribution strategies. 13 
Subsidies of particular goods and services pose problems 
analagous to those of selective taxation. By altering the rela-
tive prices of goods, there are important substitution and in-
cQme effects related to the restructuring of the choices confron-
ting the consumer. An exception to the rule occurs when the price 
elasticity of the goods in question is equal to zero -- in this 
case there are no substitution effects. General cash transfers 
like income taxes (positive or negative) also distort choice, 
but the distortion is between work and leisure rather than between 
IlJames M. Buchanan, "What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want?" 
Economica, (May, 1968), pp. 189-190. 
12George Daly and Fred Giertz, "Welfare Economics and Welfare 
Reform," The American Economic Review, LXII, (March, 1972} , p •. 131. 
13Daniel P. Moynihan, The Politics of ~ Guaranteed Income: 
The Nixon Administration and the Family Assistance Plan, (New York: 
Vintage Books, 1973). 
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particula~ goods (except in cases where the demand for particular 
goods is income elastic}. In general, in the case of subsidization 
of a particular good or service, there is a "henefit shortfall" analo-
gous to the "excess burden" created by specific taxation. If the 
public supply of a subsidized good is greater than what consumers would 
have purchased, given a free choice and a general subsidy, then there 
is a benefit shortfall. 14 
Both in-kind and cash transfers may be considered in the context 
of utility interdependence. This interdependence may logically take 
several forms. Interdependence may be benevolent or malevolent; it 
may be related to income in general (as in the Hochman and Rodgers 
model) or it may be related to the consumption or non-consumption of 
specific goods. In addition, interdependence may be related to charac-
teristics of both donors and recipients other than income or prefer-
red consumption patterns. 
Daly and Giertz have indicated that in a two-person economy, the 
following interdependent relationships may exist between a wealthy and 
an impoverished individual (3-6 below).15 For the sake of continuity, 
Hochman and Rodger's terminology -- rich Mutt and poor Jeff -- will be 
used. 
(3) If ~U~::> 0 
dU 
and = 0 
14Richard A. Musgrave and pe.ggy B. Musgrave, cp. cit., p. 460. 
l5George Daly and Fred··J w Giertz, "Benevolence, Malevolence, and 
Economic Theory," Public . Choice, XIII, (Fall, 1972), pp. 1-19. 
George Daly and Fred J. Giertz, "Welfare Economics and Welfare 
Reform, II ~ cit. 
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then a "utility externality" exists. oM is Muttls.utility ~unction, 
uJ is Jeff's utility function, and x~ is Je~f' s consumption of the ith 
~ 
good. In this case Jeff's utility index appears in Mutt's utility 
function, while Jeff's consumption of particular goods does not. This 
is similar to Hochman and Rodgers' model (1-2 above) except that Hoch-
man and Rodgers assume that the relationship between Mutt and Jeff is 
reciprocal while Daly and Giertz specify it as one-way. 
(4) If dUM duM 
-:>'0 and 
dUJ 
0 
dX~ 
~ 
then a "goods externality" exists. Mutt's utility is related to Jeff's 
consumption of a particular good while it is independent of Jeff's ge-
neral level of well-being. In both (3) and (4) transfers from Mutt 
to Jeff would be Pareto optimal, since both Mutt and Jeff would benefit 
from redistribution. (It is assumed that increases in Jeff's con'-
sumption of X. increase Jeff's utility). 
~ 
While (3) suggests a cash 
transfer, (4) implies that a transfe:r-in-kind may be more efficient. 
Wheuher or not a transfer-in-kind will in fact be the superior solu-
tion depends not only on the presence of a "goods externality." The 
efficiency of an in-kind transfer hinges on the original consumption 
pattern of the recipient, on the magnitude of the "goods externality", 
on the price and income elasticity of the good, and on the transaction 
costs associated with the trans~er form. These issues will be dis-
cussed in detail below. 
While (1-4) assume benevolent interdependence, it is possible 
that interdependence is malevolent. Specifically, Mutt and Jeff's re-
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lationship may have the follow~ng forms. 
(5) duM <0 
J 
dV 
" 
In this case, improvements in Jeff~s utility lead to a decline in that 
of Mutt. 
(6) duM <: 0 
J 
dX 
i 
In this case, Jeff's consumption of a particular good imposes an ex-
ternal diseconomy on Mutt. 
While the existence of private charity and public welfare pro-
grams are evidence in favor of benevolent interdependence, observations 
of real world behavior may also support a case for malevolent inter-
dependence. Mutt's perception of his own well-being may hinge, in 
part, on his knowledge of Jeff's poverty. Income differentials are a 
major way of assigning status in society and one's social status is re-
16 levant to one's sense of worth. Malevolence may also be goods spe-
cific, as in equatio~ (6). Mutt's enjo'~ent of his Mercedes may be 
diminished by Jeff's consumption of a similar vehicle. In addition, 
diseconomies related to the consumption of particular goods may involve 
cases other than envy; equation (6) may hold when the private con sump-
tion of particular goods (i.e. gambling, prostitution, drugs, communi-
16 
Lee Rainwater, What Money Buys: Inequality and the Social 
Meaning of Income (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1974). 
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cable diseases} inwoses external costs on the la~ger society. 
In a two-person economy, the relationsmp between Mutt and Jeff 
is fairly simple. Moving to an n-person society creates several pro-
blems in addition to the "free rider" dilenuna. The willingness of 
the haves to transfer to the have-nots may hinge not only on the in-
come and goods consumption patterns of the poor, but on their non-eco-
nomic characteristics as well. For example, donors may support trans-
fers to the "honest"· poor while rejecting them for the "lazy" poor or 
for "welfare cheats". They may be willing to transfer quality edu-
cation to poor whites but not to poor blacks. They may be sympathetic 
to the plight of the elderly, blind, or handicapped indigent, while 
disinterested in the struggle of a working father to support his family 
(In low wages. In fact, the extreme complexity of our present welfare 
system reflects precisely such an effort to differentiate between the 
"deserving" and the "undeserving" poor. 
THE EFFECTS OF TRANSFER MODES ON CONSUMPTION PATTERNS 
17 18 Olsen and Orr have both explored the relationship between 
transfer forms and the consumption patterns of the poor. In the case 
of housing, Orr assumes that a "goods externality" is present -- that 
17Edgar O. Olsen, "Some Theorems in the Theory of Efficient Trans-
fers," The Journal of Political EconOmll, LXXIX, (January/February, 1971). , 
PI" 166-176. 
18Larry Orr; ·The Welfare Economics of Housing for the ~, Dis-
cussion Paper 33-60, (Madison: Institute for Research on poverty, The 
University of Wisconsin, December, 1968). 
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the donors' utility is related to the recipient's consumption of stan-
dard housing. Orr compares the consumption effects of cash trans-
fers, housing vouchers (cash payments tied to the consumption of at 
least standard quality housing) and public housing (assumed to equal 
the lowest cost standard housing). Figure lA demonstrates the im-
pact of various amounts and forms of transfers, assuming that the in-
difference map of the recipient is known and that all transfer forms 
entail identical administrative costs. The horizontal axis measures 
housing consumption, H, while the vertical axis measures the consump-
tion of all other goods, Y-H. YO-HO is the original budget line. 
An unconditional cash grant would shift the budget line to YI-HI' H 
is the cost of standard housing. A voucher requiring t~e consumption 
of housing of at least H would result in a new broken budget line 
YOabHI • Public housing which presents the recipient with an all-or-
nothing choice res~£ts in the original budget line YO-HO plus the sin-
gle point b. Given the budget constraints and indifference map in Fi-
gure lA, in the absence of a transfer, the household would consume 
substandard housing at H' and enjoy utility II' Receipt of either the 
voucher or public housing would raise its consumption to H and its 
utility to 12, An unrestricted cash subsidy would result in the 
household remaining in substandard housing, H", but at utility 13" In 
this example, the welfare of the recipient would be maximized by an 
unrestricted cash grant. However, if the nonpoor derive benefits from 
the consumption of standard housing by the poor, then the other two 
subsidy schemes may be warranted. While the recipient prefers cash, 
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19Ibid• 
VJ 
OJ 
39 
all three schemes would be acceptable to him, since all involve an 
improvement over pre-transfer conditions. 
Orr indicates that the impact of the various transfer modes 
depends on the initial income of the potential recipients, as he 
assumes that housing consumption is income-elastic. Figure lB de-
picts a situation in which the household will reject both the vou-
cher and public housing as both would demand too large a proportion 
of the budget being devoted to housing. In this case, a change in 
pre-transfer housing consumption H', to housing consumption H de-
manded by the voucher and public housing, would result in a decline 
in utility from 11 to 10• An unrestricted cash transfer would raise 
utility to I but would increase housing consumption only slightly 
2 
to H". In this case, the in-kind transfer would fail to attain its 
objective of increasing the housing consumption of the poor since 
the intended beneficiary would reject 'the transfer and his housing 
consumption would consequently remain unaltered. 
A different result is obtained for households at higher in i-
tial income levels. In Figure Ie, the unrestricted cash grant and 
the voucher have the same effect. Housing consumption will move be-
yond standard to H" and utility will move from II to 13• Public 
housing will result in both lower housing consumption, H, and lower 
utility, I2 than the other transfer forms. In this case, public hou-
sing is clearly the inferior solution, unless the external benefits 
derived by the nonpoor from the poor's consumption of housing cease at 
the minimal level of standard housing. Increments beyond this point 
may be viewed by the nonpoor as excessive. From the view of the re-
40 
cipient, vouchers are equivalent to ca~ when the household wishes to 
spend more on housing than the value of the voucher. 
'l'lle preceding analysis has focused on the demand side of the 
transfer problem. However, frequently supply conditions have been as 
important in the selection of transfer modes. In some cases, in-kind 
transfers have been aimed not so much at "correcting" consumer choice, 
as at "correcting" market failure on the supply side. Tobin indicates 
that the crucial issue in determining whether in-kind O~ cash transfers 
are optimal is the elasticity of supply of the commodity in question. 
When the supply of a basic necessity of life is fixed or unresponsive 
to demand in·the short-run, then in-kind transfers may be preferred; 
the transfer of generalized purchasing power would not be meaningful 
to the recipient if the market failed to provide him with the goods he 
. d 20 requ~re • The subsidization of demand when supply is inelastic, as 
in the case of medical care, may lead to rapid price escalation, in-
21 
stead of (or in conjunction with) increases in consumption. 
Even when there are supply bottlenecks, in-kind aid to the poor, 
may not be the most efficient approach to the problem. Governmental 
intervention in the market to alter supply conditions may take several 
forms, just as there are many ways of approaching demand. For example, 
Welfeld has suggested, in relation to housing, that subsidies that 
20James Tobin, "On Limiting the Domain of Inequality," The 
Journal of ~ and Economics, (1970), pp. 263-277. 
21Edward R. Fried, Alice M. Rivlin,Charles.L •. Schultze, and 
Nancy H. Teeters; Setting NaticnalPricrities: . ~.!2Z! Budget, 
(Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1973), pp. 109-129. 
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are not targeted speci:f;ica11y at low-income groups may actually create 
more housing for the poor through. the expansion of the housing supply. 
This is because such la.rge subsidies per dwelling unit are required for 
low-income households that the impact of such subsidies on the housing 
inventory is small. 
22 
may be preferred. 
A more general stimulation of thn housing market 
CRITICISMS OF THE UTILITY INTERDEPENDENCE FRAMEWORK 
While the development of the theoretical implications of utility 
interdependence may be vital to more effective public policy-making, 
there are numerous practical difficulties in translating theoretical 
concepts into actual public welfare programs. The "free rider" pro-
b1em has been mentioned above. In addition, all interdependence models 
assume a uniformity of tastes with regard to redistribution within in-
come classes. A system of taxation which is feasible to administer 
requires a uniform treatment of those in each income bracket. Peg-
ging taxation to each individua1's marginal evaluation of the transfer 
would encourage the masking of preferences and entail large administra-
23 
tive costs. If the marginal rate of taxation exceeds the marginal 
increment in utility derived from a transfer for one or more individuals 
in a given income class, the transfer cannot, by definition, be Pareto 
optimal. This problem is common to all public goods -- citizens are 
22Irving H.. We1feld, "Toward a New Federal Housing policy," The 
Public Interest, XIX, (Spr ing, 19701, pp. 31-44 . 
23George M. Furstenberg and Dennis C. Mueller, "The Pareto Optimal 
Approach to Income Redistribution: A Fiscal Application," The American 
Economic Review, LXI, (September, 1971), pp. 628-637. 
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frequently confronted with. a tax/service package whic~may be satis-
factory to the "average" household in a given income class, but which 
many others, in the same bracket, find objectionable. 
Efforts to justify specific public decisions in which some indi-
viduals are clearly "losers" generally result in a logrolling model of 
democratic policy-making and a defense of majority rule. 
• • • while majority rule might be unacceptable if outcomes 
are evaluated in single-issue terms, it is compatible with 
democracy if they are construed as episodes in a convergence 
process, itself having the essential properties of logrolling. 
Even under the Paretian ethic, majority rule may be satis-
factory, given appropriate preference patt~=ns, because the 
overall outcome is preferred to the inaction that would 
result from issue-by-isBue judgements constrained by the 
Pareto criterion.24 
While logrolling permits a rough reflection of differences in the inten-
sity of preferences of different individuals on specific issues, Mishan 
warns that after vote trading, the entire package of decisions may 
result in no net transfer, even if some of the individual components 
f th k d ' t 'b t' 25 o e pac age are re ~s r~ u ~ve. Von Furstenberg and Mueller 
concur that if redistribution is not separated from vote trading on 
allocational issues, it is likely that redistribution will be compro-
mised. If majority rule is the imposition of an "elite" (the winners) 
on the minority (the losers) then the argument has come full circle 
24 
Harold M. Hochman, "Individual preferences and Distributional 
Adjustment," The American Economic Review, LXII, (.May, 1972), pp. 
353-360. 
25E•J • Mishan, "'rheFutility of Pareto-Efficient Distribution, \I 
The American Economic Review, LXII, (December, 1972), pp. 971-976. 
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and interpersonal comparisons of utility and a social welfare function 
are required. 
• • • a meaningful program of redistribution, with the 
welfare of the poor improving relative to the rich, can 
only be achieved through a Pareto-optimal tax-transfer 
program if all transferors approved of the amount and 
form in which redistribution would be carried out at 
different tax shares. Barring this, redistribution al-
ways involves the imposition of a program by some elite, 
if it is to be effective. Conversely, strict enforce-
ment of the Pareto criterion under such conditions re-
sults in the preservation of the status ~ ante. with 
a less than universal desire fo~ making transfers, the 
main objective tends to be thwarted as potential losers 
must be compensated via logrolling. 26 
The impact of transfers on the intended beneficiaries may also 
vary within income classes because of differences in taste among 
those who are equally poor. Figures lA-C demonstrate the effects of 
various housing subsidy schemes on recipients with different preferen-
ces for housing consumption. As noted above, a cash transfer will be 
universally accepted by the poor, while in-kind transfers will be re-
jected by those intended beneficiaries whose "costs" of altering their 
consumption patterns exceed the "benefits" they would derive from ad-
ditional housing consumption (Figure l~). While Figures lA-C assume 
that taste for housing is a simple function of income, there may be 
significant differences in preferences for housing and other goods be-
tween those in the same income class. For example, most public pro-
grams assume that family size is a relevant variable and many take 
into account the age and s,ex of the family head. other social, psy-
26 
George M. Von Furstenbe,rg and Dennis C. Mueller, .~ cit. 
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chological, and economic variables may also be relevant to consumption 
patterns. 
If donors wish to insure an increase in the consumption of a par-
ticular good, such as standard housing or nutritious food, price discri-
mination within an income class will logically be required. Those 
individuals with a low desire to consume standard housing or nutritious 
food, will require a lower price (a bigger bribe/subsidy) to alter 
their consumption than will those of similar income with a stronger 
preference for these goods. Those with the least taste for the speci-
fied good will be those least likely to accept an in-kind transfer 
and will be those with the lowest pre-transfer level of consumption 
and therefore, those creating the greatest externalities for the non-
poor. Thus, in the absence of price discrimination, the "wrong" con-
sumers are likely to be the beneficiaries of in-kind transfers, parti-
cularly when the supply of the transfer is limited. The price discri-
mination problem is analogous to the tax discrimination problem which 
results from the existence of donors with heterogeneous tastes for re-
distribution; policies which are uniform within an income class will 
27 
confront some intended recipients with the "wrong" price. While 
the administrative problems caused by attempting to tune social programs 
to non-income related differences are enormous, ignoring these differ-
27George Daly and Fred J. Giertz, "Welfare Economics and Welfare 
Reform," ~ cit. 
Larry Orr I 9i'...!.. cit. 
Mark V. Pauly, "Efficiency in the provision of Consumption 
Subsidies," Kyklos, XXUI, Fasc. 1, (l970I, pp. 33-57. 
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ences would lead to a violation of the Paretian standard and/or un-
intended policy impacts. 
In addition to the problem of intraclass differences in taste, 
the impact of the transfer mode may be affected by significant dis-
parities in administrative costs related to the subsidy form. While 
strong "goods externalities" may imply that in-kind transfers are to 
be preferred over cash, in-kind transfers may still be inefficient if 
the costs of the bureaucracy required to administer such transfers 
exceed the benefits to be derived from that mode. While there has 
been little empirical investigation of the problem, it is generally 
assumed that in-kind transfers are more expensive to administer than 
cash. As Figures lA-C reveal, cash transfers are expected to have 
a less potent impact on the consumption of specific goods than are 
transfers in-kind (unless the in-kind transfer is rejected). However, 
a cash transfer will still have some positive impact on the consump-
tion of the specific good, if the good is normal or superior. The 
extent of the impact depends on the income elasticity of the good. 
In some cases, (Figure IC), a cash transfer will result in greater 
consumption of the good than will an all-or-nothing in-kind transfer. 
In sum, the appropriateness of a given transfer mode will depend on 
the effect of the transfer on consumption patterns, the form and inten-
sity of the donors desires for various types of transfers, and the ad-
ministrative cos.ts associated with the transfer form. 
For the theoretical implications of utility interdependence to 
be relevant to publi.c policy-making, a great deal of information is 
required about preference patterns. Mishan cites the inability to 
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operationalize the concepts as. one o~ his principal objections to the 
utility interdependence argument. 
In a community consisting of some scores of millions 
of adults, knowledge of the requisite pattern of in-
terdependence is for all practical purposes unattain-
able. 28 
To fit the Paretian criterion, each person must individually benefit. 
Thus detailed information about each person is necessary to insure the 
consent of everyone involved. Even if such information could be gath-
ered, the costs of such an undertaking might well outweigh the benefits 
of any scheme adopted. 
In addition to these practical problems, Mishan and Musgrave 
both question the validity of the entire concept of treating distribu-
tional decisions in a Paretian context. Mishan contends that redis-
tribution may be judged Pareto optimal only if the pre-transfer distri-
bution of income is taken as given. Since the pre-transfer distribu-
tion is only one of a virtually infinite number of distributions that 
might have occurred with the same resource base, the choice of the 
pre-tax distribution on which to base transfers is a matter of ethics v 
not a matter of efficiency. Accepting the prevailing income distri-
bution as given involves non--Paretian criteria and, in effect, legi-
timizes the prevailing power relationships. In essence, the problem 
29 
becomes one of social contract determination. 
28 
E.J. Mishan, .~ cit., p. 973. 
29 
Ibid., p. 974. 
Richard Musgrave, "Pareto Optimal Redistribution: Comment," 
~ cit. 
Hochman concedes some of the points made by Mishan and Musgrave. 
• • • the Paretian logic may be able to explain significant 
aspects of distributional choice, they do not define or pro-
duce "social justice". After all Pareto-optimal transfers, 
the community must still choose, somehow, among a residual 
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set of Pareto-optimal distributions, each of which corres-
ponds to a different system of rules and rights to property 
and human capital. No one of these distributions is uniqqel¥y 
optimal, and each, potentially, is Pareto efficient. Still, 
once the argument is brought this far, consideration should 
be given to the usefulness of extending the Paretian line of 
reasoning to the constitutional level of abstraction at 
which rights and rules themselves are determined. 3D 
Another complication in the utility interdependence argument is 
introduced by Polinsky. He indicates that the utility interdependence 
medels deal only with marginal Pareto optimal redistribution. Polinsky 
contends that there are cases when redistribution is Pareto optimal 
beyond the margin when income transfers would be rejected on the basis 
of marginal considerations. For example, Mutt giving Jeff a dollar 
may have such a limited impact on changing Jeff's consumption pattern 
or utility that Mutt would consider the investment a poor one. Jeff 
may waste the dollar, from Mutt's point of view, by spending it on 
liquor, etc. However, if Mutt gave Jeff several thousand dollars, Jeff 
might become an upstanding member of the community, pleasing both reci-
pient and donor. Polinsky concludes that individual shorts~ghtedness 
will generally not result in the perception of Pareto optimal points 
beyond the margin and that a case for governmental coercion may be made. 
3DHarold M. Hochman, ~ cit., p. 355. 
31 
A. Mitchell Polip.sky, "Shortsightedness and Nonmarginal Pareto 
Optimal Redistribution," The American Economic Review, LXI, (December, 
1971), pp. 972-979. 
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In assuming that government will be able to respond, while 
individuals cannot, Polinsky ignores the strong tendency for govern-
32 
mental decision-making to be conservative in the extreme. Lindblom 
maintains, "Usually • • • though not always, what is feasible politi-
cally is policy only incrementally, or marginally, different from 
existing policies. ,,33 When last year's budget is the best guide to 
this year's budget, it is as unrealistic to expect official policy-
makers to leap beyond the margin, as it is to expect private indi-
viduals to do so. 
The theoretical development of the utility interdependence 
argument suggests the importance of empirical investigations which 
might verify the existence of hypothesized interdependence and to 
trace its patterns. Despite the significance of the criticism of 
the utility interdependence argument, the establishment of large 
public transfer programs testify to the likelihood of some sort of 
benevolent interdependence. Whether such transfers may be justified 
by the Paretian criterion, strictly construed, is more problematic. 
In addition to the sheer magnitude of public transfers, the prolifera-
tion of in-kind programs, suggests that interdependence may fre-
quently be of t~e goods-specific form. In the following chapters, 
the case for in-kind income transfers will be examined in the context 
of the new developments in welfare theory presented in this chapter. 
32Charles E. Lindblom, The Policy-Making Process, (Englewood 
Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1968). 
Aaron Wildavsky, The Politics of the Budgetary Process, 
(Boston. Little, Brown and Co., 1964). 
33Charles E. Lindblom, ~ cit., p. 26. 
CHAl;'TER III 
TRANSFERS IN"""KIND: BACKGROUND lvlATERI]U. ON THE LOW-INCOME HOUSING 
AND ;FOOD STAMl? l?ROGRAMS 
Introduction 
An empirical investigation of the dynamics of "goods-specific" 
utility interdependence will focus on two major in-kind programs: the 
low-income housing and the food stamp programs. These programs were 
selected because of the dominance of food and housing expenditures in 
the budgets of the poor and because of the strong public interest in 
directing transfer pa}~ents to these areas. The Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics' (BLS) "Lower Budget" for a hi,!!othetica1 family of four in the 
Autumn of 1973 reveals that out of a total budget of $8,181, $2,440 or 
30% was allocated to food and $1,627 or 20% to housing. l For lower 
income households, these basic consumption categories command an even 
greater share of the budget. The public interest, as expressed through 
the political process, in food and housing programs is revealed in 
Table II which indicates that approximately one-third of need-tested in-
kind transfers were targeted to these areas. 
LOW INCOME HOUSING ;1?OLI.Q!: 
Goals and Background 
Two major goals have guided the federal low-income housing program 
1U.S. Department of Labor( Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Autumn 1973 
Urban Family Budgets and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban Areas," 
(June 19, 1974), mimeo., .p. 2. 
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since its inception in the 1930's: 1) the desire to increase and up-
grade the housing supply and 2) the effort to insure all American 
households decent housing at a "reasonable" rent/income ratio. As a 
result, housing policies have been oriented to stimulating housing 
production, eradicating slums, and redistributing income in-kind to 
the house poor. (The house poor are generally defined as those 
households compelled to allocate more than 25% of their income to 
housing to command standard quality in the unsubsidized market.) 
While housing subsidies are now dwarfed by expenditures on Medicaid 
and food stamps (see Table II), housing subsidies preceded these 
medical and food assistance effort by three decades. The long his-
tory of public interest in housing reflects the importance of the 
housing industry to the American economy and the relatively high 
visibility of the external diseconomies associated with slum housing. 
Proponents of subsidized housing have always emphasized the 
indirect benefits accruing to the larger community from improved 
housing for the poor. Most housing policy discussions assume that 
utility interdependence between taxpayers and tenants of poor 
housing exists and that it is of a "goods-specific" nature. Sub-
standard housing is assumed to impose external costs on those who 
view it (most frequently on the journey-to-work) as well as private 
costs on those who must dwell in it. In addition, poor housing has 
been associated with the spread of communicable diseases, high crime 
rates, poor educational attainment and other problems which create 
burdens for the larger community. While the unique contribution of 
the physical environment is unclear and very difficult to docu-
51 
ment, social cost argument a in the ~ield o~ housing have generally 
. . . 
been quite persuasive to policymakers. 
While low-income housing programs have existed for forty years, 
political support for them has vacillated over time. Housing policies 
have periodically encountered stiff Congressional resistance and ex-
ecutive displeasure. Goal shifts have frequently occurred in an 
effort to react to program criticisms. In the 1950's and early 60's, 
interest in providing low rent housing was all but supplanted by an 
emphasis on the eradication of slums through urban renewal. Low 
rent units were destroyed; replacement housing was aimed at the 
lliiddle and upper income market; and large parcels of cleared land 
were reserved for commercial and civic structures. The Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968 refocused attention on the "house poor" 
but acute official dissatisfaction with program operations, particularly 
in the scandal ridden 235 program, culminated in an executive "freeze" 
on housing programs in 1973. Housing programs are currently back in 
business, but have shifted their emphasis. Programs which stress uti-
lization of the existing rental market will receive priority rather 
than those providing new rental units or home ownership for the poor. 
In sum<', low-income housing programs have had a long, but uneven, his-
tory of public support. 
Congressional interest in subs.idized hous.iug has been bolstered 
by concern for the health of the construction industry. The earliest 
federally funded public housing projects in the 1930's were aimed at 
creating employment as much as they were aimed at creating housing. 
New housing starts aided by direct federal assistance have been a small, 
but increasing percen"t;age of; total s.tarts.. Kris.to;e reports a. gain 
'2 
of assisted starts f;ram 3% in 1961 to 12% in 1968. Despite this 
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small direct impact on new constructiDn, Congress has provided consi-
derable indirect stimulation for the housing industry through favorable 
tax treatment and the manipulation of the supply of credit. While 
the most overt political support for subsidiaed housing has come from 
those who express concern for the high private and social costs of 
slums, other, less frequently identified, beneficiaries of government 
subsidies are the builders, contractors, and other private and govern-
mental intermediaries involved in the supply of subsidized units. 
Housing Market Conditions: SUpply and Demand Elasticity 
All established low-income housing subsidy programs direct pay-
ments to housing suppliers rather than to housing consumers. While 
new programs have providedtQ~;prospective tenant with a choice of 
accomodations far greater than the traditional public housing program, 
hox~~~~ing subsidies are still of an all-or-nothing variety. The consu-
mer cannot regulate the amount of housing he consumes nor can he allo-
cate all or part of his housing subsidy to non-housing expenditures. 
American housing programs, in their avoidance of demand subsidies have 
reflected certain assumptions about the operation of the housing market 
which require careful scrutiny. Demand subsidies. have typically been 
2Frank S. Kris.tof, "Federal Housing Policies:···· Subsidized Pro-
duction, Filtration and Objectives: Part I, II Land Economics, X1WIII, 
4, (November, 1972), p. 310. 
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rej ected on the, grounds that the supply o~ housi,ng i,s inelastic and 
that consequently, demand subsidies would result in inflated housing 
prices rather than increased housing production and improvements in 
the housing stock. In addition, the construction of new units for 
low-income households has been justified on the grounds that a less 
targeted stimulation of housing production would fail to "filter down" 
and improve housing conditions for the poor. 
Lowry's model of the filtering process is an example of the view 
that the turnover of housing stimulated by new production fails to pro-
vide those at the bottom of the chain with adequate accomodations. 
Lowry contends that as new housing is added to the stock, existing 
housing declines in value, and that landlords of existing housing 
are encouraged to disinvest and undermaintain their holdings. Thus 
the housing available to the poor tends to be of unsatisfactory,quality~ 
Kristof challenges Lowry's view of filtering primarily on the 
grounds that income is exogenous to his model. If changes in real in-
come are included in a filtering model, quite different conclusions 
about the efficacy of the process may be warranted. Kristof has traced 
changes in the housing inventory from 1950 to 1969 and finds a remark-
able record of improvement during that period. During the 1960's 
there was a net increase of 10,353,000 units despite a loss of(6,76l,OOO 
units from the housing inventory. The number of substandard units de-
clined by 70% from 17 million to 1950 to 5 million in 1969. Crowded 
3 
Ira S. Lowry, "Filtering and Houf>ing standards," 'Land Economics, 
XXXVI, 4, (November, 1960), pp. 362.270. 
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standard units increased only slightly ;J;rom 3,957,0()Q in 1959 to 
4,269,000 in 1969. The average number of rooms pel:' person increased 
from 1.42 in 1950 to 1.65 in 1969. New construction more than kept 
up with population growth; 1.5 new units were added for each net 
addition to households. 4 Kristof concludes, 
These housing gains were accompanied by, and in 
large part were attributable to, advances in family 
income. Only rising incomes whose rate of increase 
equaled or exceeded rent and house price rises could 
sustain the high volume of new construction experienced 
over most of the past two decades.5 
A closer investigation of the empirical evidence reveals that 
complex movements within the housing stock contributed to the net 
trends. During the 1950·s Kristof found that over one million of 
the substandard units were newly constructed while five million sub-
standard units were upgraded to standard. Thus the housing inventory 
appears to simultaneously have filtered downward and upward in a way 
6 
that filtering models fail to explain. 
In an effort to further investigate the response of the housing 
market to new construction, Kristof and Winnick in New ¥ork City and 
the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan covering the 
nation traced the chains of moves stimulated by new units. The pre-
vious housing of the occupants of new housing was located and the in-
4Frank S. Kristof, Ope cit., pp. 313, 315. 
Frank S. Kristof, "Federal Housing Policies.: Subsidized Produc-
tion, Filtration and Objectives: Part ·1.1," Lana Economics, .xLIX, 2, 
(May, 1973), p. 170. 
5Ibid., part I, p. 316. 
6 Ibid., Part I, p. 319. 
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come and other characteristics of the household moving into the vaca-
ted unit were ascertained. This process was followed until a chain 
of moves terminated with the demolition of a vacated unit or with 
new household formation. Kristof concludes that "By and large, the 
turnover of housing generated in central cities has permitted lower 
income segments of the community to inherit better housing • .,7 While 
Kristof's analysis considers the housing market as a whole, he does 
not investigate, in detail, the barriers that may inhibit the down-
ward flow of sound units to the nonwhite poor. 
Kristof makes a sharp distinction between housing shortages 
which he characterizes as "one of the great mythologies of the housing 
discussion.,B and the ability of the poor to effectively demand avail-
able housing which he concedes is a seriously problem. The problem of 
housing abandonment illustrates the issue. Abandonment has alarming 
consequences for the viability of entire neighborhoods as vacant 
buildings serve as a magnet for addicts and criminals who spur house-
holds in surrounding buildings to flee the area if they possibly can. 
Sternlieb notes that many of the ~~its being lost are essentially 
9 
sound; not necessarily the worst of the housing stock. Kristof 
views the abandonment of buildings, in part, as a sign of slack in the 
7Ibid., Part II, p. 170. 
B1bid. 
9George Sternlieb, "Abandonment and Rehabilitation: What is to 
be Done? .,. Papers Submitted to the Subcommittee on Housing Panels on 
Housing Production, Housing Demand and Developing ~ Suitable Living ~ 
vironment, Hbuse of Representatives, Committee on Banking and Currency, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1971), 
pp. 315-331. 
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housing market created by new construction, but he also notes that the 
inability o~ low-income households to pay' rent sufficient to maintain 
buildings has contributed heavily to Eany landlords' decisions to a-
bandon their investments. lO The failure o~ lending institutions to 
finance rehabilitation in poor neighborhoods has also been a signi-
ficant factor. While conceding the complexity of the issue, Kristof 
concludes that supply elasticity is not a serious problem and thus 
recommends a housing allowance approach that would direct subsidies to 
consumers in an effort to make the housing demand of low-income house-
holds more effective. DerLeeuw, We1fe1d, Lowry and other housing ex-
11 
perts have reached the same conclusion. 
Muth also attacks the assertion that demand subsidies will 
merely result in rent hikes because of' the unresponsiveness of supply. 
The assertion, of course, ignores competition among land-
lords. Though it is in the interest of any single indi-
vidual landlord to try to charge as much as he can for a 
given dwelling unit, he can charge monopoly prices only 
if he has a monopoly. Otherwise, if he raises his rentals 
above those charged by other landlords, his tenants will 
move to other dwellings. Vacancies at all rent levels 
generally exist where there is no rent control, so that 
better housing is available at higher rentals. 12 
10 Frank S. Kristof, ~ cit., Part :U. 
11Frank de Leeuw, liThe Housing Allowance Approach,1\ Papers Sub-
mitted ~ the Subcommittee ~Housing Panels ••• op. cit., pp. 541-554. 
Ira S. Lowry, "Housing Assitance for Low Income Families: A 
Fresh Approach,:?apers Submitted to the Subcommittee ~ Housing Pan-
els ••• Ope cit., pp. 489-524. 
-- Irving H. Welfeld, America's Housing Problem: Art Approach to Its 
Solution, Evaluative studies 10, lWashington, D.C.: American Enter-
prise Institute for l;'ublic policy Research, October, 1973). 
12Richard F. Muth, Public Housing: ~ Economic Evaluation, Evalu-
tive Studies 5, CWashington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute for 
Public Policy Research, March, 1973). 
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Since the housing .market is, characteri~ed by a l~rge number of inde-
pendent producers, collusion between them is unlikely. 
Olsen lends some theoretical support to the notion that the 
housing market would respond to a demand subsidy by increasing supply. 
He contends that the housing market exhibits most of the character is-
tics of a competitive market and that a housing allowance approach 
would result in higher prices only in the very short-run. The chain 
of shifting opportunities for profit should eventually stimulate new 
13 
construction and an increase in supply. 
Existing housing subsidy programs rest not only on the question-
able premiss of inelastic supply, but also on an assumption of inelas-
tic demand. Housing proponents contend that general cash transfers 
to the poor would not insure a socially acceptable level of housing 
cons umption. In-kind transfers are viewed as essential to diminish 
the external diseconomies associated with the "underconsumption" of 
housing by the poor. De Leeuw, in a paper analyzing the results of 
several researchers, concludes that the income elasticity of rental 
housing in the u.s. is between 0.8 and 1.0, but indicates that income 
14 
elasticity appears to be lower for nonwhite households. De Leeuw 
suggests that the price elasticity of the demand for rental housing is 
13 
Edgar o. Olsen, "A Competitive theory of the Rousing Market," 
The American Economic Review, LIX, (Se~tember, 1969), pp. ·612-621. 
14 
Frank de Leeuw, ,."ThaDemand,.;forRousin(;p .. A.,Review of Cross-
Section Evidence," The·Review of Economics and 'statistics, LIII, 1, 
(February, 1971), p:-r. -- ---
15 
about -1.0. Thus general income increases, unti.ed to housing t 
would result in increased housing consUInpti.on f but such. increases 
would undoubtedly be less per household than under our present hous-
ing programs. If taxpayers have a strong preference for increasing 
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the housing conumption of the poor, as an assumption of "goods-specific" 
utility interdependence would indicate, then in-kind transfers may 
maximize utility. Whether or not tied transfers are preferable to 
cash hinges on the strength of taxpayers' preferences, the actual 
shape of consumption patterns and the relative costs of the transfer 
modes. Whether or not tied subsidies should be directed to the 
suppliers or the consumers of housing hinges on the dynamics of the 
housing market. All of these issues require further empirical in-
vestigation, but the assumptions of inelastic supply and demand under-
lying present policies have little in the way of hard data to support 
them. 
Low-Income Housing Programs: Description and criticisms 
Public intervention in the housing market has taken several forms. 
While housing subsidies are conventionally associated with programs 
directed at the poor " Aaron demonstrates that the largest public housing 
subsidy, by far, is the favorable treatment of homeowners in the income 
tax code. Aaron found this indirect subsi.dr was worth $7 billion in 
1966; only 8% o~ whicQaccrued to t~ayers witQ annual incomes below 
15 
Frank de Leeuw and Nkan ta Ekanen, "Time Lags in the Rental 
Housing Market," Urban Institute Reprint 159-112-19 (Washington, D.C.: 
The Urban Institute, February, 1974), p. 41. 
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$5,000. 16 
The oldest housing program directed at the low-income population 
is the Public Housing Pr.ogram which prior to the 1960' s subsidized 
only the direct public provision of new unit.s. Under this program, 
the federal government contracts with Local Housing Authorities 
(LHAs) for the construction of new dwelling units which rent to the 
eligible at rates considerably below those prevailing in the unsubsi-
dized market. The new construction is financed by the federal govern-
ment which pays the interest and amortization costs of tax exempt bonds 
issued by the LHAs. The federal subsidy includes both this direct 
capital component and an indirect component in the form of federal re-
venue foregone due to the tax-free status of the bonds. Public hous-
ing also receives a small indirect subsidy from loca governments in 
the form of exemption from local property taxes. While LHAs make pay-
ments to local governments in lieu of property taxes, these payments 
are considerably less than property taxes would be on comparable struc-
tures. While nearly all of the financing for public housing comes 
from the federal government, the units are planned owned and managed by 
the LHAs. 
Traditional public housing programs have been widely criticized as 
inequitable and inefficient. By traditionally concentrating on new 
construction for the poor, very large per unit subsidies are required. 
Large per unit subsidies mean that few of the eligible receive assis-
16 
'" .. Henry J.·Aaron, Shelter and Subsidies: 'Who Benefits from Fede-
ral Housing policies?, (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 
1972), p. 163. 
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tance and that the }?X',ogram' s Un}?act on the total sUPl?ly of bousi,ng 
is negligible. Muth. estimates that, as an outer limit, public 
h Od 5 h o. 1 17 OUSLng accomo ates about 1 % of t e el~g~b e. Most estimates are 
considerably lower. 
Muth also focuses on the inefficiency of public construction 
and the perverse incentives created by the subsidy structure. Prior 
to the Brooke Amendments to the Housing Act of 1968, federal subsidies 
were available only for capital costs. This encouraged LHAs to sub-
stitute capital for ~~~rent expenditures. Maintenance was neglected 
and capital costs inflated since subsidies from Washington were viewed 
as "free". 
Valuing capital and current inputs in public housing 
at their opportunity cost elsewhere in the economy, 
the resource cost per unit of public housing is 21% 
greater than it would be if the LHAs were to bear the 
full capital costs of the real estate they use. 18 
In an effort to improve the efficiency of public housing con-
struction, the Turnkey program was introduced. Responsibility for 
development was shifted from the LHAs to the private sector. Under 
the Turnkey program, private contractors develop housing projects, sell 
them to the LHAs and turn them over to public management upon comple-
tion. Welfeld notes that the original impact of the program was to 
substantially reduce development costs. However, the lax supervision 
of private developers also led to some well-publicized fraud which in 
turn resulted in an elaborate code of development r,egulations. Welfeld 
l7Richard F. Muth,~ cit., p. 30. 
18Ib o d 19 20 ~ ., pp. -. 
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claims that as. a cons.equence, II ••• th.e d~velopment ~rocess was made 
so much more complex that the Turnkey method is nowmore expensive 
than LHA designed and managed construction. lll9 
In addition to high development costs and the failure to serve a 
significant percentage of the eligible, public housing has been cri-
ticized for pricing the neediest out of the program. Prior to the 
Brooke Amendments of 1968, tenant rents were required to cover all 
operating costs. As operating expenses rose, many LHAs confronted 
the choice of bankruptcy or of manipulating admissions so that those 
households too poor to pay rent suffi,cient to cover operating costs 
were balanced by households who could pay rent in excess of operating 
costs. Too large a concentration of the very poor threatened the 
solvency of the LHAsi thes the small existing supply of public housing 
was allocated in a way which did not necessarily favor the neediest. 
The Brooke Amendments opened the door for federal subsidies for 
operating as well as capital expenditures. While the Brooke Amend-
ments permit a greater concentration of benefits on the very poor, 
Muth and Welfeld note that they have also created a structure of inc en-
tives which is not conducive to efficient management. Since operating 
deficits as well as capital costs are now picked up by the federal 
government, LHAs have little incentive to reduce these deficits. De 
Leeuw investigated public housing operating costa ~rom 1968-71 and 
discovered that operating 6X)?enditures have been rising more rapidly 
than the inflation o~ inputs. ror example, during 1970-71 costs in-
19 
Irving H. Welfeld, 92.:.. cit., p. 17. 
62 
creased 11.3% in large housing authorities and 8.4% in small housing 
authorities. In the same period the estimated contribution of in-
20 flation was only 6%. High operating expenditures do not appear to 
be linked to greater resident satisfaction and improved maintenance. 
Sadacca, Loux, Isler and Drury conducted an extensive survey of 
management practices and operating costs in public housing programs. 
They concluded that LHAs with high performance in terms of resident 
and staff satisfaction and building m~intenance were those with 
significantly lower operating costs. 2l 
other objections to public housing programs have centered on 
the spatial distribution of benefits -- both within and between ur-
ban areas. The concentration of the poor in large projects in cen-
tral cities is viewed by most as exacerbating the difficulties as-
sociated with this population. Many social scientists assume that 
low-income households reinforce one another's socially costly be-
havior and that spatial integration with the middle-class would help 
alter this pattern. Housing authorities have been accused of sub-
stituting new, public slums for old, private ones. However, others 
view the concentration of the poor as more benign. Concentration 
may lower the costs of social service delivery. Furthermore, many 
low-income groups fear that dispersion would dilute the political, 
20Frank De Leeuw, Operating Expenses in Public Housing, 1968-
71, (Washington, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1973), p. 29. 
21 Robert Sadacca, Suzanne B. Loux, Mort6n I. Isler, and Mar-
garet J. Drury, Management Performance in Public Housing, (Washing-
ton, D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1974). 
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social and cultural benefits ther derive froI(\ the 9e,09ral?hi.c concentra-
tion of their members. 
Efforts to scatter projects throughout metropolitan areas have 
met with powerful political resistance, strongly linked to issues of 
22 
race. This resistance has effectively prohibited the significant 
dispersal of projects, with the exception of those constructed for the 
elderly. As the elderly do not pose the explosive issues of school 
integration and crime, the integration of the low-income elderly into 
middle-income neighborhoods has been relatively smooth. Conflict is 
minimized because the elderly are essentially middle-class in behavior 
pattern. Friedman notes that public acceptance of early public hous-
ing programs during the Depression was linked to the assumption that 
tenants would come from the "submerged middle-class" temporarily in-
jured by the economic crisis. He contends that enthusiasm for public 
housing waned as it became clear that its inhabitants were increasingly 
lower-class and black in origin. Prior to the tenants' rights move-
ments of the 1960's most LHAs att~~pted to assuage public opinion by 
selecting lower-class families for occupancy who were most middle-class 
in structure and behavior. Those households with severe problems were 
not admitted to public housing in the first place or were often arbitra-
23 
rily ousted if accidently let in. These unwritten policies have 
22 
Mario M. CUomo, Forest Hills Diary: The Crisis of Low Income 
Housin9' (New York: Random House, 1974). 
23 
,Lawrence M. Friedman, Government and ~'H()US'ing: A Century 
£f Frustration, (Chicago: Rand Mc Nally and Co., 1968). 
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largely been rel?laced, but as more I'problem" fami..1ies enter public 
housing, the acceptability of dispersed sites to the lar-<;Jer conununity 
has probably diminished. 
The low-income housing program has also been attacked for its 
uneven distribution of benefits across the nation. Von Furstenberg 
compared the dispersion of subsidized housing with the distribution 
of low-income households and concluded: 
••• the probability of a low-income family rece~vLng 
Federal housing assistance varies drastically from 
state to state. In general, the richer the state, the 
more assisted housing units are provided for its (rela-
tively fewer) low-income families and the poorer the 
state, the worse the odds. • •• there is a systematic 
under supply in the West and an oversupply in relation to 
the needs of the East. 24 
In an attempt to respond to the numerous criticisms of public 
housing programs several new approaches to low-income housing have 
evolved. These efforts emphasize increased reliance on the private 
market. The section 23 Leasing Progrmn, enacted in 1965, allows LHAs 
to lease units from private owners and sublet them to lowOincome house-
holds at below-market rents. The program has the advantage of avoiding 
the excessive development costs associated with direct public construc-
tion and ownership. other advantages of the program are the scattered 
location of sites in existing neighborhoods and the greater anonymity 
this dispersal permits the tenants. While the pr09ram uses the private 
real estate market and the existi,ng s.tock 0;1; housin9 mOre heayi1y than 
24George M. Von Furstenberg, "The Distribution of··Federally .. Assis-
ted .Rental .. Housing· Services ·byRegions ·and··States/~··· . The EoonOInics of 
Federal Subsidy Programs: PartS -- Housing Subidies~.S. CongresS; 
Joint Economic Committee, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1972), p. 641. 
did traditional public housin<;1 pr,09rams, the LHA remains an active 
intermediary between housing consumers and nousin9 suppliers. The 
LHA searches for units, inspects and reinspects them, negotiates 
leases, collects and pays rents, and assumes responsibility for main-
tenance. 25 
section 8 of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1974 
establishes the Housing Assistance Payment Program as the major pro-
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gram for low-income households. section 8 is basically an expansion 
of the Section 23 concept, with the important difference that the 
household will be permitted to locate its own housing. The LHA will 
still inspect the unit, collect rents, and sign leases, as under 
Section 23. The unit must be available at or belew'," HUD established 
Fair Market Rents for a given city and must be of standard quality. 
The subsidy will be the difference between 25% of the household's in-
come, net of permissable deductions, and the market rent of the unit. 
Tenant rent will vary with tenant income, not with the cost of the unit, 
so the incentive structure encourages households to locate housing at 
or near the established maximum rent. The Fair Market Rent for a two-
bedroom walk-up unit in Portland has been set at $235 for new construc-
26 
tion and $169 for existing construction. These limits appear to be 
quite generous as the median gross rent (includes utilities ) for the 
25Frank. de Leeuw and Sam li. Leaman, "The Section 23 Leasing l'ro-
gram, II Ibid., pp. 642-659. 
26Ronald M. Duzy, Director, Housing Programs Management, Portland 
Area Office, DepartJnent of Housing and Urban Development, Interview, 
February 18, 1975. 
27 
Portland SMSA was only $115 in 1970. 
The Rent Supplement Pr,ogram also relies, on privately owned 
housing but restricts sponsorship to non-profit or limited profit 
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developers. The program stresses new or substantially rehabilitated 
units for low-income families who must also be elderly, handicapped, 
displaced by government action, victims of disaster or living in sub-
standard housing in order to qualify. A subsidy is paid to the hous-
ing owner equal to the difference between 25% of the tenant's net in-
come and the market rent. However, the subsidy may not exceed 70% of 
the rent. This limitation on the amount of the subsidy has prevented 
the operation of the program in high rent communities unless the pro-
28 gram is "piggy-backed" on to one of the interest rate subsidy programs.i~ 
Section 235 and 236 are the major interest rate subsidy programs 
for "lower-income" families. They were part of the Housing and Urban 
Development Act of 1968 and are administered directly by HUD, not by 
the LHAs. Sec1:ion 235 and 236 subsidize, at a maximum, the difference 
between the cost of debt service at the market rate of interest and 
the cost of such service at 1%. section 235 is designed to enable fa-
milies to purchase homes, while section 236 is intended to provide 
rental housing. Both programs require the tenant or owner to pay the 
cost of debt service at 1%. This requirement prevents the lowest in-
27U .. s . Bureau of the Cens,us, Census of Population and Housing: 
1970, Census Tracts, final Report PHC(,l>'-165 portland, Or,egon-- Wash-
ington, SMSA, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. GcfVerl'llllent Printing Office, 1972). 
28Irving H. Welfeld, ~ cit., pp. 18-19. 
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come fa."TIilies from participati:ng in the pr,ogram. In 1971, the median 
family income in public housing was, $2,548 but in 236 it was $5,303 and 
29 
in 235 it was $5,760. Considerable criticism has been directed at 
this failure of two major housing subsidy programs to reach the needi-
est. In addition to being criticized as inequitable, the 235 program 
30 
has been plagued by fraud and defaults. 
Both the 235 and 236 programs are characterized by incentive 
structures which encourage inflated costs. In the 235 program, the 
homebuyer's payments hinge on his income, not on the size of his mort-
gage. Thus the subsidized household is encouraged to purchase expen-
sive housing (within the program limits) because it does not bear the 
cost of its extravagance. Large public subsidies have permitted the 
small number of households fortunate enough to enter the 235 program to 
be housed in relative lUXury. 
As many as 50 percent of the households are being over-
housed relative to the national average, and, therefore, 
oversubsidized. Approximately 50% of the families en-
tering the Section 235 program would only qulify for a 
two bedroom apartment under most of HUD's multifamily 
housing programs. Nevertheless, virtually all of the 
homes in this program have three or more bedrooms. 31 
29 Donald D. Kummerfeld, liThe Housing Subsidy System," Papers Sub-
mitted to the Subcommittee ~ Housing Panels ••• .2E.:. cit., p. 469. 
30rrving H. Welfeld, £?J2..:.. cit., p. 22. , 
U.S. CO,ngress, Joi.i.t EconolllicCommitteel" Subcommittee on J?riori-
ties and Economy in Government, Housing Subsidiea and HousingJ?olicy, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govermnent printing Office, March 5, 1973),. 
31 
Irving H. Welfeld, £?J2..:.. cit. , pp. 20-21. 
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The structure of the 236 program does not reward efficiency either. 
Tax benefits and other profits permitted builders increase with the 
size of their mortgage. As a consequence, development costs have 
been high and the "market rents" in the 236 units have not been com-
petitive with those in comparable unsubsidized units. 
In sum, while attempts have been made to break away from direct 
public provision of new units and to increase reliance on the private 
market, the new programs have not escaped the old charges of inequity 
and inefficiency. In many ways, the new programs have introduced 
the illusion of a competitive market without its discipline. While 
private suppliers are utilized, their profits are either independent 
of their efficiency, or, in the case of 235 and 236, linked to in-
efficiency. The housing tenant is not encouraged to economize either 
since he is not allowed to profit from limiting his housing consump-
tion. Decision-making remains overwhelmingly bureaucratic. The Pub-
lic Housing Program (both conventional and Turnkey) and the leasing 
program for low-income households will be examined in the context of 
the "goods-specific" utility interdependence framework. The Rent 
Supplement, 235, and 236 Programs will not be investigated further 
Lecause of their smaller impact on the federal budget (Table II) 
and because 235 and 236 largely fail to reach the poverty population. 
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THE E22E. STAMJ;l J;>ROGRAM 
The Politics of Hunger 
The current Food stamp Program began in 1961, on a pilot basis, 
through executive action of President Kennedy. Congress made the 
Food stamp Program permanent with the passage of the Food Stamp Act 
of 1964. The major obstacle to passage was getting the bill out of 
the House Agriculture Committee which was dominated by rural interests 
who viewed food stamps as a welfare program for urban areas. Most 
committee members favored the established surplus commodities distri-
bution program as it was overtly linked to farm price support policies. 
Vote-trading finally allowed the bill to reach the House floor where 
urban Democrats agreed to support the wheat-cotton bill in exchange 
for the votes of rural Democrats on food stamps. Democratic unity 
made Republican support unnecessary; voting in the House was on 
straight party' lines. In the Senate, support for food stamps was so 
strong that passage was obtained by voice vote. 32 
Program growth was modest for a numb~r of years, but accelerated 
rapidly in the '70s (Table I). As food stamp participation grew the 
commodity program was phased out. Commodity distribution remained in 
operation on only a few Indian reservations. The expansion of the 
Food Stamp Program has been str~n91y linked by pqlitical analysts to the 
tremendous publicity given the \\hunger issue" by the media ?-uring the 
32Randall B. Ripley, "Legislative 
Act of ·1964./' .. in .. Frederic N. Cleaveland 
and Urban Problems, (T~shington, D.C.: 
1969). . 
Bargaining and the Food .. Stamp 
and Associates Ceds), Congress 
The Brookings Institution, 
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1960's. John F. Kennedy, press in tow, was visibly affected by the 
poverty he viewed during the west Virginia primary. The establishment 
of a pilot Food stamp Program was one of his first acts as president. 
In April, 1967, Senators Robert F. Kennedy and Joe Clark received ex-
tensive coverage on their trip to the Mississippi Delta where they 
were shocked at the extent of hunger and malnutrition. 33 In May, 1968, 
CBS News presented "Hunger in America" which opened with the death of 
a baby attributed to starvation. The program drew a flood of letters 
to Congressmen demanding an expansion of the domestic food programs. 
Congress was disposed to respond despite Secretary of Agriculture 
Orville Freeman's denial of the CBS claim that there were 10 million 
hungry or starving Americwls. In addition, 1968 witnessed the publica-
tion of Hunger U.S.A. by the citizens' Board of Inquiry into Hunger and 
Malnutrition in the United States. Hunger U.S.A. identified 256 "hunger" 
counties and contained suggestions for expanding the food program. 34 
Hunger had become a hot political issue. 
In hearings before the Senate Select Committee on Nutrition anc 
Human Needs in 1969, both Senator Ralph Yarborough of Texas and Dr. 
Thomas E. Bryant, Assistant Director, Office of Economic Opportuni-ties 
for Health Affairs, directly acknowledged that the publicity given to 
hunger had created the political environment conducive to expanded food 
programs. Yarborough commented: 
33U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Hear-
ings ~ Nutrition and Human Needs, Part 2--USDA, HEW, and OEO Officials, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969), p. 241. 
34Judith A. Segal, Food for the Hungry: The Reluctant Society, 
(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970), pp. 12-14. 
I believe we have come to the point where a majority of 
Americans want to see hunger and malnutrition ended. I 
think that the dramatization of the problem during the 
past 2 years by various Senators and Senate committees, 
by some Members of the House, by your own Department 
(Agriculture), and by such private organizations as the 
Citizens Board of Inquiry and CBS television, has aroused 
the American conscience to the point that at last we will 
see the elimination of poverty, hunger, and malnutrition. 35 
Bryant testified: 
.•• the publicity, in the best sense of that word, that 
has been given to these issues has in a sense made many 
millions of Americans aware of the problem and a'Vlare that 
something needs to be done about it. I don't know that 
it is totally desirable that it happend this way, but 
the publicity that has been given to this is important. 36 
Program Mechanics 
Ths purpose of the Food Stamp Program is to increase the food 
consumption of low-income households by providing them with coupons 
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whose face value represents the cost of a minimal, but nutritionally 
adequate, diet. Monthly coupon allotments vary with family size and 
are based on the price of the Economy Food Plan, the least expensive 
of the five dietary plans published by the U.S. Department of Agricul-
ture (USDA). Prior to 1971, payment and eligibility standards were 
set by the states and varied considerably between them. Since 1971, 
schedules are uniform for the 48 contiguous states, and somewhat higher 
for Alaska and Hawaii. Lower per capita allotments are given to large 
households than to small on the grounds that there are economies of 
35U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
~ cit., p. 241. 
36Ibid., p. 336. 
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scale in food purchasing. The USDA is required to update allotments 
every six months to reflect increases in food prices. The cost of 
the Economy Food Plan is the cost of a particular market basket of 
food. However, some changes in quantities purchased over time are made 
in response to changes in the relative prices of food items. 37 The 
Census Bureau's definition of poverty is three times the cost of the 
38 Economy Food Plan, thus poverty in America is defined in real terms. 
Host participating households must purchase their stamps, al-
though free stamps are available to households with very low net in-
comes (gross income minus deductions allowed by the program). The 
household's purchase price depends on household size and net income 
under a complex formula which is intended to reflect those factors 
which most commonly impede a household's ability to devote adequate 
resources to food. The purchase price is supposed to reflect what a 
household would "normally" spend for food, while the subsidy is in-
tended to augment "normal" food purchases. However, the complexity of 
the formula creates disparities between what households of equivalent 
size and gross income pay for their stamps. The subsidy or bonus value 
of the food stamps is the difference between the participating house-
hold's payment and the face value of the coupons. For example, as of 
37U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, ¥e-
ference Materials to Part! Food Price Changes, 1973-74, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 102. 
38U•S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series 
1972" p. 60, no. 91, "Characteristics of the Low-Income Population: 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 1. 
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December, 1974, a family of 4 with net income below $30 per month would 
receive $150 of food stamps free -- this household's monthly subsidy 
would equal $150. A four person household with net monthly income 
of $200 would pay $53 for $150 worth of stamps -- its bonus or monthly 
subsidy would equal $97. It is possible that these two hypothetical 
households have similar gross incomes, but the first family may have 
higher medical, housing, and other deductible expenditures under the 
program's income calculation formula. 
Food stamps may be used to purchase all food items in markets 
which have been approved by the Food and Nutrition Service of the USDA. 
Interested stores must apply to participate in the program and must 
agree to abide by program regulations. Certification of a store in-
volves the completion of a simple one page form and is virtually auto-
matic. Most markets in urban areas participate in the program. Par-
ticipating enterprises may not accept food stamps in payment for non-
food items such as paper or cleaning products and they are not per-
mitted to make change in cash. Store coupons must he issued in lieu 
of change. The supermarket must bundle and cancel the food stamps as 
specified by the program rules and deposit them in a commercial bank. 
The commercial bank deposits the stamps at a Federal Reserve Bank 
where they are destroyed. 
While the entire cost of the food stamp bonuses to participating 
households is borne by the federal government, the program is admini-
stered by county governments. Administrative costs are shared by 
federal, state and county governments. Prior to October, 1974, the 
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USDA paid 62.5% of direct sala~, ~rayel and travel-~elated costs of 
personnel involved in 1>. certifying non-~lic 1'_ssitance households, 
2) outreach (publicity to bring new household~ into the program) and 
3) Fair Hearings. The remaining 37.5% was shared by the state and 
county. In Oregon, the county share was 30% and the state share 
70% of those administrative costs not covered by USDA. While USDA's 
share of administrative costs appears generous, in fact, the cost 
sharing applied to such a small percentage of program personnel that 
the burden on state and local government was considerable. The USDA 
cost sharing did not apply to supervisory personnel, quality control 
investigators or data processing. A survey by the Senate Select 
Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs revealed that the USDA was 
actually covering only 28% of overall administrative costs for non-
bl ' , t t" t 39 Pu ~c Ass~s ance par ~c~pan s. Administrative costs E0r partici-
pating Public Assistance households are shared between HEW and state 
and local governments. In response to complaints from the states 
that the administrative burden of the Food stamp Program was prohibi-
tive, the USDA agreed ~o fund 50% of all administrative costs of the 
program for non-Public Assistance households as of October 1, i974. 40 
39U•8 • Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Food 
Program Technical Amendments: ~ Workinsr Paper, liThe Administrative--
Cost of the Food stamp Program," (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1974), p.' 103. . 
40 
Willard Renkin, Food stamp Coordinator, MultnomahCounty Oregon 
Welfare Department, intervie\>T, November 27, 1974. 
To receive food s.tamps, a hous.ehold not on l;lublic Assitance 
must be certified as eligible br the county food stamp office. In 
Multnomah County, there are five branch offices, in four geographic 
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locations, where certification oocurs. (Further decentralization of 
certification is planned). The applicant must present proof of 
earnings, shelter expenses, tuition, medical payments, etc., in the 
form of receipts, cancelled checks, check stubs, etc. The certifica-
tion period varies from one month to one year depending on the certifi-
cation worker's appraisal of the.stability of the household's income. 
For example, an elderly participant on Social Security is likely to be 
certified for a year while an 18 year old unemployed blue collar worker 
is likely to be certified for a month or two. When the certification 
period ends, the participant must be recertified -- a process nearly 
identical to the original certification procedure. 
certified households are mailed Authorization to Purchase cards 
(ATPs). I~ Multnomah County, the ATPs and the participant's cash 
payment, if any, are exchanged for the authorized amount of stamps at 
county food sta~p offices. stamps are issued by mail for those 
households with severe difficulties in traveling to issuing offices 
i.e., the disabled, the senile. Fublic Assistance participants are 
mailed their stamps. In other counties, other distribution systems 
prevail -- some counties. use commercial banks and/or post offices. 
In Oregon, all counties other than Multnomahand Lane, distribute 
stamps through. the post. office which receives 81 cents per transac-
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tion. 4l In some states where banks or post off~ces are used, the 
cost per transaction is more; the price i.s negotia.ted by the county 
or the state. Transaction costs are shared by the county and the 
state. 
It was the intention of Congress that Public Assistance reci-
pients be automatically eligible for food stamps. By and large 
they are, even if their income from Public Assistance in high payment 
states exceeds the national income limits established fo~ the Food 
Stamp Program. However, all food stamp recipients must have cooking 
'facilities in their place of residence, although elderly or disabled 
participants may use their stamps for "Meals on Wheels" food delivery. 
A major administrative difficulty was created when the USDA refused 
to accept state Public Assistance income determination formulas in cal-
culating payment schedules for Public Assistance households. Dif-
ferent deductions from gross income are permitted by food stamp regu-
lations and Public Assistance rules. This means that a separate form 
must be completed and a separate calculation made of income for food 
stamps, even though the household is "automatically" eligible. Thus 
the food stamp program has contributed to the paper work of the 
Public Assistance Program \'lhich is already drowning in a sea of forms. 
A Public Assistance household may elecb:.. to have a portion of its roon-
thly check withheld in payment for food stamps and ma¥ have its alloca-
41 Multnomah. County Oregoll, Department of Administrative services, 
Food stamp Division, "Comparative Services and Cost Figures, Multnomah 
County Food stamp Issuing vs. Post Office Issuing, It (December 30, 1974), 
mimeo., p. 2. 
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tion of stamps mailed with. its. check. Mos,t Public Assi.stance house:"" 
holds rec:eive their stamps in this manner f but th.e household -may fol-
low the same purchasing procedures as non-Public Assistance households 
if it wishes. 
Program Criticisms 
A barrage of criticism has been aimed at the Food stamp Program 
since its inception. Most attacks have focused on the level of be-
nefits and on the administrative shortcomings of the program. Wel-
fare Rights Organizations and other spokesmen for the poor have per-
sistently claimed that program benefits are too meager to provide a 
42 
"nutritiously adequate diet" as the Food stamp Act requires. Pub-
lications of the Department of Agriculture and a deposition taken 
from Dr. Robert Rizek, Director of Consumer and Food Economics Research 
Division, USDA, state that the Economy Diet Plan on which food stamp 
allotments are based is deficient in four nutrients recommended by the 
48 
National Academy of Sciences to insure nutritional adequacy. In 
addition, the USDA Eood Consumption Survey of 1965 revealed that less 
than 10% of the families spending at the level of the Economy Food 
plan received the Recommended Dietary Allowance (RDA) and less than 
42 
U.S. Senate,Select Commi.ttee on Nutritiqn and Human Needs, 
~rings: Nutrition and Human Needs --··1972: part 3B .. - Unused Food 
AS sis tance Funds: Food Stamps; AdminUit;t;'ation Wi.tnesses, &ash-
ington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972l, p. 655. 
43 
Ibid., p. 636. 
44 
50% had obtained even 2/3 of the RDA. The USDA itself ~ecom-
mended the Economy Diet Plan for only temporary use and suggested 
that welfare agencies consider basing food allowances on the Low 
Cost Food Plan which is about 25% more expensive than the Economy 
45 
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The cost of the Economy Diet Plan is calculated for hypothetical 
families of various sizes. For example, the USDA family of four 
consists of parents ages 20-35, a boy, age 9-12, and a child age 
6-9. The family members are assumed to engage in only moderate physi-
46 
cal activity. Thus the food stamp allowance, based on the needs 
of this hypothetical family, may be generous or niggardly for real 
four person households, depending upon their similarity to the hypo-
thetical family. A household with adolescent children and a male 
head would be likely to find their coupon allotment inadequate, while 
a mother with three preschool youngsters might find the same allotment 
generous. 
The introduction of uniform national standards in 1971 was inten-
ded to simplify administration and insure equitable treatment for re-
cipients in different states. However, uniform standards have been 
44 
Ibid., pp. 759-760. 
45 
Ibid. 
46 
Ibid., p. 637. 
attacked as inequitable to those partic4>ants. residing in high ;food 
47 
cost areas. Arthur Schiff, Director, New York City Food stamp 
Program, testified before the senate Select Committee on Nutrition 
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and Human Needs that the program, in effect, transfers money from the 
48 
North to the South. Food costs do vary substantially between 
urban areas. The Bureau of Labor Statistics eBLS) "lower" budget 
for a hypothetical family of four in the Autumn of 1973 found that 
the annual cost of the same market basket of food at home ranged from 
$1852 in Dallas to $2300 in New York; a difference of $448 or 24%. 
(The food expenditures in the BLS"loweru budget are based on the 
49 
USDA's Low Cost Diet Plan). Other critics of benefit levels have 
noted that the USDA prices its market baskets at supermarket chains 
whose prices are lower than the Mom and Pop stores frequented by many 
50 
low-income shoppers. 
Another frequent complaint~s that despite mandated semi-annual 
47 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
"Hunger 1973" and Press Reaction, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1973), p. 4. 
48 U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
Hearings: Nutrition and Human Needs -- 1971, Part 3: Food Stamp Re-
gulations, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1971), 
p. 794. 
49U•S• Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, ~ cit., 
Table 1. 
50 Howard Kunreuther, "Why the Poor May 1?ay More for:Food: Theo-
retical and Empirical Eyidence," U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nu-
trition and Human Needs; Reference Material to Part I",Food priceCha-
nges, 1973";'74,·~ cit., pp. 110-125. - --- ---
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schedule up-dates, increases in benefits. have £;ai.1ed to match in-
creases in the cost of food. The National Nutri.ti.on l?olicy study 
issued in June, 1974 notes that the "poor person's price index" Ca 
price index weighted to reflect the consumption patterns of low-income 
households) has advanced more rapidly than the Consumer Price Index 
(CPI). The Policy study argues that in periods like 1973-74 when 
food prices rose more rapidly than other-prices, poor households, 
which spend a larger percentage of their budget on food than do middle 
and upper income households, suffered disproportionately from in-
flation. As upper and middle income consumers .altered the composi-
tion of their food purchases by switching to cheaper items, the de-
mand for these items increased and inflated their price more than the 
rate of inflation in more expensive foods. For example, from 1967 
to 1974, the price of hamburger increased by 89% while that of sirloin 
51 
advanced by only 60%. Grains, which are an important component of 
low-income diets, exhibited larger than average price increases due 
to crop failures and foreign purchases as well as increases in domes-
tic demand. The poor, who are already consuming the lowest cost items, 
have few substitution options. Some have suggested that the poor are 
responding by eating less and/or eating pet food not intended for hu-
. 52 
man consumption. These charges are practically impossible to 
5lU•S • senate, Select Committee on·Nutrition and H.uman Needs, 
Panel on Nutrition and Special Groups: National Nutrition );lolicy 
Study: Report and ReCOltlIllendations -- VIII, (Washin~ton, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1974l, p. 19. 
52 
Ibid., p. 20. 
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document. 
While the "poor person IS. price index" has advanced sharply, 
these increases are reflected in the cost of the Economy Food Plan, 
although where may be some time lag. From March, 1973 to March, 
1974 the price of the Economy Food Plan increased by 21% while the 
Liberal Cost Food Plan, the most expensive of USDA's five plans, in-
53 
creased by only 16.9%. The cost of the Economy Food Plan is re-
flected, with some lag, in food stamp allocations. Table IV corn-
pares increases in per capita monthly food stamp bonuses with in-
creases in the CPI, increases in the BLS" cost of food at home" com-
ponent of the CPI, and with changes in average monthly payments per 
recipient under the AFDC program. Table IV reveals that food 
stamp bonuses have outpaced inflation and were nearly three times 
greater than increases in AFDC payments. Despite this rapid rate of 
increase, it is possible that the absolute level of bonus payments is 
inadequate as many critics contend. While President Ford attempted 
to reduce Food Stamp bonuses through raising the price of stamps to 
54 
many participants, Congress has overwhelmingly rejected this policy. 
In sum, bonuses under the Food stamp Program have increased rapidly 
and are likely to continue to do so given the depth of Congressional 
support. Charges that the progX'am has ;l;ailed to keep pace with in-
flation are not s.ubstantiated by the data. 
!54Nancy Hicks, "Food Stamp Price Freeze voted by House, 374 to 
38,"TheNew- York Times, (February 5, 1975), p. 1. 
Nancy Hicks, "Senate, 76-8, votes Freeze in Price of Food 
stamps, I: The New York Times, (February 6, 1975), p. 1. 
TABLE IV 
RATES OF CHANGE IN THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX, THE PRICE OF FOOD AT 
HOME INDEX, FOOD STAMP BONUSES AND AFDC PAYMENTS, F. Y. 1971-1974 
Fiscal Year Percent 
1971 1972 1973 1974 Change 
Consumer Price Index1 
(1967=100) 119.0 123.3 128.2 139.7 17 
price10f Food at Home Index (1967=100) 114.6 118.8 128.6 153.9 34 
Mean Monthly Food S2amp 
Bonus per Recipient $13.40 $13.50 $14.50 $19.36 44 
Mean Monthly AFDC )ay-
ment per Recipient $49.65 $51.65 $54.10 $56.95 15 
1 
Monthly Labor Review, XCIV, 8, (August, 1971), pp. 104-106; 
XCV, 6, (June, 1972), pp. 94-96; XCVI, 4, (April, 1973), pp. 110-
112; XCVII, 1, (January, 1974), pp. 110-112; XCVIII, 1, (January, 
1975), p. 113. 
2 
u.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
Food Stamp Program: Statistical Summary of Operations, June, 1971, 
1972, 1973, and 1974, mimeos. 
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3U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs; 
Nati onal Nutr; ti OD pol; cy study' Report and Recommendations -- ~, 
~ashington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1974), 
p. 45. Figures are for December of the years indicated. 
83 
Many critics of'the ~ood st~~ ~rogram have accused the USDA of 
footdragging in expanding program ~artici~at~on. There has been 
a large leap in the number of program participants: in July, 1970 
nearly 7,000,000 individuals received food stamps -- by January, 1975 
17,000,000 were benefitting from the program. 55 Despite this growth, 
56 
it is estimated that less than 40% of the eligible are reached. 
Unlike public housing programs which have long waiting lists of el-
igible households that can not be accomodated, the Fbod Stamp Program 
is open-ended. All those who are certified as eligible may receive 
benefits. Thus critics view participation in the program as low 
and blame the lack of response, in part; on inadqquate publicity for 
the program. Critics claim that many potential recipients are simply 
57 
unaware that they are eligible. While it may be the case that pub-
licity has been ineffective, the failure of eligible households to 
perceive that they qualify for benefits may also be due to the com-
plexity of the formula for calculating net income for food stamps. 
Even official estimates of the number of eligible are extremely rough 
because the incidencaof permissable deductions in various income 
55 Ibid. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
"Food Stamp ~rogram: Statistical sunanary of O~erations, J'uly, 1971," 
(April 6, 1972), mimeo. 
56Gary w. Bickel and .Maurice MacDonald, "l.'articipation Rates in 
the Food Stamp l,lr,og:r::cuo: Estimated Levels for 1974, by State,: in u.S. 
Senate, Select Committee on Nutrit~on and Human Needs, Rep£rt~Nu­
trition ~ Special' GrOU;eS, Af>pendix B to' J;la:t:'t r -.,.;.. '~ood . Stamps, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government ~rinting Office, 1975). 
57"Food stamp Fund Freed by J'udge," The Ne"lY"'York Times, (October 
14, 1974), p. 19. 
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classes is essentially unknown. 
Court decisions~ compellin~ mo~e extensive out~each effo~ts to 
b~ing new households into the program, tend to substantiate the 
charge o~ footdragging. Judge Miles Lord, a federal district court 
judge in Minneapolis, held in October, 1974 that Agriculture Secretary 
Earl Butz and the USDA had failed to comply with the outreach provi-
sions of the 1971 Amendments to the Food Stamp Act. In his ruling, 
Judge Lord con~luded, 
Congress intended outreach action, but inaction at 
both the state and federal level was what actually 
took place. (Butz's) response to the Congressional. 
directive, when viewed in its totality, is fairly 
described as a total failure on his part to do what 
Congress clearly intended him to do. 58 
Judge Lord also noted that from April, 1972 to June, 1973 the number 
of persons receiving federal food assistance actually declined becat.:e 
increases in the Food Stamp Program were more than offset by decreases 
in the Commodities Distribution Program. 
59 
the accuracy of the data in the suit. 
The USDA did not challenge 
The USDA has exhibited a lack of enthusiasm for its own program 
uncharacteristic of a bureaucracy. Analysts of bureaucratic beha-
vior have emphsized the tendency of officials to expand and protect 
60 
their domain. In contrast, for several years, spokesmen for the 
USDA sought to transfer the Food Stamp ~ro~ram to HEW. The USDA 
58 
Ibid. 
59Ibid. 
60 Ant.hony Downs, ~'!~ Bureaucracy, (Boston: Little, Brown, 
and Co., 1966). 
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was also in ;favor o;f· HR 1 f a version o;f ~i.xon \ s r~ily Assistance 
Plan that would have cash.edout food staIOpS. In June, 1972 Assis-
tant Secretary of Agriculture, Richard Lyng, testified before the 
Senate Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs. In response 
to Senator Percy's suggestion that food stamp benefits be liberalized, 
Lyng commented, 
We in the Department of Agriculture have tried as 
best we can to administer this program in full coopera-
tion with other agencies that are perhaps more expert 
than we in this area -- OEO, HEW, and so on. But I 
think it is appropriate now ••• that we begin to look 
at the whole problem of poverty and not try to solve 
that problem by simply adding more funds to the feeding 
p~ogram.61 
In response to Senator percy's questions about the appropriateness of 
the Food Stamp Program for the elderly indigent, Lyng replied, 
It seems to me that we might be wise, as a Nation, to 
perhaps ~liminate the high administrative costs of the 
Food Stamp Program in terms of elderly people. Of 
course, the administration has been trying to move in 
this direction in terms of HR I for families as well; 
but, particularly for elderly people, there seems to 
me to be justification for a cash allowance to give 
them flexibility to use that cash in many ways. 62 
In sum, the Food Stamp Program, which is primarily a welfare program 
for the urban poor, has been a misfit in a department primarily re-
sponsive to rural middle-class interests. 
6lU•S • Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
Hearings: Nutrition ~ Hllm:m ~s ill3.. ... 2£.:... Cit., pp_ 675-676. 
62 
Ibid., p_ 671. 
86 
In addition to the lack o~ of~icial a~do~ ~O~ the Food St~p 
p~.ogram at the ~ederal leve.lt the l?~,ogX'axo. has been chronically under-
staffed at the state and county levels. In response to the admini-
strative cost-sharing fermula .outlined above, states have attempted 
te keep administrative cests dewn by understaffing the program. 
Oregen is .one .of the many states that has fellewed this pelicy. The 
state feed stamp .office in Salem has a staff .of feur, precisely the 
same number it had when the Feed stamp Pregram came te Oregen as a 
small scale Multnemah Ceunty pilet preject in 1963. Multnemah Ceunty, 
which had nearly 44,000 pregram participants in February, 1975, has .one 
field investigater. This may be one explanatien fer the lew .official 
incidence .of fraud. 63 In July threugh September .of 1974, typical 
months, ne benefits in Oregen were terminated because .of failure te 
, ,64 
cemply w1th pregram requ1rements. 
In several states, staff shortages have resulted in long lines 
at food s'tamp .offices and delays in certificatien which have undoubted-
ly disceuraged petential participants. Fer example, all night lines 
at feod stamp offices and one month waits for appeintments prevailed 
65 in Arizona during November, 1974. 
63 1 " S t' d Deug as Yeater, SupervLser, IssuLng ec 1on, Fee 
Department .of Administrative Services, Multnomah county, 
terview, ~ebruary 7, 1975. 
stamp Divisien, 
Oregen, in-
64Multnomah County, Oregen, feod staml? O~fice, "Report of Reduc-
tien/Terminatien of ;peod Stamp Benefits," .Form ,FNS-26S (9-71), (July, 
september, 1974), mimeo. 
65"Feod Stamp Lines Abate in Arizena," The New 'York 'Times, (Decem-
ber 27, 1974), p. 27. 
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While the lines have diroinisned in that state, some communities still 
take as long as three montr~ to process applications and certify eli-
'b'l't 66 g~ ~ ~.y. The new administrative cost-sharing formula, discussed 
above, shou'l,d encour,age states to ltIore adequately staff the program 
but shou1Cl also add to its administrative price tag., 
In addition to the high transaction costs imposed on the eligible 
by long lines, transportation costs inhibit participation by the less 
mobile. Non-Public Assistance participants must travel to certifi-
cation offices periodically to be certified and recertified. Further-
more, they must travel to a designated distributor to receive their 
stamps one to four times per month, depending on the purchase sche-
dule selected by the household. Certification and issuing points 
are particularly inaccessible to those in rural areas. However, even 
in cities, transportation may be a serious obstacle. For example, 
in Multnomah County there are no certification or issuing offices west 
of the Willamette River. Transportation costs impose particular 
burdens on the elderly and disabled. While stamps are sold in some 
public housing projects and are mailed to a small percentage of house-
holds witn severe transportation difficulties, most food stamp recipi-
ents are required to do a considerable amount of traveling. Thus the 
structure of the program probably inhibi.ts participation. 
66 
Nancy Hicks, IlUse of ;Food stamps Soars as Jobless Turn to 
Them," Th.e ~ York Times, (January 29, 1975}, p. 1. 
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Another p~ogram attribute associated withdamRening participa-
. tion is the purchase price o;e the stamps. welfare advocates in 
Oregon opposed the switch from commodities distribution to food 
stamps largely on the grounds that compelling low-income households 
to pay for stamps (commodities were free) would discourage participa-
67 
tion. Accumulating sufficient cash at one time to purchase stamps 
may require a degree of planning uncharacteristic of low-income 
households, many of whom have irregular incomes. Prior to 1971, 
participating households were required to produce their entire month's 
purchase payment at one time. However, since 1971, households have 
been offered a variable purchase option which allows them to purchase 
stamps in quarter-month or half-month bundles. Thus the pressure to 
produce one large lump sum payment has been relieved. In addition, 
households do not forfeit their eligibility if they fail to redeem 
their entire momthly allotment of ATPs. Despite this flexibility, 
the National Nutrition Policy Study suggests that purchase prices are 
too high and that the cost of stamps inhibits participation. The 
study recommends a price reduction or a free stamp policy. The free 
stamp policy suggested by the Study calls for the issuance of coupons 
equal to the bonus value of the stamps alone rather than the bonus plus 
purchase price coupon value. 
68 
size and income, as now. 
67 Douglas yeater,2£:... cit. 
Bonuses could still vary with family 
6Bu.s. Senate, select Committee on Nutrition and HUman Needs, 
Panel of Nutrition and Special Groups,~cit., pp. 31-33. 
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Another si~nificant impediment to participation in the Food stamp 
P~ogram may be the· s~i9JtlO. attached to the us;e of stamps-. Gillim 
notes, 
perhaps the key element in the program -- the 
stamps themselves -- pose the greatest obstacle to 
a person considering participation in the program. 
By requiring the use of food stamps instead of money, 
the food stamp program publicly identifies the reci-
pient of the subsidy at the time he buys his food --
probably his largest and most conspicuous purchase. 
For large numbers of housewives the grocery is a center 
where neighbors meet. There is no privacy at the check-
out counter. Many sensitive persons must refuse to en-
ter the program rather than suffer the embarrassment of 
being forced to pay with stamps and thereby reveal their 
financial difficulties before people they know. 69 
Willard Renkin, Multnomah County Food stamp Coordinator, concurs that 
the psychic costs of the program, significantly discourage participa-
70. 
tion and are particularly severe for the elderly. 
Some of the stigma attached to stamps is being reduced due to 
recent efforts of labor unions to inform unemployed and striking mem-
bers of program benefits and to urge them to take advantage of them. 
The Wall Street Journal recently printed excerpts of union publicity 
designed to increase the acceptability of food stamps to workers. An 
union official was quoted as saying, "Workers in need have a right to 
stamps. When they're working our members pay taxes so others can 
69Marion Hamilton Gillim, "An Economic Analysis of Federal Food 
Subsidies," The Economics. of Federal Subsid¥ pro<]raIJls; Part .~ -- Se-
lected Subsidies, u.s. Con<;Jress, .:;Joint Economic·CollJlllittee, Subcom-
mittee on Priorities. and Economy in Goverrnp.ent,(}'Jashington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Ji'rinti,ng Office, 1974).1 p. 10.9Q. ' 
70Willard Renkini~ cit. 
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71 have food stamps. n. E;t;forts to reach non-;Public As.sistance house-
holds are starting to pay-otf. In January, 1975 the New York Times 
reported an important shiXt in the composition of tood stamp recipi-
ents: for the first time, more than 50% of the recipients were non-
Public Assistance househo1ds. 72 Increasingly, middle-class families, 
squeezed by inflation, appear to be joining the program. Wall 
Street Journal interviews with officials in the Massachusetts Depart-
ment of public Welfare revealed that 
Food stamp applicants are incrasing1y 'you and me' 
••• Among those applying for food stamps these days 
are accountants, truck drivers,goverrunent employees, 
factory workers, college students and even a few 
Massachusetts school teachers. 73 
As more non-Public Assistance households join the program, the stigma 
attached to participation is likely to diminish. 
Some critics of the Food Stamp Program are more concerned with 
the recipients' alleged abuse of the program than with the issue of 
stigma. For example, many are strongly opposed to aiding strikers. 
While this issue has yet to be resolved by the courts, strikers are 
currently receiving benefits. Assistance to college students has 
also been controversial. The Wall Street Journal editorialized re-
7111Layoff Cushion: Unions Teach Jobless Members How to Get Food 
Stamps,ll The Wall St;reet Journal, (J'lovember 1;2, 1974>', p. 1. 
72Nancy Hicks., "Use o~ rood staIllPS. Soars as. Jobless Turn to Them," 
.9£!.. cit. 
73David G'UlUpert, lIOn the Dole: Becaus.e Glf Inflation, :Middle-Class 
Families Join ;Food Stamp Rolls·, II The Wall Street Journal, OJecember 
20, 1974), p. 1. . - --
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cently that while many: genuinely needy;e'aroili.es ~ail to obtain ;food 
stamps" ••• college.students have been taking advantage of them in 
growing numbers, transforming a program designed to provide a balanced 
diet for the poor into a form of government scholarship.,,74 The 
USDA responded to this criticism by declaring students ineligible for 
food stamps as of March 1, 1975 if their parents claim them as depen-
dents for income tax purposes?5 This ruling still does not solve 
the "hippie connnu11e ll problem which has upset some program critics for 
many years. In 1971, the USDA.sought to indirectly deal with the 
issue by denying benefits to households consisting of unrelated indi-
viduals. This policy was struck down by the courts, but the issue 
remains a live one. The Wall Street Journal complains that food 
stamps are "subsidizing the diets of able-bodied young men and women 
who are using food stamps not to relieve poverty, but to allow them to 
maintain a preferred life-style. 1I76 
In addition to criticisms relating to the "unworthiness" of some 
recipients, there are persistent reports that food stamps are being 
used to purchase luxuries that few non-participants can afford. Since 
no record is made of items purchased with food stamps and no market 
74 
"Food stamps and the Future," Th.e Wall street Journal, (;Tanu-
ary 15, 1975), p. 10.. -- -
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survey has been conducted, it is dif:f;icult to estimate how prevalent 
steak is 'in the sooPPi?g carts of food stamp hoUsehold.s. Gillim 
notes that the publicness of food stamp purchases~ay trigger reac-
tions to shopping patterns which are probably not characteristic of 
the program. 
other persons buying in the grocery, especially non-
participants in the program, will note examples of extra-
vagance or poor judgement in the choice of groceries bought 
with stamps and base their condemnation of the entire pro-
gram of family food subsidies on what may be only occasional 
indiscretions in buying. 77 
There have also been unsubstantiated reports of black markets in food 
stamps or food purchased with food stamps. 
Concern over the operation of the Food stamp Program has grown 
with its share of the budget and its importance as a welfare program. 
The Food Stamp Program, by the second half of 1974, in effect, guaran-
teed an $1800 annual income to a household of four. The concept of 
an income guarantee is extremelyi controversial and was explicity re-
jected by Congress in 1969 and 1970 when it considered the Family 
Assistance Plan and HR 1. While the food stamp guarantee is in-kind 
ra~~er than in cash {and therefore more politically palatable}r it is 
nevertheless a guaranteed income, available to intact families, house-
holds of unrelated individuals, households without children, and the 
working poor who have been r,egulated out of most cash 1?ublic Assistance 
programs. strong Congressional support for the p~ogram has probably 
77 
Marion Hamilton'Gillim, ~ cit. 
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been aided b¥ the ;t;act that the program has. never been· discussed 
in terms of an income guarantee; instead it has beeriyiewed as a re-
sponse to the popular "hunger issue". 
In his analysis of the politics of the Family Assistance Plan 
Moynihan notes: 
All of the parties to the dispute within the admini-
stration, and presumably most of those observing it from 
outside regarded the establishment of a guaJanteed income 
as a profound departure from existing practice. Some were 
for it, some against: a~l agreed it would constitute a quan-
tum change. And yet this was not quite the "reality". 
The Food Stamp Program, was, in essence, a universal system 
of income support for the working poor. 78 
The distinction between an "incremental" change and a "quan-
tum leap forward" is much in the eye of the beholder ••• 
The general observation may be made that in retrospect pro-
grams such as food stamps will often be seen to have involved 
major changes in policy which were obscured at the time be-
cause the start-up costs of the prqgram were small and be-
cause it was not presented as anything of extraordinary im-
port. 79 
The growing importance of food st.1.Il\pS as an income support mecha-
nism is suggested by Table IV which reveals that food stamp benefits 
have been increasing much more rapidly than benefits under AFDC, the 
major cash program for the non-elderly poor. Table IV shows that 
while the average food stamp bonus per recipient increased by 44% 
from F.Y. 1971-1974, the average monthly per capita AFDC payment regis-
78 
Daniel .;F •. Moynihan, The politics. 2f s.Guaranteed. Income: The 
Nixon Administration ~ the Family Assistance pian, (New York: vin-
tage Books, ;L9731, p. 175. 
79 
Ibid. 
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tered a gain o~ only 15%. While semi-annual u~dates of food stamp 
schedules are required, updates of state ;l?ublic Assistance s.chedules 
are not. Table V indicates the relationship between food stamp and 
AFDC payments for the U.S., Oregon, the five highest AFDC benefit 
states and the five lowest AFDC benefit states. Table V reveals 
that food stamps have become a major component of the welfare package. 
In some states with low AFDC payments, food stamp benefits now ex-
ceed cash benefits. The National Nutrition Policy study viewed 
this trend with some alarm. It commented: 
The dramatic increases in the cost of the Food Stamp 
program do not alter the fact that they move us in a 
direction all thoughtful stUdents of income maintenance 
long ago recognized as unwise. If food stamp benefits 
improve apace with welfare ~noreases that is one thing. 
But we are now seeing food stamp benefits increase in 
place of welfare or other forms of cash support, and 
that is a wholly different -- and unacceptable -- matter. 80 
While recommending the ca'shing out of food stamps, the Study .assessed 
this as politically unrealistic and turned its attention to program 
modifications, some of which have been discussed above. 
The political popularity of the Food Stamp Program may be 
viewed as evidence of the existence of "goods specific" utility inter-
dependence. The public has been willing to support a large in-kind 
income transfer program during the same time period when new cash 
transfer program s were rejected lthe Ji'amily Assistance Plan and HR 1) 
and when per recipient benefits under AFDe, ~ old cash program, have 
80 
U.S. Senate, select committee on .Nutri.tion and Human Needs, 
Panel on Nutrition and Special Groups, ~ cit., p. 48. 
TABLE V 
1 FOOD STAMP BONUSES AND AFDC PAYMENTS, U. S. AND SELECTED STATES 
Mean Monthly 
Food Stamp 
Bonus Per 
Recipient 
January, 1974 
U. S. $19.54 
Oregon $21.08 
Five Lowest AFDC States 
Mississippi $17.58 
Alabama $23.27 
South Carolina $24.03 
Louisiana $23.99 
Texas $21..01 
Five Highest AFDC States 
Wisconsin $14.58 
Minnesota $17.63 
New York $12.91 
Massachusetts $13.83 
Michigan $13.81 
1 
Mean Monthly 
AFDC Payment 
Per Recipient 
November, 1973 
$56.86 
$68.17 
$14.45 
$21.61 
$24.34 
$25.25 
$30.77 
$93.89 
$82.78 
$81.34 
$79.83 
$73.77 
Food stamp 
Bonus as 
Percent of 
AFDC Payment 
35 
31 
129 
105 
100 
96 
68 
16 
22 
16 
18 
19 
95 
Source:, u.S. Senate, ,Select, Committeeon .. Nutrition and .. Hurnan 
Needs, National Nutrition PolicyStudX:Reportand'Recommendations --
VIII, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, June, 1974), 
pp. 42-43. 
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been relatively stagnant. Unlike housing programs, the ability of 
the market to supply food to the low-income has never been questioned. 
However, like housing programs, certain assumptionscabout the inelas-
ticity of the demand of poor households have been made. Underlying 
the Food stamp Program is the premiss that low-income families need 
to be induced to consume an "adequate" amount of food. It is feared 
that general income transfers would be "wasted" by the recipients 
from the point of view of the taxpayer. As with low-income housing 
programs, the efficacy of the food stamp strategy depends on the 
shape of taxpayer and potential recipient's preferences, on the 
relative administrative costs of various transfer schemes, and on 
the degree to which consumption patterns of program participants 
differ from those of nonparticipants of equivalent income. These 
issues will be examined in an empirical investigation of the Food 
Stamp Program in Multnomah County. 
CHAPTER rl 
CRITERIA FOR THE EVALUATION OF IN-KIND TRANSFERS 
Hypotheses ~ be Tested 
The preceding chapters on the development of the utility inter-
dependence framework in welfare theory and on the current operation 
of two major in-kind transfer programs indicate some fertile territory 
for empirical investigation. In-kind programs are emphasized in 
this research because of their rapid rate of growth relative to cash 
transfers (Table I) and because of their current dominance of the 
welfare package (Table II). The strong political support for in-kind 
programs suggests that this transfer mode will command an even ~arger 
share of the welfare budget in the immediate future. Given the in-
creasing importance of transfers in-kind, the many untested and fre-
quently unstated premisses underlying this transfer mode demand ex-
planation. 
In-kind transfers assume that the "natural" consumption patterns 
of intended program beneficiaries impose external costs on the larger 
community, that these external costs are diminished by transfers in-
kind which induce alterations in consumption patterns, and that the 
costs associated witiL such. trans:f;ers dQ not exceed the sum of private 
and social bene:f;its derived ~rom them. In the vocabulary of wel:f;are 
theory, in-kind transters reflect a belief in the existence of "goods-
specific" utility interdependence and a conv~ction that special incen-
tives are required to persuade the poor to purchase a socially accep-
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table level of basic commodities. Generalized income transfers are 
rejected on the grounds that the un~egulated ~rket behavior of con-
sumers (and in some cases, of suppliers) would not -maximize social 
utility. 
Empirical validation of these important assumptions has not been 
rigorously attempted. The following research gaps, vital to a proper 
evaluation of the efficacy of in-kind strategies need to be filled. 
In-kind transfers assume that the consumption patterns of the target 
population of intended beneficiaries are substantially altered by in-
kind programs, but actual comparaisons of the consumption patterns of 
program participants and eligible nonparticipants have been neglected. 
To what extent to in-kind programs succeed in altering market behavior? 
Private and social benefits of transfer programs are assumed to equal 
or exceed program costs. Is this the case? How does the magnitude 
of conceivab~e private and social benefits compare with the market 
value of the transfer and the administrative and other costs of the 
program? In-kind transfers are expected to reach the target popula-
tion. To what extent are program benefits, in fact, distributed in 
the manner intended by policymakers? 
An empirical examination of the operation of the low-income 
housing and food stamp programs in Multnomah County, Oregon will serve 
as a vehicle for analyzing these important theoreti~al issues. Speci-
fically, the equity and efficiency of in-kind transfers will be asses-
sed by testing the following hypotheses. 
I. In-kind transfers are inefficient. 
A. In-kind transfers are characterized' by bigh administra-
tive and participation costs. 
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B. In-kind transfers do not have the intended impact of sig-
nificantly diminishing the external diseconomies associated 
with the consumption patterns of the target population. 
1. Transfers generous enough to significantly alter 
the consumption patterns of the recipients reach 
'i only a fraction of the eligible and thus have little 
impact on the consumption choices of the target popu-
lation as a whole. 
2. Transfers which reach a large proportion of the eli-
gible are not generous enough to significantly alter 
consumption patterns. 
II. In-kind transfers are inequitable. Those of similar income 
and demographic characteristics do not receive similar treatment. 
Problems in Evaluating Public Progrruns 
There are numerous impediments to the effective evaluation of 
programs aimed at redistributing income. Many of these are a pro-
duct of the political environment of welfare legislation described 
in Chapters I and III. One problem is the tendenc~ of public poli-
cies to have blurred objectives and multiple goals which are not 
clearly we.igh.ted or 1l\a¥ even be in conflict with. one another. For 
example, low-income housing programs have been simultaneously oriented 
to increasLi9 the supply- v! housing and tran~erring income to the 
low-income population; goals which may call for quite different 
program structures. Once the goals of a particular program are 
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identified, criteria for assessing them in the light of broader social 
objectives and for measuring the operation of the program in relation 
to its goals are required. Since there is a wide divergence of 
opinion as to what societal goals, in regard to income redistribution 
ought to be, the researcher must resort to very general standards to 
appraise the adequacy of public transfer programs. At a minimum, 
it is assumed in this work that public transfer programs strive to 
operate equitably and efficiently: that a program should insure the 
equal treatment of equals and that the societal and private benefits 
of a program should be maximized relative to its cost. 
Even when clear criteria for evaluating programs are accepted, 
there are important practical problems which stem from the nature 
of decision-making and administration in the public sector. A serious 
obstacle to program assessment is the control of information by the 
responsible bureaucracies which have aconcratestake in concealing pro-
gram flaws. Oversight by Congressional committees, the General Ac-
counting Office, and the media place limits on the capacity of public 
,agencies to conceal or misrepresent info~atiQnf but program evaluation 
still relies heavil¥ on data ~enerated in house. While explicit 
questions from ccngreasional committees or the G.A.O. do elicit expli-
cit, if uncomfortable, re~ponsesf in many cases, it is not clear to 
outsiders what the key questions should ce. Thus program evaluations 
are difficult, in practice, because evaluations by those responsible 
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for programs, are biased and external evaluations. suffer' from the con-
trol of data by· insiders. 
The effective evaluation of public programs is further inhibited 
by their non-market character. In the private sector, a firm has a 
strong incentive to engage in self-criticism, since failure to do so 
may result in a loss of profits, or, in the extreme, bankruptcy. In 
the public sector, the link between budget share (profits) and the 
efficient production of a desired good or service is obscure. The 
future funding of a particular program hinges more heavily on the 
level of past funding and on the characteristics of the political en-
vironment than it does on agency performance. In addition, as discus-
sed above, the standards for measuring the "goodness" of a public 
product are far more controversial than the generally accepted index 
of success in the private sector, profits. 
Despite these unresolved issues, a,' set of criteria will be pro-
posed for evaluating in-kind transfer programs. The criteria will be 
~l extension and specification of standards suggested by Weisbrod 
1 
for evaluating programs aimed at the redistribution of income. 
Weisbrod contends that transfer programs ought to: 
1. Minimize administrative costs. 
2. Maximize "target efficiencyll Croaxiroize the l?articipation 
of those in the target 9rouP and miniIllize the J?articipation 
of thos.e outside the target 9rOul?~ 
lBurton A. Weisbrod, "Collective .Action"andtne Distribution of 
Income, II in l;'ub1ic 'Expenditures and}?olicY"A;n.a1ysis, Robext H. Haveman 
and Julius Margolis C.edi tors}, (Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 
1970), pp. 117-141. ' 
3. Maximize a110cative efficiency (minimize substitution 
effects). 
4. Maximize nondemeaning benefits (minimize the "stigma" 
associated with transfer programs). 
5. Maximize the utility of the taxpayers and the transfer 
recipients. 
6. Maximize program flexibility over time. 
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Weisbrod notes that these criteria are frequently in conflict 
with one another and difficult to operationa1ize. For example, pro-
grams which are highly accurate in channeling benefits to the target 
group may require large administrative costs, depending on how the 
target group is defined. In-kind transfers, which are intended to 
have substitution effects, involve trade-offs with a110cative effi-' 
ciency. Some of the empirical dimensions of these trade-offs will 
be analyzed with the aid of a model for evaluating in-kind transfers. 
This model, presented below, operationa1izes most of Weisbrod's 
criteria. It will be employed in two empirical investigations of the 
strength of the case for in-kind transfers. 
A Model for Evaluating In-Kind Transfers 
A model for evaluating in-kind income transfer programs appears 
in Figure 2. The model proposes methods for measuring key concepts 
identified in the theoretical discussion of "goods-specific" utility 
interdependence in Chapter II and in Weisbrod's work discussed in 
this chapter. 
103 
A 
AB = Recipient Payment 
B 
BC = Cash Value of Transfer 
to Recipient 
AC = Private Benefits 
AD = Market Value 
C BD = In-Kind Income 
CD = Substitution Effects 
D 
DE = Administrative and 
Other Costs 
BE = Program or Public Costs 
AE = Total Costs 
E 
Figure 2. A model for evaluating in-kind transfers. 
All of the following definitions refer to value per recipient. 
AB = Recipient Payment, if any. 
BC = Cash Value of the In-Kind Transfer to the Recipient. 
AC = Cash Value of the In-Kind Good or Service to the Recipient or 
Private Benefits = AB + BC. AC is defined as the recipient's 
point of indifference between an in-kind and a cash transfer 
or what the recipient would have been willing to pay for the 
in-kind good or service, if he had received cash. 
AD = Market Value of the in-kind good or service or its unsubsidized 
cash value. AD may be equal to or greater than AC, depending 
upon the recipient's marginal propensity to consume the good 
or serVice in question. 
BD = In-Kind Income provided by the transfer program. 
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CD = Substitution Effects or the utility loas suffered by the reci-
pient from tne distortion of his consumption Rattern resulting 
from the. acceptance of an in-kind transfer. CD;:; 0 when the 
marginal propensity of the recipient to con~e the good or 
service in question is equal to or greater tlian the consumption 
level demanded by the in-kind program. 
DE = Administrative and Other Pr9sramCosts. 
BE = BD + DE = Program ~Public Costs or the sum of the market 
value of the transfer minus the recipient's contribution and 
the other costs of making the transfer. 
AE = AS + BE = Total Costs. 
Figure 2 includes social costs, but it does not contain an esti-
mate of social benefits. While theoretically social benefits are 
measurable, in practice, it is not feasible to directly assess the 
external benefits of transfer programs from existing data. However, 
De Salvo has suggested an indir.ect method of estimating what the mini-
mal external benefits must be for a pr<;>gram to "pay-off" from a benefit-
cost viewpoint. He suggests that social or external benefits must, 
at a minimum, equal total costs minus the cash value of the in-kind 
2 good or service to the recipient. Equation 1 contains De Salvo's 
conceptualization of minimum required social benefits (SB) in terms 
of Eigure 2. 
(1) sBInin = AE - AC 
This equation permits the comparison of pr.ograllls on the basis of the 
minimum external benefits that they require to warrant their costs 
and sugges.ts that pr.Ograms with high.. administrative costs require com-
2Joseph S. De Salvo, "A Methodology for Evaluatin~ Housing 
programs, u Journal:. of Re9inn~ Science, XI, 2 {J\ugust, 1971), pp. 
173-185. 
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mensurately l~rge external benefits to be deemed efficient. 
While De Salvo's approach considers the size of social benefits 
required to cover costs, his methodology does not measure actual social 
benefits. An indirect attempt will be made to approximate the actual 
social benefits of in-kind programs through an analysis of substitution 
effects and participation rates. The discussion of utility inter-
dependence in Chapter II suggested that in-kind transfers are evidence 
of the taxpayers' desire to transfer particular goods and services 
rather than general income. If this is the case, then the magnitude 
of substitution effects, or the degree to which in-kind transfers in-
crease the consumption of particular goods or services, may be used 
as a proxy for external benefits. While the receipient suffers dis-
utility from altering his consumption patterns, presumably tax-
payers experience increments in uti1i~y related to the size of such 
alterations. 
The effect of changes in consumption patterns or substitution 
effects on program nonparticipants is linked not only to the size of 
the alterations in expenditures but to the extent to which the desired 
effects prevail among the target population. If a program induces 
large substitution effects but reaches only a small fraction of the 
eligible, then it is unlikely to signiiicantl¥ dimini.sh the negative 
externalities associated with the consumption vatterns o~ the target 
population as a whole. for example, installing 5% of the occupants 
of substandard housing in high quality units ma~ have large effects 
on the consumption patterns of those selected, but it is unlikely 
to significantly alter the impact of substandard housing on the non-
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poor because 95% 0:1; the tCl:rget population r~ains in s.ubstandard 
accomodations. In an e:l;fort to incorporate these keY7ariables in 
an estimate of social bene:l;its, Equation (2) will he used to approxi-
mate the social or external benefits of in-kind programs. 
(2) SB = ClD X PR 
where CD equals the substitution effects, if any, el±cited by the 
transfer (Figure 2~) and PR is a participation ratio··. defined as the 
number of program participants divided by the number of program eli-
gible. Equation (2) indicates that if there are no substitution ef-
fects then there are no external benefits. This is a result of the 
stringent assumption that in-kind transfers are motivated solely by 
the desire to increase the consumption of particular commodities 
rather than to transfer income in general. 
While participation ratios are important in the assessment of 
external benefits, they may also be viewed as indicators of supply 
bottlenecks and/or participation costs. Low participation ratios 
suggest that there is a limited supply of a transfer or that the 
costs of participation outweigh its benefits from the intended bene-
:l;iciary's perspective. In pr.ograms with elastic supply but low 
participation ratios, the preceding chapters suggest that the following 
factors are important in the potential recipient's participation 
decision. 
1. In-kind transfers may have in:l;oxmaiion, transaction, 
and transportation costs whi.ch exceed the value of the 
transfer to the recipient. For example, there may be 
excessive red tape, complex eligiblity requirements, 
inadequate program publicity and/or inconveniently 
located vendors. 
2. The disutility of altering preferred consumption 
patterns required by the in-kind tr~nsfer may exceed 
its value to the recipient. tIn l?igure 2 f CD 1ll.ay be 
greater than BC). 
3. The high psychic costs associated with some programs 
which publicly identify and stigmatize the recipient 
may exceed the value of the transfer to the recipient. 
4. The transfer may not be available in the geographic 
area in which some of the eligible reside. 
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Thus participation ratios may be important indicators of participation 
costs as well as a component in the evaluation of social benefits. 
The model presented in Figure 2 and Equations (1) and (2) 
will be employed in an empirical evaluation of the low-income housing 
and Food stamp programs in Multnomah County, Oregon. These programs 
will be evaluated exclusively in the context of their equity and 
efficiency as ~oods-specific income transfer mechanisms. Other 
functions that thesa programs may serve will not be dealth with in 
this research. Chapters V and VI contain the empirical results for 
housing and food stamps respectively, while Chapter VII relates these 
results to the proposed hypothes~and the theoretical framework of 
utility interdependence. 
CHAPTER V 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF IN-KIND TRANSFE,RS: THE CASE or LOW-
INCONE HOUSING 
In this chapter, the model presented in Chapter IV will be ap-
plied to the low-income housing programs managed by the Housing Autho~ 
rity of Portland (HAP). All HAP data are for April 1, 1972 to 
March 31, 1973, (HAP fiscal year 1972) unless otherwise noted. (This 
unconventional fiscal year, beginning in April, is the HUD accounting 
period and does not conform to accounting pericds ±nother federal de-
partmen ts • ) HAP's jurisdiction extends over Multnomah County, which 
includes the City of Portland. As of 1972, HAP's inventory included 
1400 conventional public housing units, 526 Turnkey public housing 
units, and approximately 1660 privately owned, leased units which HAP 
sublet to low-income households. 
Program Costs 
The first step in evaluating housing programs as an income trans-
fer strategy is to assess program costs or BE in Figure 2 of Chapter 
IV. For conventional and Turnkey structures, owned by HAP, program 
costs are the sum of 1) capital costs, 21 operatinc;J subsi..di.es and 3) 
tax subsidies. For leased units., p~o<;:Jram cOsts consist solely of 
operating s.ubsidies. 
1) Capital Costs. Tables VI and VII. list the orisinal de-
velopment costs of HAP.IS conventional and Turnkey units' and the con-
version of ~hese costs into constant 1972 dollars. Table VIII con-
TABLE VI 
DEVELOPMENT COSTS, CONVENTIONAL PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, 1938-1972 1 
PJ::"oject Project Number Cost in 2 Number Name CD. Units Year Cost 1972 Dollars 
2-1 Columbia Villa 440" 1938 1,683,863 8,793,018 
2-23 Dekum 82 1942 217,833 1,002,453 
2-3 Iris Court 54 194B- 526,939 1,386,682 
Maple Mallory 48 194 
2-8 Peaceful Villa 66 1952 523,152 1,188,982 
2-7 Royal Rose 36 1954 257,099 558,911 
2-9 Royal Rose Annex 9 1959 74,504 137,970 
2-10 Sumner Court 9 1959 91,772 169,948 
2-4 Northwest Tower 180 1963 2,186,639 3,706,168 
2-13 Tamarak 120 1967 1,694,194 2,455,354 
2-5 Columbia Villa Addition 38 196~ 2,405,791 2,797,431 
Hillsdale Terrace 60 197 
2-6 Hollywood East 300 1969 4,349,031 §,a36,289 
2-11 Dekum Court 40 1971 785,857 845,008 
1 Source: Housing Authority of Portland, records. 
2costs were converted to 1972 dollars by using the "Boeckh Index of Construction Costs: 
Apartments, Hotels, and Office Buildings," in 1973 Business statistics, 19th Bienniel Edition, 
U.s. Department of Commerce, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 55. 
3Demolished 1972. 
I-' 
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TABLE VII 
1 DEVELOPMENT COSTS, TURNKEY PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, 1938-1972 
Project Number Cost in 
Name of units Year Cost 1972 Dollars2 
Dahlke Manor 115 1971 2,262,370 2,432,656 
Holgate House 80 1971 1,556,767 1,673,943 
Sellwood Center 112 1971 1,809,195 1,945,371 
Schrunk-Riverview Tower 118 1971 2,109,599 2,268,386 
Williams Plaza 101 1971 1,927,051 2,072,098 
lsource: Housing Authority of Portland, Records. 
2Costs were converted to 1972 dollars by using the "Boeckh Index of Construction Costs: 
~?artments, Hotels, and Office Buildings," in ~Business Statistics, ~ Biennie1 Edition, 
u.S. Department of Commerce, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 55. 
I-' 
I-' 
o 
. TABLE V:U.I 
MODERNIZATION COSTS, CONVENTIONAL ~UBL!C HOUSING, 1969-1972 
tin 1972 dollars}l 
Project Number Project Name Modernization 
2~1 Columbia Villa 1,587,470 
2-3 Iris Court and 100,678 
Maple Mallory 
2-4 Northwest Towers 195,260 
2-7 Royal Rose 203,261 
2-8 Peaceful Villa 88,457 
2-9 Royal Rose Annex 29,067 
2-10 Sumner Court 24,614 
costs 
1 Source: Housing Authority of Portland, Records. Costs 
were converted to 1972 dollars by using the "Boeckh Index of Con-
struction costs: Apartments, Hotels, and Office Buildings," in 
1973 Business Statistics, 19th Biennie1 Edition, U.S. Department 
of Commerce, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1973), p. 55. 
III 
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tains HAP's expenditures ;for :l\lode;rnization a!;;. ot: 19.72. The .mean 
capital e~enditure per 'Unit (o;r,iginal plu~ modernization costl of 
conventional public housing was $2Q, 719. 99 while Turnkey units 
averaged $19,757.52 (Table IX~ Column 1). While Turnkey units were 
slightly less expensive than conventional units, they are not of corn-
parable size. conventional units averaged 1.46 bedrooms, while 
Turnkey units average 0.66 bedrooms. In Portland, all of the Turn-
key projects have been built for the elderly and consist exclusively 
of efficiency and one-bedroom units. Portland development costs 
are very close to average national per unit costs for low-rent public 
housing of $20,967. 1 
The key controversial issue in estimating capital costs is the 
selection of the discount rate or the social opportunity cost of 
transferring resources from the private to the public sector. Few 
analysts would quarrel with the contention that public projects com-
pete with private endeavors for resources and that consequently, op-
portunity, rather than actual capital, costs are relevant in assessing 
public prorgrams. However, the choice of a specific discount rate 
is more problematic. The discount rate is crucial because project 
cost est.iInates are very sensitive to the rate employed. Table IX 
shows the annual per unit capital subsidies required ;for conventional 
and Turnkey units at ~our d~ferent discount rate!;;.. Most economists 
would probably opt for a ra,te between 5 and 7 pe;rcent. Smolensky, 
lU. S. Department of Housing and Urban Deyelopment, '1972 HUD' sta-
tisticalYearbook, (washington, D.C.: U.S. Goverrnnent Printing Office, 
1974), p. 163. 
TABLE IX 
CAPITAL SUBSIDIES, CONVENTIONAL AND TURNKEY ~uaLIC HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, 1972 
Total Development and 2 
Modernization Costs ~er Unit Annual Subsidy, at Selected Interest Rates 
per Unitl 4% 5% 7% 10% 
Conventional 20,719.99 lQ46,99 1207.45 l554~33 2118.61 
Turnkey 19,757.52 998.36 1151. 37 1482.18 2020.20 . 
1 
Derived from Tables VI, VII and VIII. "Costs in 1972 Dollars" and "Modernization Costs" 
were summed and divided by the total number of units. 
2The annual per unit subsidy was calculated by solving for S in the following formula: 
<n=40 
v'"5- .c::. 
t=l 
(S ) 
+ 
(1 + X) t 
where V = per unit development and modernization costs in 1972 dollars, S = annual subsidy per 
unit and X = interest rate. The formula is suggested in Eugene Smolensky, "public Housing or 
Income Supplements -- The Economics of Housing for the Poor, " American Institute of planners 
Jmprhal, (March, 1968), p. 95. 
I-' 
I-' 
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in a calculation of the capital costs of public housing, used 5% which 
reflected the average yield of FHA bonds from 1952-1964, the period 
of his study.2 An extremely conservative estimate of the social rate 
of discount is 4%, the average yield of Aaa bonds from 1938-1972, the 
period of HAP's investment. 3 At the opposite extreme, Baumol makes 
a strong case that the corporate income tax structure requires invest-
ments in the private sector to yield at a rate twice as large as the 
rate of interest to be profitable. Baumol argues that given the com-
petition between public and private projects, public projects ought 
to yield at roughly double the interest rate on government bonds or 
10%.4 However, Baumol assumes that the entire private sector is cor-
porate in structure and does not account for the favorable treatment 
of certain forms of corporate debt. Table IX reflects the range of 
viewpoints on the question of interest rate and reveals that moving 
from a discount rate of 4% to 10% more than doubles the estimated an-
nual per unit subsidy. In this study, 7% will be used as the discount 
rate as a reasonable reflection of the sharp climb in interest rates 
in recent years and as a partial concession to Baumol's argument. 
2Eugene Smolensky, "Public Housing or Income Supplements -- The 
Economics of Housing for the ?oor," American Institute of Planners 
~urnal, (March, 1968), p. 96. 
3U•S• Department of Commerce, 1973 Business Statistics (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 105. 
4william J. Baumol, "On the Social Rate of Discount," The 
American Review, LVIII, (September, 1968), pp. 788-802. 
11S 
In the calculation of capital costs in Table IX, a building life 
of 40 years was assumed -- this is standard for public housing pro-
jects. In addition, it was assumed that capital costs are completely 
subsidized by the federal government. (Smolensky assumed that a 
small portion of tenant rents was used to defray capital costs. This 
was the case in 1966, ~hp- year of his study, but since the late 60's 
tenw~t rents have not been sufficient to cover even operating expen-
ditures. ) 
2. Operating Subsidies. Tables X, XI, and XII contain the 
monthly operating receipts, expenditures and deficits for conventional, 
Turnkey and leased units, respectively. Per unit operating deficits 
in conventional units, ($24.21), are over twice as large as those in 
Turnkey units, ($10.42), primarily because of higher maintenance and 
administrative expenses in conventional units. These higher costs 
are largely attributable to the much older average age of conventional 
units (Tables VI and VII) and the fact that many conventional units 
serve families with children who present HAP with greater "problems" 
than the elderly residents of the Turnkey projects. S Nationally, 
monthly per unit subsidies for LHA owned units (includes conventional 
and Turnkey) were $13.46. 6 
Monthly receipts, expenditures, and deficits for leased units, 
(Table XII), are not directly comparable with those for projects owned 
5Norman Branvold, Comptroller, Housing Authority of Portland 
Interview. 
6U•S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, ~ cit., 
p. 133. 
TABLE .x 
O~ERATING P,E.CEI?TS AND EXPENDITURES., CONVENTIONAL 1(UBLI:C HOUSI:NC;, 
PORTLAND, OREGON, AJ?RJ:L 1, 1972 -- :MARCH: 31, 19731 
gperating·Receipts 
Tenant Rents 
Other Income 
TOTAL OPERATING 
RECEIPTS 
Operating~penditures 
Administrative 
Tenant Services 
utilities 
Ordinary Maintenance 
and Operations. 
General Expenses2 
Non-routine Expenses 
TOTAL OPERATING 
EXPENDITURES 
(Operating Deficit} 
~ 
. O?erunitMonthl . 
33.07 
7.66 
40.73 
14.66 
1.46 
14.92 
23.90 
9.95 
.05 
64.94 
Total 
. . (l6i986PUMs) 
561,656,00 
130,151.00 
691,807.00. 
249,035.00 
24,878~00 
253,415.00 
406,027.00 
169,033.00 
850.00 
1,103,238.00 
lsource: Housing Authorit¥ o~ Portland: Records. 
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2General Exl?e::1ses include eml?lo~ee ~rin9'e b.ene;its.. . The s.epara-
tion of ~ringe beneftts from administrative exl?enditures is mandated' 
by the HUD accountin~ fOI1\lat and doe~ not reflect a decision of the 
local housing autnoritr. 
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TABLE XI 
OPERATING RE.CEn'TS AND EXPENDITURES, TURNKE:(, PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTLllND, 
OREGON, APRIL 1,1972 --.MARCIl 31,19731 
Tenant Rents 
Other Income 
TOTAL OPERATING 
RECEIPTS 
OperatinjiExpenditures 
Administrative 
Tenant Services 
Utilities 
Ordinary Maintenance 
and Operations 
2 General Expenses 
Non-routine Expenses 
TOTAL OPERATING 
EXPENDITURES 
(Operating Deficit} 
PUM 
(per Unit Month! . 
32.98 
5.05 
38.03 
10.15 
.75 
14.69 
16.33 
6.50 
.03 
48.45 
(10.42l 
• 
Total 
.. (6; 312 . PUMS) 
208,142.00 
31,888.00 
240,030.00 
64,023.00 
4,706.00 
92,744.00 
103,059.00 
41,018.00 
167.00 
305,717.00 
. (65,687.00) 
lSource: Housing Authority of portland; Records. 
2 General Exl?enses include employee fringe benefi-ts. The separa-
tion of fringe bene~its from administrative expenditures i-s mandated 
by the HDD accounting tormat and does not reflect a decision c~ the 
local housing authority"~ 
TABLE XI.I 
OPERATING RECEIJ?TS AND EXl?ENDI~URES, LEASED LOW""INCOME HOYSING, 
PORTLAND, OREGON, APRIL 1, 1972 -- MARCH. 31, 1973 
Operating Receipts 
Tenant Rents2 
Other Income 
TOTAL OPERATING 
RECEIPTS 
OperatingE~penditures 
Administrative 
Tenant Services 
Uti1ities2 
Ordinary Maintenance 
and Operations 
General Expense3 
Non-Routine Expense 
TOTAL OPERATING 
EXPENDITURES 
Landlord Lease Payments 
TOTAL EXPENDITURES 
(Deficit) 
PUM 
(per unit 'Month) , 
20.17 
3.85 
24.02 
15.68 
.78 
.26 
5,09 
3,06 
.02 
24.89 
H~3. 87 
128.76 
(104.74) 
Total 
, , (19 i 962 'PUMS} 
402,657.00 
76,926.00 
479.583.00 
312,915.00 
15,580.00 
5,263.00 
101,523.00 
61,131. 00 
445.00 
496,857.00 
2,073,436.00 
2,570,293.00 
(2 1 090;710.00) 
lSource: Housing Authority of Portland: Records. 
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2Near1y all utility bills are paid by the tenants and are not re-
flected in the utility line of the bUdget. However, tenant rents are 
considerably below those in conventional and turnkey public housing be-
cause expected utility exJ?enditu:ces are considered when setting rents. 
3General ExJ?enses include employee fringe benefits. The separa-
tion of fringe benefits from adminis.trative ~J?enditures. is mandated by 
HUD accounting format and does not reflect a decision of the local hous-
ing authority. 
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by RAJ;>.. The 1~rge .monthly pe;r: unit de;l;icit 0;1; $lQ4.74 largely re-
flects RAJ;> , s l?ayments to· i?rivate landlords .• Tenant rents and utility 
expendi tures by HAl? are lower than those in public housing because te-
nants in leased units pay utility vendors directly. Their rental pay-
ments to the housing authority are adjusted downward to reflect this 
arrangement. Table XIII summarizes the operating subsidies required 
for low-income units on a monthly and annual basis. 
3. Tax Subsidies. Housing authorities do not pay, 'property 
taxes on the structures that they own. In lieu of property tax, they 
pay 10% of shelter rent (tenant rents minus utility payments) to local 
governments. For example, in 1972, in conventional units, HAP col-
lected $561,656 in rent and paid $253,415 for utilities (Table X). In 
lieu of taxes, HAP paid 10% of the difference or $30,824 to local tax 
districts. Table XIV indicates that Hl2's pa~~ents in lieu of taxes 
are substantially lower than full property taxes would be on their 
structures. In 1972, this tax subsidy, the difference between full 
property taxes and actual HAP payments, amounted to $298.95 per unit 
per year for conventional units and $435.39 per unit per year for Turn-
key units. The larger tax subsidy for Turnkey units reflects the fact 
that Turnkey units are newer and consequently have a considerably higher 
per unit valuation. While the assessed value per unit in conventional 
projects was $11,213, Turnkey units were assessed at $15,814. Since 
RAJ;> rental receil?ts are related to tenant income, not unit value, the 
spread between 10% of'shelter rent and full property tax is greater for 
nore valuable units. 
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TABLE .xII:! 
OPERATING SUBSIDIES, CONVENTIONAL AND TURNKEY l?UBLIC HOUSING, LEASED 
LOW-INCOME LEASED HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON, APRIL 1, 1972 -- MARCH 
31, 19731 
Per Unit Per unit unit 
Month ($) . Annual . t.$) Months . Total' ($) 
Conventional 24.21 290.52 16,986 411,431 
Turnkey 10.42 125.04 6,312 65,687 
Leased 104.74 1,256.88 19,962 2,090,710 
1 
Derived from Table X, Xi, XII 
TABLE XIV 
PROPERTY TAX SUBSIDIES, CONVENTIONAL AND TURNKEY PUBLIC HOUSING, PORTALAND, OREGON, APRIL h, 1972 --
MARCH 31, 1973l;, 
Payment in Lieu of Taxes 
Approximate Full Real Property Taxes 
(@ 28.92 per thousand)2 
(TAX SUBSIDY) 
Tax Subsidy Per unit Month 
Annual Tax Subsidy Per unit 
Conventional 
(Assessed Valuation 
$ 15,697,820) 
30,824.01 
453,980.96 
(423,156.95) 
24.91 
298.95 
1Source: Housing Authority of Portland: Records 
2 Taxing Authority 
Mu1tnomah County 
city of Portland 
Port of Portland 
School District #1 
Mu1 tnomah lED 
Portland Community College 
TOTAL 
Tax ~ 
5.08 
8.21 
1. 02 
9.15 
4.72 
.74 
28.92 
Turnkey 
(Assessed Valuation 
$ 8,317,940) 
11,539.83 
240,554.82 
(229,014.99) 
36.28 
435.39 
I-' 
t\) 
I-' 
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summa:¥, of . pro<;l!a:m· costs. Table Y.V summarizes. the total .monthly 
and annual per· unit costs of HAP owned and leaSed units, assuming a 
7% discount rate. In terms of the model in 'Figure 2, BE or program 
costs are $2143.80 per year for conventional units, $2042.64 for Turn-
key units, and $1256.88 for leased units. AS or annual tenant rent 
equals $396.84 for conventional units and $395.76 for Turnkey units. 
In leased units, AS equals the sum of rent and utility payments to 
private vendors or $422.04 per year. AE or total annual per unit 
costs are $2540.64 for conventional units, $2438.40 for Turnkey units, 
and $1678.92 for leased units. Thus leased housing is 34% less ex-
pensive than con'ventiona1 units and 31% less expensive than Turnkey 
units. As noted above, direct comparisons between Turnkey and con-
ventional units are distorted by differences in averaga.:·unit size, age 
and type of occupant. However., leased units serve roughly the same 
population as conventional public housing and are comparable or slight-
1y larger in size. 
These results for conventional and Turnkey units are very close 
tc those reported recently by Solomon for Boston. Using a similarly 
inclusive concept of costs, Solomon found total annual costs in con-
ventiona1 units were $2586 while those in Turnkey units; averaged 
$2430. However, he :l;ound annual costs in leased units aver.aged 
$2484, substantiall~ 9reate~ than those calculated tor portland. 7 
7Arthur p. Solomon, !!9E.,.singthe Urban poor, {Cambridge: the 
MIT press, 19741, p.1494 
TABLE XV 
HOUSING SUBSIDIES PER UNI~C', CONVENTIONAL, TURNKEY AND LEASED LOW-INCOME HOUSING, PORTLAND, OREGON 
APRIL 1, 1972 -- MARCH 31, 19731 
Conventional 
Turnkey 
Leased 
Monthly 
Capital 
Subsid 
129. 53'~ 
123. 52'~ 
o 
Monthly 
Operating 
Subsid' 
24.21 
10.42 
104.74 
1Derived from Tables IX, XIII and XIV. 
* d" Assumes a ~scount rate of 7%. 
Monthly 
property 
Tax Subsid 
24.91 
36.28 
o 
**Inc1udes utility payments to private vendors. 
Total Subsidy 
Per 
Month Annual 
178.65 2143.80 
170.22 2042.64 
104.74 1256.88 
Annual 
Tenant 
Rent 
396.84 
395.76 
422.04** 
Total Annual 
Cost 
Per Unit 
2540.64 
2438.40 
1678.92 
I-' 
N 
W 
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Part of the dif~erence is attributable to l~r~er tenant rent payments 
in Boston-- average ~enant contributions. exceeded those in ~ortland 
by $300 per year. This difference may be due to the greater affluence 
of Boston public houSing tenants and/or to the higher rent levels that 
prevail there. In 1970, median contract rent in Portland was $97 
while in Boston it was $111. 8 Most of the remaining difference be-
tween the portland and Boston results for leased housing is a function 
of Solomon's inclusion of accelerated depreciation in his assessment 
of program costs. Accelerated depreciation was not included in the 
cost calculations for Portland leased housing because of the judgement 
that these tax benefits are available to all private landlords, not just 
to those leasing to HAP. As such, these costs should not be charged 
exclusively to the low-income housing p~cgram. 
Market Value 
The market value of public housing units, AD in Figure 2, is dif-
ficult to determine because in many respects public housing is a unique 
product without a private sector counterpart.. Housing authorities faci-
litate the provision of social services to their tenants in addition to 
furnishing housing. For ex~le, ~ has arranged for public health 
nurses, counselors, and food stamp vendors to visit large ~ projects. 
Other services are also delivered directl¥ to BAr residents because of 
81975 the US Factbook, The American Almanac, 1.neStatisticalAb-
stract . of· th.e U. 5."' as prepare'dby the Bureau of· the Te'nsus, Departm~ 
of Commerce, QNeWYork: Grosset and Dunlap, 1975), pp. 895, 915. 
HAPls.cooperat~on witQ social service .agenci~s. 
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While these services 
are undoubtedly important to their recipients, ~IS prilnary objective 
is to provide a substitute for private housing. While the non-housing 
services may enhance the value of public housing, the stigma that many 
low-income households associate with living in public projects and the 
neighborhood effects of the concentration of low-income households may 
reduce the value of public~.y· ~' owned units below the "market pnice" of 
physically comparable units. 
Table XVI contains several approaches to pricing public housing 
as well as the median rent for the county and the SMSA. The first 
set of suggested market rents were proposed by HUD when requested to 
estimate the market value of public housing by the Subcommittee on Fis-
cal Policy of the Joint Economic Committee. HOD proposed using its 
rent standards which include utilities for Relocation Assistance. In 
Multnomah County, these standards were $136 for a one-bedroom unit and 
$172 for a two-bedroom unit. When compared with the median gross rent 
in the SMSA, which includes some affluent suburban developments, the 
market values propesed by HUD appeal inflated. It is not credible that 
the "market" would price public housing units substantially above the 
$125 for a one-bedroom unit and the $152 ~or a two-bedroom unit prevail~ 
ing in the SMSA. Table XVI. indicates tha.t another l?ossible approach 
to estimating the market value of public housin9 units is to use the 
maximum rent limits established for low-income leased units in the 
county as proxies. Leased units must qualif~ as standard and pass HAP 
inspection. In addition~ they are intended as an alternative to pub-
lic housing for a comparable population. In constant 1972 dollars, the 
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TABLE XVI 
SELECTED METHODS OF ESTIMATING THE MARKET VALUE OF PUBLIC HOUSING UNITS, 
PORTLAND, OREGON, 19721 
Monthly Rent 
1 Bedrm. 2 Bedrm. 
Proposed Market Rents 
1) HUD Max. Gross Rent Relocation 
Assistance Payments, Multnomah co. 2 136 172 
2) HUD Max. Gross Fair Market Rents, 
Existing Leased Housing, Multnomah 
county3 117 137 
3) Median Gross Rent in Public Housing 
Census Tracts4 
Conventional 110 133 
Turnkey 120 no 2-bedrm. units 
Median Gross Rent Multnomah county4 120 145 
Median Gross Rent Portland SMSA4 125 152 
lAll necessary conversions to 1972 dollars were made by using 
the Shelter Rent Component of the Consumer Price Index in Handbook of 
Labor Statistics, 1973, U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), 
p. 299. 
2 U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Fiscal 
Policy, Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 15: Welfare in the 70's: 
~ National Study of Benefits Available in 100 Local Areas, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 16. 
3U•S• Department of Housing and Urban Development, "Region 10, 
Fair Market Rents (Maximum Gross Rent Payable) for Existing Section 
23 Leased Housing," Federal Register, 39, 131, July 8, 1974. 
4U•S• Bureau of the Census, Census of Population and Housing; 
1970, Census Tracts, Final Report PHC(1)-165, portland, Oregon-Washing-
ton SMSA, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972). 
Median rents in public housing tracts were weighted by the number of 
public housing units appearing in those tracts. Median rents were as-
sumed to be for one-bedroom units since the median number of persons in 
rental units = 2. 2-bedroom rents were estimated by using the average 
differential in the HUD schedules between 1 and 2 bedroom units. 
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~ums estahlished~or'existing leased housin9were $117 ~or a one-
bedroom unit and $137 for a two~bedroom unit. 
Another approach.. is to asswne that public housing is comparable 
to the median rental unit in the census tracts in which public housing 
is located. This technique yielded a market value of $110 and $120 
respectively for conventional and Turnkey one-bedroom units. This 
methodology appears to successfully pick up the fact that Turnkey 
units, on the average, are newer and are located in "better" neighbor-
hoods than are conventional units -- and hence should be more valuable. 
Two-bedroom conventional units are assigned a market value of $133, 
using the same technique. (There are no two-bedroom Turnkey units). 
These rents are close to the median gross rents for the county. As 
such, they seem quite generous to public housing. For lack of a more 
direct measure, these median rents in the relevant census tracts will 
be employed as proxies for the market value of conventional and Turnkey 
units, AD in Figure 2. 
Estimating the market value of leased units is much less con-
voluted since private landlords presumably demand a "market price" for 
their units from HAP. Table XVII indicates that leased units have a 
meanmonthl~ gross rent of $107.63 for a one-bedroom unit and $128.85 
for a two-bedroom unit. utility and maintenance expenditures have 
been added to the payments to landlords to ex~edite comparisons with HAP 
owned units which.. include these outlays. 
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TABLE XVII 
ESTIMATED MARKET VALUE f LOW-INCOME LEASED HOUSING, J?ORTLA,ND, OREGON, 1972 
1 Average Landlord Rent 
Utilities2 
3 
Maintenance 
TOTAL ESTIMATED GROSS 
MONTHLY MARKET RENT 
1 
1 Bedroom Unit 
.. for Elderly 
87.54 
15.00 
5.09 
107.63 
2 Bedroom 
. Unit 
108.76 
15.00 
5.09 
128.85 
Housing Authority of Portland, "Leased Housing status Report," 
mimeo. 
2Uti1ities are not included in landlord payments. utility ex-
penditures in conventional and turnkey units, as shown in Tables XIII 
and XIV, plus the small utility expenditures for leased housing in 
Table XV were used to approximate utility expenditures in leased low 
income housing. 
3 
Maintenance in low-income leased housing is the responsibility 
of the housing authority. Maintenance expenditures are from Table 
XV. 
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~~te Benefits.: .. The. ~ Val ue of PUblic HOllsi.n<; ~ Tepants 
The calculation 0;1; substitution effects., CD: in Figure 2, or 
the degree to whicQin-kirid subsidies alter the. recipients' preferred 
consumption patterns, requires an estimate of what tenants' would be 
likely to expend on housing, if their subsidy were in cash. Table 
XVIII contains mean gross monthly rental expenditures of households 
by family size and income class. While the source of these statistics, 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey of 1960-61, 
is quite dated, no adequate alternative was located. Therefore, the 
rent and utility components of the Consumer Price Index were used to 
9 
convert gross rents into 1972 prices. A new BLS survey has recently 
been completed but the results will not be available until 1976.10 
Two checks were made on the accuracy of projecting housing con-
sumption expenditures for low-income households from data nearly a 
decade old. These checks revealed that there appears to be astonish-
ingly little error in the methodology. A survey of low-income house-
holds prepared for HAP in 1972 found that, of those eligible for public 
housing, median monthly rent was $S6, median family size was 1.S and 
. 1 . $ 0 11 med~an annua~ncome was below 300 • Table XXI indicates that a 
9U. S • Departmento;f Labor, &lreau of Labor Statis.tics, Handbook 
of Labor statistics 1973, tWashington, D.C.: u.s. Goverrunent ;('rinting 
Office, 1974), p. 29~ 
lOBruce Hanchett, Assistant Regional Director, Bureau of Labor 
Statistics, to JuditQA. Bamack, Letter, October 3, 1974 • 
. ... .. 
. llLund.,MoCUtoheon~·Jacobson, qInc.iAna1xsisof pUblicl.Y·Assis-
ted Low Income FarRily HOUSing Requirements portland, Oregon, ·197.1-1975, 
Report prepared for the aousing Authority of Portland, January, 1972, 
pp. T4-TS. 
TABLE XVIII 
ESTIMATED GROSS MONTHLY RENT BY FAMILY SIZE AND INCOME SLASS, URBAN UNITED STATES, 19721 
Estimated Gross Monthly Rent by Money Income After Taxes 
1000- 2000- 3000- 4000- 5000- 6000- 7500-
Family Size 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 .;6999 9999 
1 63 67 87 82 100 119 117 
2 64 85 92 101 108 110 133 
3 57 77 88 99 109 122 140 
4 * 75 78 97 101 113 133 
5 * 78 89 94 110 120 123 
6+ 
* 
55 83 93 107 113 138 
lU.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditures and Income: 
Cross-Classification of Family eharacteristics, ~ united States, 1960-61, Supplement 2, Part A 
to BLS Report 237-38, (Washington, D.C.: u.S. Government printing Office, 1965), Tables 11a-llg. 
1972 gross rents (includes utilities) were estimated by applying the rent and utility components of 
the Consumer Price Index to the rent and utility statistics from the 1960-61 survey. TIle Consumer 
Price Index and its components is from u.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook 
of Labor Statistics, 1973 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 299-304. 
*Smal1 sample size in these categories made results unreliable. 
I-' 
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household of two with income between $2000-2999 was expected to have 
a 1972 rent of $85 -- nearly identical to that reported in the HAP 
survey. A second verification of the methodology was made by com-
paring Table XVIII with county data from the 1970 census. In 1970 
the mean gross rent of households below the poverty line in Multno-
12 
mah county was $83 ($90 in 1972 dollars). This is also quite close 
to the projected rents for low-income households in Table XVIII. 
While these attemps at independent verification of the methodology sug-
gest that large errors are improbable, it would be desirable to revise 
Table XVIII, as necessary, when the new BLS survey becomes available. 
Table XVIII will be used to estimate the cash value of in-kind housing 
transfers to the tenant, AC in terms of Figure 2. 
Participation Rates 
In Chapter IV it was suggested that a major issue in assessing 
the social benefits of in-kind subsidies is the extent to which the 
transfers reach the target population. Table XIX contains HAP's 1972 
eligibility limts for leased and public housing. Table XX contains 
the distribution of households (includes families and single indivi-
duals) in the county by household size and cash income at the time of 
the 1970 census. Table XXI, showing the number of county households 
eligible for HAP programs, was derived by applying HAP's eligibility 
12U.S. Bureau of the Census, Census of Population: 1970, Gene-
ral Social and Economic Characteristics, Final Report, PC (1)-39 Ore-
gon, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 262. 
Family 
Size 
1 
1-
1 
2 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
1 
TABLE XIX 
1 
HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, ELIGIBILITY LIMITS, 1972 
Maxj.murn Annual Income for Maximum Annual Income for 
Elderly· (E) or Admission public Housing Admission Leased Housing 
None1der1y (NE) Gross Net for·Rent Gross Net for Rent 
E 3778 3400 4722 4250 
NE 3579 3400 4474 4250 
E 4556 3800 5611 4750 
NE 4316 3800 5316 4750 
NE 5368 4500 6553 5625 
NE 6211 5000 7§26 6250 
~ 7053 5500 8500 6875 
NE 7789 5900 9342 7375 
NE 8526 6300 10184 7875 
Source: Housing Authority of Portland, Records. 
I-' 
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Household 
Size 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6+ 
'l'ABLE XX 
1 
ANNUAL MONEY INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, 1970 
2000-
Number of Households by Income 
3000- 5000- 7000- 10000- 15000-
2000 2999 4999 6999· ·9999 14999 24999' 25000+ I Total 
17323 7293 9333 6977 5905 2884 748 374 50837 
4656 4378 9325 8840 12891 14801 7067 2188 64146 
1506 1022 2522 3618 7093 8914 5077 1231 30983 
859 642 2309 2064 5512 8974 4940 1388 24369 
383 305 718 969 3557 5415 3130 871 15348 
350 254 716 928 2778 4884 3066 978 13954 
TOTAL 199637 
ISource: Portland State University, Center of Population Research and Census, Census 
Tract Records, 1970. Income refers to 1969 income as reported in the 1970 Census of Popu-
lation. Income is the algebraic sum of wage and salary income, nonfarm net self-employment 
income, farm net self-employment income, Social Security or railroad retirement income, public 
assistance or welfare income, and all other income. Income does not include the value of 
income "in-kind." 
I-' 
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TABLE XXI 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ELIGIBLE FOR LOW-INCOME ~UBLIC OR L~ED HOUSING, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
AND INCOME, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, 1972 
Household Number of Households by Income 
Size 2000 2000-2999 3000-4999 5000-6999 7000-9999 I Total 
1 17323 7293 7466 0 0 32082 
2 4656 4378 9325 2033 0 20392 
3 1506 1022 2522 2822 0 7872 
4 859 642 1309 2054 992 5856 
5 383 305 718 969 1779 4154 
6+ 350 254 716 928 2167 4415 
TOTAL 74771 
lEstimated by applying the gross income eligibility limits for leased housing in Table XIX 
to the county income distribution in Table XX. It was assumed that the households in a given 
income class are evenly distributed across that class. For household sizes 1 and 2, eligibility 
limits half way between those for elderly and nonelderly households were employed. 
I-' 
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limits (Table XIX) to the distribution of households in Table xx. 
Assuming that the distribution of households by income and size 
did not change radically between 1970 and 1972, Table XXI indi-
cates that approximately 74,771 households in Multnomah County 
were eligible for HAP assistance. Since HAP had only 3511 units 
in 1972, only about 5% of the target population was accomodated. 
Table XXI reveals that 37% of the households in the county 
were eligible for HAP programs. Since other HUD programs, such 
135 
as 235 and 236, have more generous eligiblity limits, an extremely 
large proportion of the county population is eligible for some form 
of housing subsidy.· _ Table XXII compares HAP I ~ eligibility limits 
with the 1972 poverty thresholds established by the Census Bureau. 
HAP eligibility limits are far above the official poverty lines. 
For example, HAP's eligibility limits for leased units are 46% to 
136% above the Census thresholds -- depending upon household size. 
In addition, HAP's limits are more generous for elderly households, 
while Census poverty lines are higher for the nonelderly. The Cen-
sus Bureau's differentiation between elderly and non-elderly in 
setting poverty lines is based on the definition of poverty as 
three times the cost of a minimal diet; elderly households are 
assumed to require less food than younger households. HAP's standards 
reflect the view that the housing needs of the elderly than are those 
of younger households of comparable size. 
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TABLE XXII 
LLOW-INCOME 'l'IiRESHOLDS FOR NONFAID-j HOUSEHOLDS B~ ~OUSEHOLD SIZE f U.S. f 
1972 AND HOUSING AUTHORI~ OJ? J;lORTLAND LOW-INCOME HOUSING ELIGIBLLH'Y 
LIMITS 
Household···· .Elderly. ·eEl· ·or . . Low-Incom~ Max. Income Max. Income 
Size None1derly (NE) .. Threshold· Public·Housing2 ·Leased Hsg. 2 
1.. NE 2168 3579 4474 
1 E 2005 3778 4722 
2 NE 2808 4316 5316 
2 E 2530 4556 5611 
3 NE 3339 5368 6533 
4 NE 4275 6211 7526 
5 NE 5044 7053 8500 
6 NE 5673 7789 9342 
7 or more NE 6983 8526* 10184* 
*7 person household 
lU.S. Bureau of the Census, Current population Reports, Series 
p-60, No. 91, "Characteristics of the Low-Income Population; 1972," 
U.S. Government printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1973, Table A-2, 
p. 143. . . 
2Maximum gross. annual income for admiss,ion, Table .xU. 
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Dis.tribution ££. ;i;>rivate Benetits.: Characteris~ics. of ~ Tenants 
e( « --
While households far above the povert¥' line are eligible for 
subsidies, Table xxrrr indicates that actual benet its are concentrated 
on extremely indigent households. The mean annual income of tenants 
in all of HAP's units was below $3000 per year and virtually all 
of HAP's tenants receive same form of governmental cash transfer pay-
ments. Less than 3% of HAP's tenants are employed. Table XXIV 
reveals that the average HAP household is small, consisting of 2.22 
individuals. Only 42% of the households served by HAP contain chil-
dren. Benefits are heavily skewed toward the elderly and toward 
households with female heads. Table XXV shows that the median age 
of all HAP household heads is 65; 76.2% of households are headed by 
women. HAP's emphasis on the elderly is clear; the 1970 Census 
13 
found that of persons below the poverty line, 24% were elderly. In 
contrast, over 50% of HAP~s units are allocated to the elderly. HAP 
also has a heavy representation of non-whites relative to their pre-
sence in the county population. Table XXV indicates that 27.7% of 
HAP's units were occupied by non-white households. The 1970 Census 
counted blacks as only 4% of the population of the county and about 10% 
14 
of the county's poverty po~ulation. 
Table XXVI contains characteristics of low-rent public housing 
13 
1975 the ~ Factboo~, ~~, p. 911. 
14 
u.s. Bureau of the Census, ~ cit., pp. 262-63; 266. 
TABLE XXIII 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TENANTS: INCOME AND SOURCE OF INCOME, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, 19731 
Number of Households 
Mean Ar!nual Income 
Workers per Household 
(percent) 
None 
1 
2 or more 
Cash Transfer Payments 
(percent) 
OM 
AFDC 
AB 
APTD 
Other 
Conventional Turnkey Low-Income 
public Housing public Housing Leased Housing 
1390 
$2376.64 
96.9 
3.1 
0.0 
8.3 
39.3 
0.8 
6.2 
51.6 
* 
527 
$2212.00 
99.6 
0.4 
0.0 
11.8 
0.0 
2.7 
3.2 
90.0 
1594 
$2962.68 
96.9 
3.1 
0.0 
8.0 
43.3 
0.9 
6.0 
43.0 
Total 
HAP 
3511 
unavailable 
97.3 
2.7 
0.0 
8.7 
35.2 
1.1 
5.7 
53.6 
*Does not include the following projects for the elderly: Northwest Tower, Hollywood East, 
and Peaceful Villa. 
ISource: Housing Authority of Portland, Survey of Tenants. 
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TABLE XXIV 
cHARACTERISTICS OF TENANTS: 
1 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, 1973 
Conventional Turnkey Low-Income Total Housing 
Public Housing public Housing Leased Housing Authority 
Number of Households 1390 527 1594 3511 
Percent 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Household Siz~ (Percent) 
1 ·A9.2 94.0 44.8 53.7 
2 17.7 6.0 15.6 15.0 
3 14.1 0.0 13.4 11.7 
4 8.3 0.0 9.6 7.7 
5 5.4 0.0 7.0 5.3 
6 2.3 0.0 4.1 2.8 
7 1.4 0.0 3.0 1.9 
8 1.0 0.0 1.5 1.1 
9 0.4 0.0 0.4 0.4 
10 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.2 
11 or more 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.2 
Mean Household Size 2.24 1.06 2.60 2.22 
Families with Children 46.0 0.2 52.9 42.3 
(percent) 
1 
Source: Housing Authority of Portland survey of tenants. 
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TABLE XXV 
CHARACTERISTICS OF TENANTS: AGE, SEX, AND RACE OF HEAD, HOUSING AUTHORITY OF PORTLAND, 19731 
Number of Households 
Age of Head (Percent 
of Households) 
Under 18 
18-24 
25-34 
35-44 
45-54 
55-64 
64+ 
Estimated Median Age 
Female Head (percent 
of Households) 
2 
Race: Percent Nonwhite 
1 
Conventional Turnkey Low-Income 
Public HousinSL __ Publ~c_Jiousi!lg Leased Housing 
1390 527 1594 
0.1 0.0 0.1 
12.0 0.0 6.2 
16.7 0.2 22.5 
10.8 0.9 15.7 
8.1 1.3 10.3 
5.9 7.2 7.6 
46.5 90.5 37.6 
58 74 (mean) 50 
78.3 78.9 73.4 
27.8 10.4 33.3 
Source: Housing Authority of portland, Survey of Tenants. 
Total 
HAP 
3511 
0.1 
7.3 
16.:-
11.1 
7.9 
7.0 
50.5 
65 
76.2 
27.7 
2Estimated by assuming that ~ases are evenly distributed within each age class. I-' 
~ 
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TABLE XXVI 
LOW ... BENT PUBLIC HOUSING, CHARACTERI.STI:.CS OJ? HOUSEHOLDS REEXlUUNED FOR 
CONTI:NUED OCCUPAN~. DUR:I:NG TWELVE MONTHS ENDED SEPTEMaER 3~, 
. 1 1972, U.S. 
Elderly Households 
Number of Households 
Percent 
Mean Household Size 
Median Age of Head 
Percent Nonwhite 
Median Annual Income 
Percent of Households 
Receiving Cash Transfer 
Payments 
1 
135,810 
100 
1.65 
71 
35.9 
$1988.00 
97 
All·Households 
367,641 
100 
3.34 
48 
60.9 
$2879.00 
75 
u.s. Department of Housing and Urban Development, 1972 HUD 
Statistical Yearbook, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1974), Tables 108-111, pp. 121-123. 
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occupants. on a national bas~s. As in 1?oxtland ( .;l?ublic housing bene-
fits nation-wide are concentrated on very low income households. The 
median annual income :eor housing authority tenants in the nation was 
$2879. Compared to Portland, a smaller, but still substantial, 75% 
of tenants receive ca~ transfer payrnetns. However, HAP clearly 
serves older and smaller households· than the average public housing 
program. Nationally, the median age of household heads was 48, com-
pared to 65 for HAP. The median household size, nationally, was 
3.34 while HAP's was 2.22. While nationally the percent non-white 
in public housing is more than double HAP's rate; most public housing 
is located in urban areas with substantially larger non-white popula-
tions than Mul tnomah County. In sum, benefits from low-income housing 
Subsidies, both in Portland and in the nation, appear to reach:the 
genuinely needy. However, HAP has a strong bias in favor of the needy 
elderly -- perhaps reflecting the greater political palatability of 
projects serving a less controversial population than younger indigent 
households with school-age children. 
Evaluating Housing Subsidies 
Figures 3 and 4 contain applications of the model presented in 
Chapter IV to the empirical data contained in thi~ chapter. Figure 
3 demonstrates the effects of heus.inS subsidies on an elderly couple 
in a one-bedroom Turnkey or leased unit. The couple is assumed to 
have an annual cash income of $2;>00, close to the :mean income for HAP 
residents (Table XXIII} • ExcerjJts from HAP's rent schedule appear 
20 
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143 
AB = $41.00 = Tenant Rent (includes 
utilities in leased) 
AD = $107.63 = Market Value, Leased 
Unit 
AD' = $120.00 = Market Value t Turn-
key Unit 
BC = $51.00 = Cash Value of In-Kind 
Income to Recipient 
BD = $66.63 = In-Kind Income, Leased 
Unit 
BD' = $79.00 = In-Kind Income, Turn-
key Unit 
AC = $92.00 = Cash Value of Unit to 
Tenant 
CD = $15.63 = Substitution Effects, 
Leased unit 
CD' = $28.00 = Substitution Effects, 
Turnkey Unit 
D' DE = $19.80 = Administrative and 
Other Costs, Leased Unit 
E 
E' 
D".:e:' = $83.20 = Administrative and 
Other Costs, Turnkey Unit 
BE = $86.43 = Total Public Costs, 
Leased Unit 
BE' = $162.20· = Total Public Costs, 
Turnkey unit 
AE = $127.43 = Total Monthly Costs, 
Leased Unit 
AE' = $203.20 = Total Monthly Costs, 
Turnkey.Unit 
Figure 3. Impact of housing subsidies on two-person, elderly 
household in turnkey or leased unit, annual cash income of $2,500. 
20 
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E' 
AB = $70.00 = Tenant Rent (includes 
utilities in leased) 
AD = $128.85 = Market Value, Leased 
Unit, 
AD' = $133.00 = Market Value, Con-
ventional Unit 
BC = $31.00 = Cash Value of In-Kind 
Income to Recipient 
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BD = $58.85 = In-Kind Income, Leased 
Unit 
BD' = $63.00 = In-Kind Income, Con-
ventional Unit 
AC = $101.00 = Cash Value of Unit 
to Tenant 
CD = $27.85 = Substitution Effects, 
Leased Unit:. . -c\ .• ': 
CD' = $32.00 = Substitution Effects, 
Conventional unit 
DE = $19.80 = Administrative and 
Other Costs, Leased Unit 
~'E' = $78.92 = Administrative and 
Other Costs, Conventional Unit 
BE = $78.65 = Total Public Costs, 
Leased Unit 
BE' = $141.72 = Total Public Costs, 
Conventional Unit 
AE = $148.65 = Total Monthly Costs, 
Leased Unit 
AS' = $.211.72 = Total Monthly Costs, 
Conventional Unit 
Figure 4. Impact of housing subsidies on four-person hOllsehold 
in conventional or leased unit, annual cash income of $4,500. 
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in Table XXVII.; at $2500 per year I tlu:! couple. would pay' ~ $41 per 
month. for a Turnkey unit and approximatel¥, the. same to HAP and private 
utilityyendors' for a leased unit. Therefore, in terms of tfie model 
in Figure 2, AB or tenant rent in Figure 13 is $41. 
AD or the market value of a leased unit is $107.63 (Table XVII) 
while AD', the market value of a Turnkey unit is $120.00 (Table XVI). 
The market value minus the tenant's rent is the amount of in-kind in-
come provided to the tenant, BD or BD'. Bec;,is $66.63 ($799.56 annual-
ly) for leased housing and BD' is $70.00 ($948.00 annually) for Turnkey 
housing. As indicated in Chapter IV, this market value of the in-kind 
transfer may not be identical with its cash value to the tenant. To 
estimate the cash value of the unitt> to the tenant, it is necessary to 
determine what the tenant would be likely to spend on housing, if his 
income were entirely in cash. Table XVIII, which contains typical 
housing expenditures by income class and household size, was employed 
to establish the tenant's poin~ of indifference between a cash and an 
in-kind housing subsidy, or the cash value of the HAP unit to the ten-
ant. To locate the relevant income class in Table XVIII the couple's 
in-kind income, BD or BD', must be added to their cash income, so that 
a comparison may be made with the consumption pattern of a two person 
household of similar total income whose income i~ entirely in cash. 
In Figure 3, when in-kind income is added to cash- income, the house-
hold moves up to the $3000-3999 income clas~ in terms of Table XVIII. 
~us AC, or the amount.the couple would be expected to spend on housing 
if their income were entirely in cash, is equal to $92.00. BC or the 
cash value of the in-kind income to the recipient, is $51.00. 
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TABLE .xxv!I 
HOUSING AUTHORITY ~F J;lORTLAND, MONTHLY' RENT SCHEDULES, 1972 
Gross InCome 
1500 
2500 
3500 
4500-
5500 
Gross -Income 
1500 
2500 
3500 
4500 
5500 
6750 
1 
Elderly- 2 -Person -HousehOiL:d-
Net Income for Rent 
1050 
1950 
2850 
3750 
4650 
4 person Household 
Net Income for Rent 
525 
1475 
2425 
3375 
4325 
5512 
-Monthly Rent 
22 
41 
59 
78 
97 
Monthly Rent 
11 
31 
51 
70 
90 
116 
Source: Housing Authority ot; Portland, Records. 
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CD and CD'. the market value of the unit minus the cash value 
of the unit to the tenant, are the substitution effects or the dis-
tortion in consumption patterns induced by the in-kind housing subsi-
dies. For leased housing, the couple expands its housing consumption 
by $15.63 or 17% while in Turnkey housing, consumption is increased 
by $28.00 or 30%. From the point of view of the tenant, subsidized 
housing is a bargain in that the subsidized rent of $41.00 per month 
is 55% less than the $92.00 the couple would expect to pay for an 
unsubsidized unit of worse quality. 
AE, $127.43, the total monthly cost of the leased unit, was de-
rived from Tables XII and XVII. Total monthly cost of a leased unit 
is defined as the sum of landlord rent, operating expenditures and 
utility payments to private vendors. AE', $203.20, or the total cost 
of a Turnkey unit is from Table XV, (total annual cost divided by 12). 
DE and DIE', the administrative and other costs, are the difference 
between the total cost of the units (AE and AE') and the market value 
of the units (AD and ADI). BE, the total public costs of the leased 
unit, was $86.43; while BE' the total public cost of the Turnkey unit 
totaled $162.20. For leased housing, administrative costs were $19.80 
or 23% of total public costs, while administrative costs in Turnkey 
units were $83.20 or 51% of total publi~ costs. 
Figure 4 traces the impact of in-kind housing subsidies on a four 
person household with annual cash income of $4500 in a two-bedroom con-
ventional public housing or leased unit. All terms are defined in 
precisely the same way as in Figure 3. In Figure 4, AB or tenant 
rent equals $70.00 (Table XXVII). AD, the market value of the leased 
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unit is $128.85 (Table XVII). AD', the market value of the conven-
tional unit, is $133.00 (Table XVI). BD, the in-kind income pro-
vided by the leased unit is $58.85 ($706 annually) while BD', the 
in-kind income associated with the conventional unit is $63.00 ($756 
annually). In terms of Table XVIII, the household's total cash and 
in-kind income makes it comparable to a household in the $5000-5999 
income class. AC or the expected housing expenditure for a household 
in this income class whose income is entirely in cash is $101.00. BC, 
the cash value of the in-kind income to the recipient, is $31.00. Thus 
the leased unit induces substitution effects, CD, equal to $27.85 or 
a 28% increase in the household's housing consumption. Conventional 
public housing increases housing consumption by $32.00, (CD'), or 32%. 
Total costs, AE, for the leased unit are $148.65 (Tables XII and XVII) 
or which $19.80 is allocated to administration, DE. For the conven-
tional unit, total costs, AE', are $211.72 (Table XV) while administra-
tive costs, D'E', are $78.72. Total public costs, BE, were $78.65 for 
the leased unit and $141.72 (BE') for the conventional unit. Admini-
strative expenditures were 50% of total public dosts for the conven-
tional unit and 25% of total public costs for the leased unit. The 
household in Figure 4 paid 31% less for its subsidized unit than it 
would expect to pay for unsubsidized housing of inferior quality. 
Figures 3 and 4 demonstrate that housing subsidies do succeed in 
inc~easing the housing consumption of tlleir recipients. HAP tenants 
consumed 17 to 32 percent more housing than they would have, if given 
an equi~alent cash subsidy. From the tenant's point of view, the ad-
vantages offered of living in a higher quality, lower priced unit 
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than he would be likely. to select if he were unsubai.di:z;ed, apJ?arent1y 
outweigh the diautility experienced in a1teriA~ preferred consumption 
patterns. The length¥' waitinCJ lists for admission· into ~i1lbsi.di:z;ed 
housing programs testify to their popu1ari.ty all}ong potential recipi-
ents. nl recent years, 300.0 to 4000 households have typically 
appeared on HAP's waitin<;r list.J.,5 
The changes in consumption patterns induced by housing subsi-
dies, when considered in the goods-specific utility interdependence 
framework, are assumed to produce external social benefits. How-
ever, in the case of units owned by the housing authority, these ex-
terna1 benefits are associated with extremely high administrative costs. 
Leased housing in Portland was found to be considerably more efficient. 
While the impact of leased housing on housing consumption patterns is 
somewhat smaller than that of public housing, administrative costs 
are much lower than those associated with pub1ica11y owned units. These 
results are in agreement with the work of other investigators who have 
noted the very large administrative costs involved in the direct pub-
1ic provision of housing units (Chapter III). 
Equation 1 of Chapter IV stated that one measure of the minimum 
social or external benefits re~uired for an in-kind investment to pay-
off is 
11 min SB ;:::; AE "" AC 
or social benefits must equal or exceed total co~ts minus private 
15 
Lund, Mc Cutchei:m~ Jacobson Inc., ~ cit., p. 12. 
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bene~its (the cash value o~ the in-kind t~ansfer to therecipient1. 
In Figure 3 SBmin =-$35.43per unit p~ month. :l;or leased housing and 
$111.20 per unit per month ~or Turnkey. In F,igure 4 f SBmi.n is $47.65 
for leased and $110.72 for conventional public housi.ng. Thus in Turn-
key and conventional units, the minimum social benefits required ex-
ceed the private benefits of the transfer, CAC). In Turnkey, the 
minimum social benefits needed are 55% of the total benefits, while in 
conventional units they are 52% of the total. In leased housing, the 
minimum social benefits demanded are still considerable (28% of the 
total in Figure I and 32% of the total in Figure 4) but less than those 
associated with units owned by the housing authority. 
A second measure of social benefits, which attempts to assess 
probable actual benefits rather than the minim~~ benefits required for 
pr9gram pay-off appears in Equation 2 of Chapter IV: 
2) SB = CD x PR 
or social benefits are held to be a function of substitution effects 
times the participation ratio. As an estimate of the magnitude of 
substitution effects for all HAP households, the average of CD and CD' 
in Figures 3 and 4, or $26.00, was employed. Therefore total substi-
tution effects are e~ual to $93,236 per month l$26 times 3586, the number 
o~ HAl? units}. Since HAl? pr,ograms were found to reach only 5% of the 
eligible, PR ;::; .05. Thus, 
31 SB;::; $93r2~6 X .05 ;::; $4661.80 
or $2.60 per unit per month. This rough. calculation of social benefits 
indicates that th~y are far less than the minimum social benefits neces-
sary to justify the subsidies on a benefit-cost basis as calculated above 
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according to Equation 1. However, this very low estimate of social 
benefits is the result of defining such benefits very narrowly. The 
model does not include social benefits which may be derived from in-
come transfers in general, and does not include benefits from public 
housing which are unrelated to the transfer of income. other concep-
tualizations would yield other results. 
summary 
The data presented in this chapter indicate' that housing sub-
sidies do not equitable and efficiently redistribute income. By 
directing large subsidies at a small number of eligible households, 
housing programs are successful in inducing changes in the consumption 
patterns of program participants. However, since 95% of the target 
population remains untouched, the negative externatlities presumed to 
be associated with the housing consumption patterns of the target 
group, as a whole, are not significantly diminished. In addition, 
the substitution effects induced, are associated with high admini-
strative costs. While housing subsidies may be desirable on other 
g~ounds, they are deficient as an income redistribution strategy. 
CI-f.lU>TER VI. 
AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATI.ON OF IN-KIND TR.ANS.FEF.S; THE CASE O.F .FOOD 
STAMl?S 
In this chapter, the model for evaluating in-kind transfer pro-
grams presented in Chapte~ IV will be applied to the Food Stamp Program 
in Multnomah County, Oregon for FY 1973. In 1973, the county averaged 
40,573 food stamp recipients per month or approximately 15,500 house-
holds. Of these, 27,184 or two-thirds were Public Assistant recipients 
and the remaining 13,389 or one-third were not associated with the 
1 Public Assistance Program. County food stamp personnel certify eligi~. 
bility and distribute stamps to Non-Public Assistance (NPA) households 
through five branch offices at four geographic locations. Cer-tifica-
tion and stamp distribution for Public Assistance (PA) households is 
the responsibility of the Public Assistance Program. 
Program Costs 
Di~ect program costs are shared by program participants and the 
federal, state and county governments. A summary of these costs appears 
in Table XXVIII.. Purchase l?apLents b¥ county l?a:.::tj~:;il?a.nts totaled 
$5,236,199 in FY 1973 -- an ayer,age of $129.Q6 pe:.:: reciJ?ient 0:':: $336,84 
lU.S. Department of Ag:.::ic'altu:.::e, Food and Nutrition service, 
"Food sta:rnp P:.::og:.::am: . Statistical Summa:.::y 0; 0l?e:.::ations, \I (July, 1972 -
June, 1974), mimeo. 
State of Oregon, Public Wel£;are Division, ltJ.=!ublic Welfare in 
Oregon," (July, 1972 -.June, 1973), Table 0, mimeo. 
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TABLE X1.'VIII 
DIRECT FOOD STAMP PROGRAM COSTS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON,FY 1973 
Annual per Annual per 
Total Recipient Household 
Private Costs 
1 
Participant Payments $5,236,199 $129.06 $336.84 
Public Costs 
Bonus Payments (USDA) 1 7,740,063 190.77 497.91 
Administrative Costs 
Federal 
USDA2 1,204,207 29.68 77 .46 
HEW 3 94,872 2.34 6.11 
State4 427,725 10.54 27.52 
County 5 84,169 2.07 5.41 
TOTAL ADMINISTRATIVE 1,811,000 44.63 116.50 
TOTAL PUBLIC COSTS 8,944,270 235.40 6;1.4.41 
TOTAL PUBLIC & PRIVATE 14,180,469 364.46 951.25 
lU.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
"Food Stamp Program: Statistical SUIlUnary of Operations, June, 1973," 
mimeo. ,p. 23. 
2Estimated by multiplying USDA non-bonus progra~ costs per re-
cipient by the number of county recipients. USDA costs are from The 
Budget of the U.S. Government, Appendix, FY 1975, (Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 204-5. 
3Estimated, see text. 
4U•S• Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
Food Program Technical Amendments, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1974), pp. 196-1. Partially estimated, see text. 
5Multnomajl County Budget, Fiscal ~ 1974-1975, (portland: 
Multnomah County, 1974), p. 264. 
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per household. Participant payments depend upon household size and in-
corne net of permissable deductions. Tables XXIX and XXX contain pay-
ment schedules, eligibility limits, and the market value of the coupons 
for 1973 and 1974. The formula f.or calculating monthly net income 
for food stamps is extremely complex. Monthly net income is defined 
as monthly cash gross income minus the following deductions: 
1) taxes 2) work expenditures such as union dues and child care 
3) 10% of earne~ income up to a maximum of $30 per month 4)educa-
tional expenditures 5) medical expenditures in excess of $10 per 
month and 6) shelter expenditures (rent or mortgage plus utilities 
including basic telephone service) in excess of 30% of income net 
of all other deductions. In addition to this basic formula, special 
deductions are permitted for unusual emergencies such as funerals or 
natural disasters. Assets, (bank deposits, stocks, bonds, cash on 
hand, etc.), may not exceed $1500 for a nonelderly household or 
$3000 for an elderly household of two or more. Assets do not in-
2 
elude a horne, household furnishings, or one car. 
The bonus value of food stamps distributed in the county in 
FY 1973 was $7,740,063 or $190.77 per recipient (Table XXVIII). The 
bonus value is the difference between the face or market value of food 
stamp coupons and the payments made by recipients. In other worBs, 
the bonus value of the food stamps is the market value of the in-kind 
income provided by the program to participating housellolds. County 
2 u.s. Department of Agri~ulture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
!£od ~tam~ Program, (current as of July 1,1972), pamphlet, pp. 9-10. 
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TABLE XXIX 
MON'Y"rlLY FOOD STAl-U' COUl?O~ ALLOTMENTS t PU;R.CHASE' R.E.QUJ:.MMENTS t AND ELJ:-, , 
GIBILtT't LIMITS, 48 STATES' AND DISTRICT OF COLUMBT'A, EFFECTIVE JULY 1, 
, 19721 
Household Size 
1 .'2 3 11 5 :6 7 8 
Allotment, $36 $64 $92 $112 $132 $152 $172 $192 
Net Income Purchase Requirement 
o - 19.99 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 20 - 29.99 $1 $1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
30 - 39.99 4 4 $4 $4 $5 $5 $5 $5 
40 - 49.99 6 7 7 7 8 8 8 8 
50 - 59.99 8 10 10 10 11 11 12 12 60 - 69.99 10 12 13 13 14 14 15 16 
70 - 79.99 12 15 16 16 17 17 18 19 
80 - 89.99 14 18 19 19 20 21 21 22 
90 - 99.99 16 21 21 22 23 24 25 26 
100 - 109.'99 18 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 
110-- 119.99 20 26 27 28 29 31 32 33 
120 - 129.99 22 29 30 31 33 34 35 36 
130 - 139.99 24 31 33 34 36 37 38 39 
140 - 149.99 26 34 36 37 39 40 41 42 
150 - 169.99 26 36 40 41 42 43 44 45 
170 - 189.99 26 42 46 fA7 48 49 50 51 190 - 209.99 44 52 53 54 55 56 57 
:no - 229.99 44 58 59 60 61 62 63 
230 - 249.99 44 64 65 66 67 68 69 
250 - 269.99 70 71 72 73 74 75 270 - 289.99 74 77 78 79 80 81 
290 - 309.99 74 82 84 85 86 87 
310 - 329.99 86 90 91 92 93 
330 - 359 .. 99 86 94 97 98 99 360 - 389.99 88 98 104 107 108 390 - 419.99 102 lOS 116 117 420 - 449.99 104 112 122 126 
450 - 479.99 116 126 130 
480 - 509.99 12Q 130 134 
510 - 539.99) 134 138 
540 - 569.99 136 142 
570 - 599.99 136 146 600,.. 629 .. 99 
"'150 
630 - 659.99 ;b5a 
Max. Net Inc. 178 233 307 373 440 507 573 640 
':CN3LE XXIX 
(continuedl 
lsource: U.S. De)?artment of Agriculture,;pood and Nutrition 
Service, "Food Stamp Program, CUrrent as of July 1, 1972," mimeo., 
pp. 26-27. 
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TABLE XXX 
MONTHLY FOOD STAMP COUI?ON ALLOTMENTS, J;>URCH1\SE REQUlREMENTS, AND ELl-· 
GIBILITY LIMITS, 48 STATEs AND DISTFCT OF COLUMBIA f EFFECTIVE JULY L, 
1974 
1 
Allotment $46 
Net Income 
o - 19.99 0 
20 - 29.99 $1 
30 - 39.99 4 
40 - 49.99 6 
50 - 59.99 8 
60 - 69.99 10 
70 - 79.99 12 
80 - 89.99 14 
90 - 99.99 16 
100 - 109.99 18 
110 - 119.99 21 
120 - 129.99 24 
130 - 139.99 27 
140 - 149.99 30 
150 - 169.99 33 
170 - 180.99 36 
190 - 209.99 36 
210 - 229.99 
230 - 249.99 
250 - 269.99 
270 - 289.99 
290 - 309.99 
310 - 329.99 
330 - 359.99 
360 - 389.99 
390 - 419.99 
420 - 449.99 
450 - 479.99 
480 - 509.99 
510-- 539.99 
540 - 569.99 
570 - 599.99 
600 - 629.99 
630 - 659.99 
660 - 689.99 
690 - 719.·99 
720 - 749.99 
2 
·$82· 
o 
$1 
4 
7 
10 
12 
15 
18 
21 
23 
26 
29 
32 
35 
38 
44 
50 
56 
62 
62 
62 
Household Size 
3 4 5 6 7 8 
$118 $150 $178 . ·$204$230 $$256 
Purchase Requirement 
a 0 a 
a 0 0 
$4 $4 $5 
778 
10 10 11 
13 13 14 
16 16 17 
19 19 20 
21 
24 
27 
30 
33 
36 
40 
46 
52 
58 
64 
70 
76 
82 
88 
94 
100 
100 
22 
25 
28 
31 
34 
37 
41 
47 
53 
59 
65 
71 
77 
83 
89 
95 
104 
113 
122 
126 
126 
23 
26 
29 
33 
36 
39 
42 
48 
54 
60 
66 
72 
78 
84 
90 
96 
105 
114 
123 
132 
141 
ISO 
150 
150 
o 
o 
$5 
8 
11 
14 
17 
21 
24 
27 
31 
34 
37 
40 
43 
49 
55 
61 
67 
73 
79 
85 
91 
97 
106 
115 
124 
133 
142 
151 
160 
169 
172 
172 
172 
o 
o 
$5 
8 
12 
15 
18 
21 
25 
28 
32 
35 
38 
41 
44 
50 
56 
62 
68 
74 
80 
86 
92 
98 
107 
116 
125 
134 
143 
152 
161 
170 
179 
188 
194 
194 
194 
o 
9 
$5 
8 
12 
16 
19 
22 
26 
29 
33 
36 
39 
42 
45 
51 
57 
63 
69 
75 
81 
87 
93 
99 
108 
117 
1~6 
135 
144 
153 
162 
171 
180 
189 
198 
207 
216 
158 
TABLE .xxx 
. Ccontinuedl 
.. Household . Size .. 
1 2 3 4 ·5. 6 7 8 
Net Income . Purchase Re~irement 
750 - 779.99 216 
780 - 809.99 216 
810 - 839.99 216 
840 - 869.99 216 
Max. Net Inc. 194 273 393 500 593 680 767 853 
lsource; u.s. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee 
on Fiscal Policy,Studies in Public Welfare, Paper No. 17, National 
Survey of Food Stamp and Food Distribution Program Recipients, A 
Summary of Findings of Income Sources and Amounts and Incidence of 
Multiple Benefits=, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1974), pp. 18, 21. 
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bonuses l?er recipient were slightly higher than the average annual 
bonus of $174.33 that prevailed nationally (Table XXXI). Food stamp 
bonus payments are funded completely by the u.s. Department of Agri-
cuI ture (USDA). 
The administrative costs of the program are shared by three 
levels of government (see Chapter III). In FY 1973, the USDA's 
food stamp budget explicitly allocated only $23.8 million or $1.95 
per recipient to administration. 3 However, Table XXXI reveals that 
program costs beyond the value of the bonuses were substantially 
higher. Of the $204 per recipient spent by the USDA, $29.68 or 15% 
failed to reach the participants in the form of stamps. Administra-
tive costs for Public Assistance households are not "broken out" of 
the HEW Public Assistance budget. The costs allocated to HEW in 
Table XXVIII were estimated by employing known county and state 
expenditures and the prevailing cost-sharing formula. It is esti-
mated that HEW spent approximately $94,872 in the county for food 
stamp.administration in FY 1973. 
The county budget shows that Multnomah County spent $84,169 on 
distributing food stamps in 1973 (Table XXVIII). In the same period, 
the state of Oregon reported total expen~itures of $876,000 on the pro-
4 gram, excluding costs shared with HEW for PA households. Since Mult-
nomah County contained 38% of the state's recipients, $330,880 of state 
3The Budget of the ~ Government, Appendix, FY 1975, (Washing-
ton, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 205. 
4 
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, 
Food Program Technical Amendmen~s, (Wasbington, D.C.: U.S. Govern-
ment Printing Office, 1974), p. 196. 
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'iABLE XXXI 
u.s. DEPARTMENT OF AGRI:.CULTURE, FOOD STAMP PROGR.AM COSTS, U.S:;r ,FY:1913 
Value of Bonus Stamps Issuedl 
Non-Bonus Expenditures 
TOTAL USDA COSTS 
Average Monthly Number of 
Recipients = 12,233,3822 
Total 
$2,132,600,000 
363,600,000 
$2,495,654,000 
Annual.per 
Recipient 
$174.33 
29.68 
$204.01 
lBudget of the !!.:..§.:.. Government, FY 1975, Appendix, (Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974), pp. 204-205. 
2U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
"Food Stamp Program, Statistical Summary of Operations," (July, 1972 -
June, 1973), mimeo. 
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expenditUres were a1lecated te ceunty administratien. 5 Of this ceunty 
share, $280,563 is asSumed te cever st~~ distributien in cenfermance 
with the 30/70 ceunty/state cest-sharing fermula. The remaining 
$52,317 is assumed te be the state share .of certifying NPA heusehe1ds, 
which accerding te the USDA fermu1a is 37.5% .of the certificatien 
cests .of these heasehe1ds. Dividing the tetal NPA certificatien bud-
get by the number .of NPA recipients resulted in a NPA certificatien 
cest .of $10.42 per recipient.er $27.20 per heuseheld. Willard Renkin, 
Multnemah Caunny Feed Stamp Ceerdinater, suggested that certificatien 
cests fer PA recipients were reughly twe-thirds .of these fer NPA reci-
pients. 6 In a Cengressienal survey .of feed stamp administrative cests, 
the state .of Nerth Daketa suggested the same ratie. 7 This ratie was 
used te estimate state and HEW cests fer PA heusehelds in Table XXVIII. 
Table XXVIII centains .only the direct cests .of the Feed Stamp 
Pregram. Hewever, the pre gram has indirect cests as well, many .of 
which are difficult te quantify. An infermal telephene survey .of the 
majer supermarket chains in the ceunty revealed that feed stamp pur-
chases averaged abeut 2 minutes mere per transactien in check-eut time 
than did regular purchases. The extra time is primarily due te the 
5 
U.S. Department .of ~gricu1ture, ~eed and Nutritien Service, 
"Feed stamp pr.ogram: Statistical SUIllIIIary .of Operations," .~ cit. 
6Willard Renkin, Feed Stamp Ceerdina ter, Mu1 tnemah. Ceunty, 
Or,egen, interview, November 27, 1974. 
7u•S• Senate,'~ cit., p. 184. 
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necessity of separating items whicQmay be ~urchased witQ ~ood stamps 
from those whichinay not (p.on-~ood l?roducts f a1coho1 f qigarettes, 
etc.) and tallying the two categories separately. Supermarketmanar-
gers indicated that frequently shoppers do not warn the checkers, in 
a~vance, of a food stamp transaction. When this occurs, the checkers 
tally all of the items together as they would for a normal purchase. 
When the shopper attempts to pay in food stamp script, the order must 
be unpacked, sorted, and reta11ied to conform to program rules. Addi-
tiona1 checker time is also involved in making change in script, rather 
than cash, as the program requires. The ~nagers also reported addi-
tiona1 clerical work in connection with bundling and canceling the 
food stamp coupons. Despite the extra burden the program imposes on 
the supermarkets, the managers, with one exception, welcomed the pro-
gram as beneficial to their businesses. 8 A rough calculation of super-
market food stamp costs, based on the two minutes extra per transac-
tion reported above and the prevailing checker wages in 1973, was made. 
It is estimated that indirect supe~rket costs in the county were 
about $6.40 per recipient per year ($16.69 per household) or over 
$250,000 total. These indirect costs are undoubtedly passed along to 
the general public. 
Food stamp coupons move from the markets to the cOIllIIlercial 
b~s to the Federal Reserve Banks where they are eventually de-
stroyed. Telephone interviews with bank o~ficials indicated that 
extra clerical personnel have been hired to handle food stamps. The 
8Interviews with the managers of Kienows, Albertsons, Fred 
Meyer, and Safeway~ Nov~er1 1974. 
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J?ortland area federal Reserve Bank which. serves· ox:egon, southern 
Washington, Northern Idaho and Nevada, was processi,ng 3 inillion food 
stamp coupons per month in the Fall of 1974. This volume required 
the services of three full-time clerks and a part-time supervisor. 
Additional security personnel have also been needed because food 
stamps are treated like cash, rather than checks. 9 A very rough and 
conservative estimate of the county share of food stamp banking costs 
in 1973 is $15,000, less than $1.00 per household per year. 
other indirect program costs which have not been measured are 
the travel costs and waiting time demanded of program participants. 
Innaddition, no attempt has been made to calculate the psychic costs 
which may be associated with being identified as a food stamp reci--
pient. For the purpose of evaluating the Food stamp Program in terms 
of the model presented in Chapter IV, only the direct costs shown in 
Table XXVIII will be considered. This conservative approach will en-
hance the comparability of the food stamp results with analyses of 
other transfer programs which rarely include indirect costs, despite 
their Eelevance. 
Market Value 
The market value of food stamp coupons is simpl¥ their face 
value which. is equal to the sum of participant payments and the bonus 
provided by the USDA. In 1973, the average annual value of food 
9Kenneth Carr, Fiscal Department,. Federal Reserve Bank, Port-
land area, interview, November 8, 1974. 
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stamp coupons per recipient in Multnomah County was $319.83 or 
$843.75 per household. Of this $129.06 per recipient ($336.84 per 
hosuehold) or 40% was provided by the participant. The remaining 
$190.77 per recipient ($497.9l.per household) or 60% was furnished 
by the USDA (Table XXVIII). Nationally, in the same period, the 
average coupon value per recipient was $317.98 of which 45% repre~ 
sented recipient payments and 55% was funded by the USDA. lO 
Private Benefits: Cash Value of Food Stamps to Recipients 
In an effort to estimate what households of various sizes and 
income would be likely to spend on food, if their income were entirely 
in cash, the Bureau of Labor Statistics' Consumer Expenditure Survey 
of 1960-61, described in the preceding chapter, was employed. No 
satisfactory data sources of more recent vintage were located. The 
1960-61 results were updated through the use of the food expenditure 
component of the Consumer Price Index. ll Table XXXII contains esti-
mated food expenditures by household size and income class for FY 1973. 
Incomplete and partial results of the 1972-73 survey; released by BLS 
in April of 1975,suggest that the values in Table XXXII may be up to 
20% too high. 12 As with the housing expenditures in Table XVIII, 
10The Budget of the ~ Government, OPe cit. 
llu.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Handbook 
of Labor Statistics, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1 974>::P. 299. 
12Julius Shiskin, "The 1972-73 Consumer Expenditure Survey, Some 
First Year Diary Results," U.S. Department of Labor, (April 16, 1975), 
mimeo. 
TABLE XXXII 
ESTIMATED MONTHLY FOOD EXPENDITURES BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND INCOME CLASS, URBAN U. S., FISCAL YEAR 19731 
Estimated Monthly Food Expenditures by Annual Money Income After Taxes 
Household 1000 .. 2000 ... 3000..,. . 4000,- .. .. 5000"". 6000..,. . 7500-
Size 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 7499 9999 
1 55 74 88:.; . 100 101 129 134 
2 76 92 112 125 137 154 178 
3 77 100 129 145 160 178 215 
4 76 123 142 158 176 199 227 
5 79 127 156 174 183 216 256 
6 or more 105 149 161 184 214 231 274 
1source: U.s. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor statistics, Consumer E~enditures and Income: 
Cross Classification of FaMily Characteristics, Urban U.S., 1960-61, Supplement:; Part A 'to BLS Report 
237-38, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1965), Tables 11a-g. Food expenditures for 
FY 1973 were estimated by applyi~g the total food component of the Consumer Price Index to the food ex-
penditures reported in the survey. The Consumer Price Index appears in U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor statistics, Handbook ~ Labor statistics, 1973, (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1974), pp. 299-304. I-' 
~ 
U1 
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it would be desirable to revise Table xxxrr f as necessary~ when the 
results from the new survey become avail~ble. 
Dis~ribution of'private Benefits; Recipient Characteristics 
Information on the characteristics of food stamp recipients is 
surprisingly scarce. The on~y major national survey of participating 
households was conducted in 1974 by Chilton Research Services for the 
Subcommittee on Fiscal Policy. This survey relied on personal inter-
views with recipients and was plagued with non-response. Of a total 
of 3,600 sample households, only 2,191 or 61% were ultimately inter-
viewed. In addition, the survey elicited information pertaining to 
November of 1973 in February and March of 1974. The high rate of non-
response, the time lag associated with the interviews and the depen-
dence on recipient self-report for data relating to income and expendi-
tures produces an undetermined but potentially significant bias in the 
13 
results. 
Some of the principle findings of the Chilton survey were that 
the mean cash, after tax, income of tood stamp households was $238 per 
month while in-kind income aver.aged $126 per month. Public cash and 
in-kind income accounted ~or about 80% o~ total income whi~a income 
from private so~ces amounted to only 2Q% o~ the total. Benefits from 
Public Assistance pro~rams were received by 60% of the surveyed house-
. . . 
13U ... s .... congress,.JointEconomiccommittee, Subcommittee .. on Fiscal 
Poli,cy,:Sttldies !!!.l.'ubli.c Wel:e'are, P!Wer ~ 17 ,'~ationalsurV'e¥of 
Food '. stamp ahd .Food Distribution l.'rogram Recipients; A SUmmarY'.c.f 
Findings of Income Sources and Amounts and Incidence of Mlll tipJ e Bene-
fits, (Washington, D.C.:. U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974). 
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holds. The aver,age recipient hous.ehold obtained benetits frQItl three 
major federal programs~ Household size averaged',3.2;1?ersons, while 
one and two person households made 'ilp one-half o:e those surveyed. 
Female headed households were 66% of the total, while Blacks consti-
tuted 37% of those interVie~ed.14 The average deduction from gross 
income, under the pr,ogram formula for determining net income for Food 
Stamps, was approximately $73-78 per month. On the average, net 
income for food stamps was 70 to 72 percent of gross pre-tax income 
for interviewed households. lS 
In an effort to investigate the characteristics of recipient 
households in greater detail and to avoid the possible biases asso-
ciated with the Chilton survey, a study of 498 Non-Public Assistance 
food stamp households in Multnomah County, Oregon was conducted in 
December of 1974. A 6 percent random sample of active NPA files 
was pulled and data were gathered from agency records. The use of 
records rather than interviews, has the advantage of at least minimal 
verification of income, rent, and other expenditure data by food stamp 
personnel. In addition, the records indicate which deductions were 
actlually permitted from gross income in the computation of pr,ogram 
benefits. In some cases, the deductions itemized by applicants dif-
fered from those.,allowed by the ,a<;Jency. This dive,rgence raises some 
,14Ibid ., pp. 1-2. 
, l5Gary W. Bickel and Maurice Mac Donald, "l'articipation Rates 
in the Food stamp l'r,ogram: Estimated Levels for 1974, Py State" ~~ .. , 
in u .. s ... ' Senate" ,Select Committee on Nutrition and Human Needs, Report 
~ Nutrition and Special Groups, Appendix B to Part I -- Food Stamps, 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. ,Government Printing Office, 19751. 
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nique for the evaluation· of }?rogram benefi.ts. Another advantage of 
working with agency records was the elimination of the proqiEem of 
non-response; all active files were accessible. 
Unfortunately, it was not possible to survey Public Assistance 
food stamp households, so the results are not representative of the 
food stamp population as a whole. However, in considering issues of 
program expansion and in calculating the number of potential eligible, 
the characteristics of the NPA caseload are most pertinent. While 
in the county, by late 1974, about 55% of recipient households were 
, d 'h h ubl" 16, 1 assoc~ate w~t t e P ~c Ass~stance program , nat~onal y, NPA 
households now dominate the program (see Chapter III). It is the NPA 
share of the total that has been growing most rapidly and that will 
continue to grow. Currently, in the county, about 85% of Public 
Assistance households are receiving stamps. This is near the upper 
limit of PA participation anticipated by program officials. 17 Since 
virtually all PA households that wish to participate are doing so, 
those eligible, but not participating, are primarily NPA hoaseholds. 
Tables XXXIII through XL contain the results o£ the Multnomah 
County ~A survey. Table XXXIII indicates that }?articil?ating house-
holds are small; mean s~ze was 2.53 }?ersons while median size was 2. 
Male heads of househol6. ... : : 55% of the N};>A sample. Benefits were 
l6Doug1as Yeater, Supervisor, Issuing Section, rood Stamp Pro-
gram, Multnomah County, or.egon, interview, februaryu7, 1975. 
l7Ibid• 
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TABLE XXXIII 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: HOUS~­
HOLD SIZE, SEX, AND AGE OF HEAD, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DEC., 1974 
Household Size 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 or more 
TOTAL 
Mean Household Size = 2.53 
Median Household Size * 2.00 
Sex of Head 
----
Male 
Female 
Under 18 
18 - 24 
25 - 34 
35 - 44 
45 - 54 
55 - 64 
65+ 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
Mean Age of Head = 38.1 
Median Age of Head = 30.0 
Number 
208 
92 
72 
51 
40 
35 
498 
274 
224 
498 
3 
141 
149 
62 
45 
22 
76 
498 
* Does not equal 100.0 due to rounding error. 
Percent 
41.8 
18.5 
14.5 
10.2 
8.0 
7.0 
100.0 
55.0 
45.0 
100.0 
0.6 
28.3 
29.9 
12.4 
9.0 
4.4 
15.3 
100.0* 
1source: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah 
County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description. 
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heavily concentrated on young households: 58.8% of household heads 
were below age 35. Only 25.8% of the sample had heads between ages 
35 and 64. Elderly households comprised 15.3% of the total. Table 
XXXIV indicates that the reported value of the assets of surveyed 
households was very low. 
Table XXXV contains mean gross monthly income, mean net month-
ly income (income after deductions permitted by the program formula) , 
and mean bonus values by household size for the sample as a whole. 
For the total sample, gross income averaged $256 per month, mean 
monthly net income was $132 and the average monthly bonus was $66. 
The difference between net and gross income was $124 per month. Thus 
net income for the sample was only 52% of gross income. 
Tables XXXVI, XXXVII and XXXVIII contain gross income, net 
income, and bonus data by household size and income class. These 
tables indicate that the Food stamp income determination formula 
tends to result in proportionately larger deductions from gross in-
come for upper income recipients. Figure 5 plots data from Tables 
XXXVI and XXXVII for all classes in which there are a minimum of 
five observations. Figure 5 reveals that the relationship between 
gross and net income is not linear. As gross income increases, 
proportiona1~increases in net income diminish at the upper end of 
the income spectrum of survey households. Figure 6 which plots data 
from Tables XXXVI and XXXVIII indicates that the relationship be-
tween food stamp bonuses and, gross income is also non-linear as bo-
nus values are an inverse function of net income. As gross income 
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TABLE XXXIV 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUbLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: AS-
SETS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974 
Cash on Hand 
o 
$1 - 49 
$50 - 99 
$100 - 149 
$150 or more 
Value of Other Assets 
TOTAL 
(stockS; bonds, bank accounts, etc.) 
o 
$1 - 49 
$50 - 99 
$100 - 199 
$200 - 299 
$300 - 399 
$400 - 499 
$500 - 999 
$1000 - $1499 
Car ownership 
No Car 
One Car 
Two or more 
TOTAL 
TOTAL 
Number of 
Households 
194 
257 
23 
13 
11 
498 
259 
113 
24 
35 
12 
8 
11 
24 
12 
498 
237 
235 
26 
498 
Percent 
39.0 
51.6 
4.6 
2.6 
2.2 
100.0 
52.0 
22.7 
4.8 
7.0 
2.4 
1.6 
2.2 
4.8 
2.4 
100.0 
47.6 
47.2 
5.2 
100.0 
1source: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah 
County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description. 
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TABLE XXXV 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: 
GROSS MONTHLY INCOME, NET MONTHLY INCOME, AND BONUS VALUE, BY HOUSE-
HOLD SIZE, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 19741 
Household Gross Monthly Income ~ Monthly Income Bonus 
Size Mean Stand,. 'Dev. Mean Stand. Dev. Mean Stflnd.Dev. 
1 (N=208) 145 90 .. 70 61 33 13 
2 (N=92) 230 153 103 83 58 21 
3 (N=72) 331 186 156 124 79 33 
4 (N=51) 387 180 210 132 100 54 
5 (N=40) 390 242 216 174 117 51 
6+ (N=35) 481 235 318 187 140 62 
TOTAL SAMPLE 
(N=498) 256 193 132 130 66 48 
Median Gross Monthly Income = $202 
Median Net Monthly Income = $121 
1 
Source: "Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah 
County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description. 
TABLE XXXVI 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: GROSS MONTHLY INCOME BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE 
AND INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 19741 
Gross Monthly Income by Annual Income Class 
Household $1- $1000- $2000- $3000- $4000- $5000- $6000- $7000- $8000 
Size 0 999 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 6999 7999 or more 
1 Mean 0 55 135 203 284 382 603 
N 29 20 73 71 12 2 0 0 1 0 
2 Mean 0 65 140 209 294 371 460 532 631 
N 13 4 14 23 19 9 4 4 2 0 
3 Mean 0 128 218 285 374 448 534 616 756 
N 7 0 9 8 10 13 10 8 6 1 
4 Mean 0 132 214 318 371 473 540 638 770 
N 2 0 3 5 9 15 7 4 2 4 
5 Mean 0 138 223 276 373 464 556 635 764 
N ! 0 2 5 9 5 2 3 3 7 
6+ Mean 0 146 229 398 456 510 632 761 
N 3 0 2 1 0 7 6 3 5 8 
1source: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Mu1tnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974. 
See text for description. 
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TABLE XXXVII 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: NET MONTHLY INCOME FOR FOOD STAMPS BY 
HOUSEHOLD SIZE AND GROSS INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 19741 
Mean Net Monthly Income for FQod Stamps by Annual Gross Income Class 
Household $1- $1000- $2000- $3000- $4000- $5000- $6000- $7000- $8000-
Size 0 999 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 6999 7999 or more 
1 0 14 68 106 110 79 
* * 
186 * 
2 0 26 58 125 138 157 180 149 172 
* 
3 0 * 47 47 128 238 246 222 244 387 
4 0 * 0 57 213 210· 208 385 338 410 
5 0 * 46 67 155 151 194 34·~ 420 473 
6+ 0 
* 
30 130 * 261 278 227 441 524 
*No observations in this class. 
1Source: Ranaom sample of NPA food stamp househo1ds~.Multnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974. 
See text for description. 
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TABLE XXXVIII 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: MONTHLY FOOD rTAMP BONUS BY HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE AND INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 1974 
Mean Monthly Food Stamp Bonus by Annual Gross Income Class 
H~useho1dl $1- $1000- $2000- $3000- $4000- $5000- $6000- $7000- $8000-
Sl.ze 0 :.999 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 6999 7999 or more 
1 46 45 34 26 26 33 * * 10 * 
2 82 79 71 53 51 43 38 45 38 * 
3 118 * 109 108 86 59 58 59 53 18 
4 150 * 150 138 95 93 94 41 54 34 
5 178 * 166 161 136 136 79 102 43 45 
6+ /246 * 197 155 )1t 148 155 184 112 66 
*NO observations in this class. 
lsource: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Mu1tnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974. 
See text for description. 
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increases, bonuses decrease at a slower rate in the upper income 
classes. 
Table XXXIX contains the incidence of some major deductions 
from gross income and the reported income sources of households in 
the survey. About 35% of the sample reported earnings as their 
major income source. Deductions for excess shelter payments were 
permitted virtually every household with the average value of such 
deductions equalling nearly $73 per month. Thus shelter deductions 
account for 58% of the $124 average monthly difference between net 
and gross income. While excess shelter deductions were large, the 
average gross monthly rent paid by sample households was only $122.84. 
The program formula permits the deduction of shelter expenditures in 
excess of 30% of income net of all other deductions. This results in 
households with extremely modest housing expenditures receiving some 
shelter deduction .. · The reward for shelter expenditures depends upon 
the income and the size of the household. A two person household with 
net income of $103 per month -- the mean net income for this house-
hold size (Table XXXV) receives a $21 per month additional bonus 
if it has the $73 shelter deduction typical of the sample. without 
such a deduction, the household's net income would equal $176 and it 
would be required to pay $44 for its stamps. with the shelter deduc~· 
tion, it pays only $23 for its stamps (Table XXX). 
Table XL contains the average shelter deductions by household 
size and income class and Figure 7 plots these deductions against 
gross monthly income (Table XXXVI). Shelter deductions demonstrate a 
tendency to increase slightly with increases in gross income. 
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TABLE XXXIX 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: DE-
DUCTIONS FROM GROSS INCOME AND REPORTED INCOME SOURCES, MULTNOMAH 
COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 19741 
Deductions from Gross Income Permitted Sample Households (N=498) 
Type of Deduction 
Number of Households 
Permitted Deduction 
Medical 
Child Care 
Tuition 
Excess Shelter Payments 
(Mean Excess Shelter Payment= 
$72.72 per month) 
(Mean Gross Rent= $122.84 per 
month) 
238 
24 
70 
493 
Reported In~ Source 2 Number of Households 
social Security or SSI 
Pension 
Earned Income3 
veterans Benefits 
Unemployment Compensation 
Child Support and/or Alimony 
Educational Loans or Scholarships 
Strike Benefits 
No Reported Income 
Unknown or other 
TOTAL 
114 
9 
173 
26 
36 
22 
19 
5 
58 
36 
498 
* Does not equal 100.0 due to rounding error. 
Percent 
47.8 
.. 4.8 
14.1 
99.0 
Percent 
22.9 
1.8 
34.7 
5.2 
7.2 
4.4 
3.8 
1.0 
11.6 
7.2 
100.0* 
lSource: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multno-
mah County, Oregon, December, 1974. See text for description. 
2In cases where households had more than one income source, 
the dominant source was recorded. 
3Earned income includes wages and income from self-employment. 
Many recipients, whose major income source was earned income, did 
not work full time. 
TABLE XL 
CHARACTERISTICS OF NON-PUBLIC ASSISTANCE FOOD STAMP RECIPIENTS: EXCESS SHELTER DEDUCTIONS BY HOUSEHOLD 
SIZE AND INCOME CLASS, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, DECEMBER, 19741 
Mean Monthly Excess Shelter Deduction by Annual Gross Income Class 
Household I $1- $1000- $2000- $3000- $4000- $5000- $6000- $7000- $8000-
Size 0 999 1999 2999 3999 4999 5999 6999 7999 or more 
1 75 41 44 48 70 78 * * 21 * 
2 99 90 65 60 69 86 97 99 102 ,~ 
3 123 * 70 127 90 74 83 101 106 145 
4 102 * 92 124 59 100 94 35 86 55 
5 146 * 84 153 94 112 6J 81 83 51 
6+ 173 * 148 98 * 104 101 73 85 53 
*NO observations in this class. 
Isource: Random sample of NPA food stamp households, Multnomah County, Oregon, December, 1974. See 
text for description. 
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This partially explains why the rate of increase in net income was 
lower for the higher income classes. Other aspects of the Food 
stamp income determination formula also tend to result in propor-
tionate1y larger deductions from gross income for the upper income 
eligible. Earned income and work related expenditures are treated 
far more generously than is income from transfers. Families in the 
higher income brackets are much more likely to have income from 
earnings and are therefore likely to have a greater spread between 
net and gross before shelter deductions. Since shelter deductions 
are the last to be calculated, the deductions allowed upper income 
eligible households tend to be multiplicative. 
Estimating the Number of Eligible 
An effort to estimate the number of eligible, nation-wide, from 
the Chilton survey data was made by Bickel and Mac Donald. They used 
the average .70 - .72 ratio between net and gross income that prevailed 
in the Chilton survey to derive the maximum gross income limits implied 
by the net income maximums mandated by the Food Stamp program. These 
implied gross income limits were fitted to the distribution of house-
holds by income and household size on a state by state basis to esti-
mate the number eligible on income criteria. Bickel and Mac Donald 
concluder that about 33.5 million persons were eligible for Food 
Stamps in 1974, with 292,441 eligible in Oregon. Nationwide, Bickel 
and Mac Donald estimated that 31-38% of the eligible receive Food 
1S 
Stamps while Oregon participation was 39-47i of the eligible. 
l8Gary W. Bickel and Maurice Mac Donald, Ope cit., pp. 13, 29. 
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The results of the NPA survey in Multnomah County suggest that 
Bickel and Mac Donald seriously unde~estimate the number of eligible 
households. Sixty percent of the Chilton households were Public 
Assistant recipients. As discussed above, the treatment of income in 
the Food Stamp program does not favor such households. The .52 ratio 
between net and gross income found in the county survey is probably 
more accurate in describing the net/gross spread for those close to 
the eligibility limits. Figure 5 suggests that even the assumption 
that net income is 52% of gross at the upper limits of the program is 
too conservative. While the average net/gross ratio in the county 
survey was .52, the relationship between net and gross was not linear. 
Figure 7 indicates that net is a smaller proportion of gross in the 
upper brackets represented in the survey. However, very few sample 
households were anywhere near the eligibility maximums, thus it was 
not possible to determine precisely what gross incomes were implied 
by the Food Stamp program's net income limits. 
Table XLI contains the 1973 Census Bureau low-income thresholds 
and the Food Stamp net income maximums, by household size, for 1973. 
The conservative average .52 net/gross income ratio that prevailed in 
the county survey was used to derive the gross incomes implied by the 
net income limits for 1973. While the net limits are very close to 
the poverty thresholds, the implied gross eligibility limits include 
a large number of non-poor in the eligible population. (The close 
correspondence between the net income maximums and the poverty thresh-
olds is not surprising since both are based on the USDA economy diet 
plan). Table XLII shows the result of fitting the implied gross 
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TABLE XLI 
LOW-INCOME THRESHOLDS FOR NONFARM HOUSEHOLDS AND FOOD STAMP ELIGI-
BILITY LIMITS, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE, U.S., 1973 
Maximum Net An- Implied Maximum 
Household Low-Income nua1 Income for ::~a~o~r~~:m~~3 Size Thresho1d1 Food stamps2 
1 $2,247 $2,136 $4,108 
2 2,895 2,796 5,377 
3 3,548 3,684 7,085 
4 4,540 4,476 8,608 
5 5,358 5,280 10,154 
6 6,028 6,084 11,700 
1 U.S. Bureau of the Census, Current Population Reports, Series 
P-60, No. 98, "Characteristics of the Low-Income Population: 1973", 
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1975), p. 162. 
2 U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food and Nutrition Service, 
"Food Stanlp Program, Current as of July 1, 1972," mimeo., pp. 26-7~ 
3Estimated by using the average net income/gross income ratio 
of .52 that prevailed in a random sample of 498 NPA food stamp house-
holds in Mu1tnomah County, Oregon in December, 1974. 
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income limits in Table XLI to the county distribution of households 
by size and income class in Table XX. A total of 70,262 households 
or 40% of the county population were estimated as eligible for Food 
stamps. Of those eligible, only about 15,500 or 20% were actually 
participating in the program. 
Bickel and Mac Donald warn of some major sources of error asso-
ciated with estimate made in the above manner. Since the Food Stamp 
program has an asset~ as well as an income test, it is possible that 
those who qualify on the basis of income are unable to pass the assets 
screen. The only d~tailed survey of the value of assets of low-income 
households dates from 1962. On the basis of this survey, Bickel and 
Mac Donald conclude that, at most, 21% of those eligible on the basis 
of income, would be.eliminated by an assets test. 19 
Bickel and Mac Donald indicate that a more serious source of bias 
is the significant undercounting that results from using annual income 
data to calculate eligibility for a program which determines eligibil-
ity on the basis of current monthly income. In reviewing the work of 
other researchers, they maintain that, 
• • • the number of normally above-standard households that 
will fall temporarily below the food stamp eligibility levels 
in particular" months is substantially larger than the opposite 
number of normally below standard households temporarily rising 
in some months to above-maximum incomes. 20 
Bickel and Mac Donald report that research suggests that undercounting 
due to the "accounting period" bias is about 37% for urban households. 
This undercounting estimate relates to the l2-month equivalent of the 
19Ibid.,·p.15. 
20Ibid., p. 24. 
number of households eligible in a given year, not to the number 
of households ever eligible which would be much higher. 
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If the 21% overestimate due to the assets screen is subtracted 
from the 37% "accounting period" underestimate, and the 16% difference 
is applied to the results in Table XLII, th~ estimated number of 
county eligible jumps to 91,944 households or 46% of the population. 
The number of eligible participating drops to 17 percent. 
While these estimates are admittedly crude, the conclusion that 
an extremely large number of households, including substantial numbers 
of non-poor, are eligible for Food stamps, is inescapable. While the 
results of both the Chilton and county surveys indicate that very few 
of the upper-income eligible are currently participating, the recent 
legal decisions compelling more vigorous "outreach" activities and the 
rapid expansion of the NPA share of the program suggest that more upper 
income eligibles will be drawn in. Willard Renkin, Food stamp Coordi-
nator, Multnomah County, Oregon, indicated that important barriers to 
NPA partic~pation, in the past, were the characterization of Food 
Stamps as a "welfare" program and an ignorance on the part of high 
income eligibles that they could receive benefits. 2l This ignorance 
of eligibility is understandable in view of the complexity of the 
income determination formula which results in a large difference 
between net and gross income maximums. Probably few households above 
the poverty thresholds suspect that they are eligible because the 
maximum incomes cited in program publicity are always the net income 
limits. As larger numbers of NPA households enter the program and as 
2lWillard Renkin, op.cit. 
TABLE XLII 
ESTIMATED NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLDS ELIGIBLE FOR FOOD STAMPS, BY HOUSEHOLD SIZE ~u INCOME, MULTNOMAH COUNTY, 
OREGON, FY 1973 
Number of Eligible Households by Gross Annual Income Class 
Household Less than $2000- $3000- $5000- $7000- $10,000-
Size $2000 2999 4999 6999 9999 14,999 Total 
1 17,323 7,293 5,133 0 0 0 29,749 
2 4,656 4,378 9,325 1,680 0 0 20,039 
3 1,506 1,022 2,522 3,618 201 0 8,869 
4 859 642 1,309 2,054 2:;955 0 7,819 
5 383 305 718 969 3,557 167 6,099 
6+ 350 254 716 928 2,778 1~661 6,687 
Total 25,077 13,894 19,723 9,249 9,491 1,828 79,262 
1 
Estimated by applying the Implied Maximum Gross Annual Income for Food Stamps in Table XLI 
to the county income distribution in Table XX. It was assumed that the households in a given income 
class are evenly distributed across that class. 
I-' 
00 
~ 
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more detailed program information becomes available, these barriers to 
the participation of the upper-income eligible are likely to diminish. 
Evaluating Food stamp Subsidies 
Figures 8 and 9 contain applications of the model for evaluating 
in-kind transfers presented in Chapter IV to the Food Stamp Program. 
Figure 8 demonstrates the effects of the program in Multnomah County 
in FY 1973 for a two-person NPA household with annual gross income 
of $2500. This household is near the average size and income of the 
households in the county survey (Table XXXV). The results of the coun--
ty survey indicate that this household would have a net monthly income 
of $125 after deductions permitted by the program (Tables XXXVI and 
XXXVII). This net income required a recipient payment, AB in Figure 
8, of $29 for stamps with a face or market value of $64, AD in 
Figure 8 (payment schedule is in Table XXIX). The difference between 
the market value and the recipient's payment of $35 is the bonus value 
of the stamps of the monthly in-kind income provided by the program, BD. 
On an annual basis, this in-kind tra~sfer is worth $420. Table XXXII 
contains expected food expenditures by household size and income class. 
The $420 in-kind income is insufficient to move the household with 
annual income of $2500 to the next income class. Thus the expected 
food e~enditures for the household, AC' in Figure 8, equal $92. Since 
the expected expenditures for fodd, if the household's income were 
entirely in cash, exceed the market value of the food stamps by 44%, 
there are no substitution effects. CD is equal to 0 as the program 
does not compel alterations in the consumption pattern preferred by the 
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Gross Monthly Income = $208 
Net Monthly Income = $125 
AB = $29 = Recipient Payment 
BC = BD = $35 = Cash Value of 
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In-Kind Income 
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AC = AD = $64 = Private Benefits= 
Market Value of Food Stamps 
AC' = $92 = Expected Food Expendi-
ture if Income were in Cash 
CD = o = Substitution Effects 
DE = $9.71 = Administrative Costs 
BE = $44.71 = Total Public Costs 
AE = $73.71 = Total Public and 
Private Costs 
Figure 8. Impact of food stamps on two-person household; 
annual cash income of $2,500. 
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recipients. The monthly administrative costs per household, DE, of 
$9.71 were obtained by dividing the annual administrative costs per 
household in Table XXVIII by 12. It was assumed that administrative 
costs are independent of household size as no additional paper work 
or processing is required for larger households. BE or the total 
public costs of the program are $44.71 of which 78% os paid out as 
bonus and 22% is allocated to administration. AE, the total public 
and private cost of the transfer is $73.71. 
Figure 9 contains the same data for a four person NPA house-
hold with annual gross income of $4500. This gross income was asso-
ciated with a net monthly income of $210 in the county survey (Table 
XXXVI and XXXVII). At this income level, the required recipient 
payment, AB, is $59 for coupons worth $112, AD (Table XXIX). The 
difference between AD and AB of $53 is the cash value of the in-kind 
transfer, BD. On an annual basis, the transfer is worth $636 --
enough to push the household into the $5000-5999 income bracket in 
terms of Table XXXII. At this income level, the household would be 
expected to expend $176 per month on food, AC', if its income were 
entirely in cash. This is an amount 57% greater than its food stamp 
allotment of $112. Therefore, there are no substitution effects and 
CD = O. As in Figure 8, DE or administrative expenditures equal $9.71. 
Administration receives 15% of the total public costs of $62.71, BE, 
while bonus payments to the recipients account for the remaining 85%. 
AE, the total public and private cost of the transfer is $121.71. 
Figures 8 and 9 demonstrate that, unlike housing subsidies, 
food stamps do not succeed in inducing changes in consumption patterns. 
A 
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Figure 9. Impact of food stamps on four-person household, 
annual cash income of $4,500. 
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As such, the indirect or social benefits of this transfer mode which 
are related to the presence of substitution effects (Equation 2 in 
Chapter IV) are zero. As with housing benefits, the definition of 
social benefits in Equation 2 is very narrow; other conceptualizations 
would yield other results. Equation 1 in Chapter IV suggests that 
the minimum social benefits, SBmin, required for an in-kind invest-
ment to pay-off, were equal to total costs, AE,minus private benefits, 
AC. In both Figures 8 and 9, SBmin = $9.71 per household per month, 
considerably less than the maximum social benefits demanded by housing 
programs which induce substitution effects. 
Summary 
The data in this chapter indicate that the theoretical and 
political arguments in favor of in-kind programs, which suggest that 
changes in consumption patterns produce external benefits, are not 
relevant to the Food Stamp Program as it currently operates. Benefit 
levels are not sufficiently large to induce substitution effects, thus 
recipients treat their in-kind income as cash. This tendency to view 
food stamps as cash is further reinforced by the variable purchase 
option which allows participating households to buy as little as one-
quarter of ~heir monthly allotment. With 20% of public program dollars 
allocated to administration, the economic logic of giving in-kind 
rather than in cash is suspect, when recipients are treating the 
transfer as cash. The data in this chapter also indicate that very 
large numbers of American households are eligible for food stamps, 
including many of those not officially designated as poor. While 
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program b~~efits are currently concentrated heavily on the indigent, 
the open-ended funding for the program and the rapid increase in 
Non-Public Assistance participation, suggest continued program 
expansion. The budgetary impact of the program, already expected 
to exceed $5 billion in FY 1975, could be much more substantial 
in the future. 22 
22"Food stamp Plan to Provide More," The ~ York Times, 
(April 9, 1975), p. 8. 
CHAPTER VII 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results of an empirical investigation of the low-income 
housing and Food Stamp programs suggest that in-kind transfers are a 
politically popular, but inefficient and inequitable method of redis-
tributing income. The hypotheses, proposed in Chapter IV, were 
confirmed by the data presented in Chapters V and VI. 
High Administration and Participation Costs 
High administrative costs were associated with all of the pro-
grams examined in this research. The Food Stamp Program in FY 1973 
devoted one-fifth of its program dollars to administration. Further-
more, the administrative share of the budget is likely to increase, 
as a recent change in the cost-sharing -FormuL::. permits state aha local 
governments to shift a greater percentage of the financial burden of 
program administration to the Federal government. with Washington 
paying more of the bill, the understaffing characteristic of the 
program is likely to diminish. Under the conservative assumption 
that administrative costs are still 20% of the Food Stamp budget, 
about $1 billion will be spent on the administration of this single 
program in FY 1975. 1 
The administrative share of the low-income housing budget was 
l"Food stamp to Provide More," The ~ York Times, (April 9, 
1975), p. 8. 
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even greater: 23-25% of public leased housing dollars were allocated 
to administration, while administrative costs were 51-56% for units 
owned by the housing authority. High administrative costs are not 
unique to in-kind programs. AFDC, the major cash welfare program, 
has also diverted a large proportion of program dollars to bureau-
cracy. If it is assumed that all needs-tested transfer programs 
allocate 20% of their budget to administration (a conservative esti-
mate), then over $6 billion was spent in FY 1973 for the management 
of welfare programs (Table II). 
The major reasons for these high administrative costs, discussed 
in detail in Chapter I, are program complexity, the diffusion of re-
sponsibility between and within levels of government, and the political 
environment of income redistribution programs which places contradic-
tory demands on policymakers. In addition,the structure of incentives 
in the public sector does not clearly reward efficient administration. 
The fundamental disagreement in American society about who deserves 
assistnace, under what conditions, and in what form, has stimUlated 
a rash of rule-making. Different rules are designed to appeal to dif-
ferent factions in an effort to create consensus for a program. Most 
programs seek to distinguish between the "worthy" and "unworthy" poor 
on grounds other than income. The greater the effort to make fine dis-
tinctions between the eligible and the ineligible, the greater the com-
plexity and the greater are the administrative problems. While 
there are certainly many examples of bureaucratic blundering, the basic 
structure of the welfare system demands high administrative costs from 
even the most efficient of administrators. In sum, while the nation 
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is maJd-?g an important ef;f;ort to redistribute income tbrp.ugh large 
public transfer programs, this ei:fort is bei?g undercut by the di-
version of many pr.ogram dollars from the target population to admini-
stration. 
While all programs require some administrative outlay, the re-
sults of the income maintenance experiments suggest that the bureau-
cratic share could be substantially lower than that associated with 
current transfer programs. David N. Kershaw, project director of 
the New Jersey, Denver, and Seattle experiments, estimates that a 
national cash assistance program would cost less than $1 billion 
annually to administer (about $150 per case) • Kershaw's system 
would include the verification of information at the time of applica-
tion, periodic auditing of a random sample of all participants, and 
2 
"audits for cause" of those suspected of fraud. Thus Kershaw claims 
that administrative expenditures for a cash system would be roughly 
comparable to the current cost of administering the Food Stamp Program 
alone. Income maintenance programs, by simplifying eligibility and 
payment standards and procedures, appear to make possible substantial 
reductions in the diversion of program dollars to bureaucracy. How-
ever, there may be errors associated with projecting national costs from 
small-scale experiments. It is conceivable that political pressures 
2 
David N. Kershaw, "Administrative Issues in Establishing and o-
perating a National Cash Assistance !;lrogram," in U.s. Congress, Joint 
Econondc committee, S'llibcommittee.on Fiscal !;lolicy •. Studies in PUblic 
. welfare, paper No ~ 5 (Part 3); Issues· in Welfare' Admi..,.,dstratidn: 'Im-
'plicationsof·thelnCdme·Maintenance Experiments, rwashington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government printing Office, 1973). 
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for rule prol~~erat~on and that a lack of reward ~or ef~~c~enc~ would 
also come to characteJ:ize. an mco..'lle lUamtenance s~tem. 
In addition to high admmistrative costs, the structure 6f the 
American welfare system imposes high information and transaction costs 
on its intended beneficiaries. The low participation rates in the 
open-ended Food stamp Program are evidence that there are significant 
barriers to the involvement of the eligible. The complicated in-
come determination formulas, characteristic of the Food Stamp Program 
and most other welfare programs, make it difficult for potential 
participants to assess their eligibility and/or probable benefits. In 
addition, program participation frequently demands long waits for 
services, traveling to take advantage of benefits, aggressiveness 
in applying for transfers, and/or services in a form which embarass 
some of the eligible. Potential recipients are confronted with a 
confusing and inconvenient delivery system which leads many of the eli-
gible to elect not to participate. Ironically, the structure of par-
ticipa~ion costs tends to discourage the least controversial subgroups 
of the target population -- the elderly and disabled. 
Substitution Effects 
In-kind trans~ers enjo~ lUuch greater polit~cal support than do 
cash transfers. WhD.e d~ficul t to q.uant~¥, ~erican public opmion, 
as reflected in the political systere, has backed the transter of basic 
commodities more strongly than it has the redistribution of cash mcome. 
In the vocabulary of welfare theory, the data support the existence of 
"goods-specific" utility interdependence. Specific ills! like malnu-
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trition and slum housin9, rather than poyert¥~ ~eneralt are viewed 
as imposin~ social costs on the communitY'- In part. specific de-
ficiencies become the focus of attention because they are more visible 
and less abstract than poverty in general. Perh~ps as crucial, in a 
culturally heterogeneous nation, transfers of the basic necessities 
of life are less divisive than are transfers of cash. Many taxpayers 
suspect that cash transfers would be "wasted" by welfare recipients 
who are perceived as having values and behavior patterns unlike those 
of the American mainstream. In-kind transfers are proposed as a means 
of assisting the poor in a way which is expected to maximize the social 
benefits of income redistribution. The popular political logic insists 
that the Food stamp Program is the preferred perscription for the mal-
nourished while housing programs are most appropriate for the house 
poor. It is assumed that cash transfers would partially be diverted 
from the expenditure categories of greatest concern to the donors. 
In short, in~kind transfers are thought to generate s~sitution effects 
or to insure more socially acce~table consumption patterns than would 
the transfer of cash. 
The results of an empirical evaluation of the Food Stamp and low-
income housing pr,oSJrams reveal that the popular conception of the im-
pact of in-kind pro~rams is based on sQme erroneOllS assumptions. A 
key discovery was that in-ki;nd l?r,o~raros dq not alw.axs induce substitu-
tiQn effects. A comparison .ofthe food expenditures Of rood stamp 
households with the food consumption patterns of comparable low-income 
households found that those purchasing their full monthly allo't:.ment of 
food sta.'l'nps were not compelled by the program structure to increase 
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consumption of food. J:n addition, the adoJ;ltion of· the variable l?ur-
chase option permits participating households to determine their own 
level of food consumption within wide lw.ts. Households purchasing 
as little as one-quarter of their monthly allotment are granted ac-
tive status in the program. 
In the Food stamp Program, the strategy has been to cut the 
transfer pie into small pieces. Relatively meager transfers are 
provided to a very large number of participants. A convoluted sys-
tem of script, with 20¢ of every $1 going to administration, has 
been created under the illusion that the hungry are receiving more 
food than they would be inclined to purchase for themselves, if pro-
vided with equivalent cash subsidies. vfuile the Food stamp Program 
undoubtedly permits participants to purchase more food than they would 
in the absence of any subsidy, the evidence is that food stamp reci-
pients use their script as they would increments in cash. The high 
administrative and participation costs associated with the Food Stamp 
Program do not appear to be compensated for by social benefits dif-
ferent from those which could be obtained from cash transfers. 
In contrast, the low-income housing programs were found to in-
du~e the kinds of alterations in consumption patterns expected of in-
kind transfers. The housing pie is cut into large pieces for a 
much smaller number o~ I?articipating households. As a result, those 
fortunate enough to. gain admission cans.ume considerably more housing 
than they would if given a comparable cash s,ubsidy. Since there are 
so few pieces of pie, 95% of those eligible are unable to participate. 
To the extent that external diseconomi.es are assQciated with the 
housing consumption patterns 0;1; the enti.re elisihle l?ol?ulation, these 
external diseconomies are only slightly diminished by programs which 
leave the bulk of the target group untouched. While housing programs 
generate substitution effects, their price is high both in terms of 
administrative costs and the inequitable exclusion of the eligible 
from program benefits through the restriction of supply. 
In sum, while the Food stamp and low-income housing programs 
represent opposite strategies in terms of the benefits available per 
household and the number of households permitted to participate, 
all programs were found to be deficient in significantly altering 
the consumption patterns of the eligible population as a whole. In-
kind programs do produce benefits. However, it is questionable whe-
ther these benefits are greater than those which would result from 
equivalent cash subsidies or whether the benefits produced are greater 
than their costs. 
Equity 
The current welfare system does not provide those with similar 
socio-economic characteristics with similal':' benefits. Housing trans-
fers are available to only a small numbel; 0:1; eligible. The complex 
income determination f;ormula employed in the ;E'ood Starop ;l?r.ogram results 
in a considerable variation in the benefits paid to households of si-
milar size and income. Some program benefits are not available in 
all geographic locations. While the potential cumulative benefits 
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available te l?eer househelds, under the maze .of, ~elfare pr,egra.ms, is 
very large, the actual distributien e~ public transfers varies ener-
meusly between equally needy households. Very few households re-
ceive all .of the benefits te which they are legally entitled. 
The current distributien .of benefits in both the Feod stamp 
and low-inceme heusing pre grams was feund te be heavily skewed toward 
the peer. However, .official definitiens .of eligibility were feund 
te include many nen-peer. In Multnomah County, Oregen, 37% .of the 
households were eligible fer heusing assistance and 46% were eligible 
fer feod stamps. While the tight supply .of heusing transfers inhi-
bits participatien grewth, the petential fer expansien in the epen-
ended Feed stamp Pregram is enermous. By June of 1975, it is esti-
mated that 10% .of the American populatien will be receiving feed 
3 
stamps. The wisdom .of a pelicy which weuld take middle-class tax 
dellars and distribute them te lewer-middle class recipients in the 
ferm .of script -- after allecating a sizable prepertion te administra-
tion -- is suspect. Hewever, the greater the diffusien .of benefits 
and the mere middle-class the recipients, the greater is the apparent 
4 
pelitical petency .of a program. 
Non-Ecenemic rssues 
While the econemic l,e~ic .of in-kind pr.egrams, is net compelling, 
3"Feed stamp plan te Previde More, "~. ci,t. 
4David A. steckman, "The Social Pork Barrel," ~ public Inte-
~, Ne. 39, (Spring, 1975), pp. 3-30. 
the I?olitical l.oliJic behind such t:r;ans:i;ers re,mains. powerful. When 
policymake:r;s. attack in-kind proliJrarns, they tend to fOCUS on inade-
quate benefit or participation levels or on glaring administrative 
malfunctions. There appears to be very little interest in criti-
cally evaluating the transfer mode itself or in empirically vali-
dating the assumptions underlying the rhetoric promoting in-kind 
programs. Supporters of policies which redistribute income may 
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rationally fear that attacks on the basic structure of popular trans-
fer programs would result in a reduction in the benefits available to 
the poor rather than to the creation of superior programs. The 
pressure to enlarge the public welfare pie and to liberalize eligibi-
lity requirements has produced enormous program expansion. This 
expansion has occurred because the reward structure in the political 
system encourages policymakers to respond to the pressures emanating 
from the "publics" associated with established programs, rather than 
to respond to the implications of academic analyses. 
In this research, a theoretical framework which emphasizes the 
economic impact of in-kind transfers has been employed. However, con-
siderable attention has been devoted to the political environment. 
The development o~ the utility interde~endence paradigm in welfare econ-
omics permits the in~eliJration o~ political and econo~ic variables and 
this. int.eliJration has. been s.tressed in this. work. Despite the high 
costs found to be associated with in-kind trans~ers, it is. possible 
that public preferences; ;for this mode are so strong and the antipathy 
to cash transfers so great that the total benefits associated with 
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in-kind transfers may be worth their costs. However, this. investi-
gation has revealed that the political rhetoric in ~avor of in-kind 
transfers is based upon illusions as to the effect of such transfers 
on the target population. To the extent that policymaking is a ra-
tional process, the actual impact of program operations ought to en-
ter the public calculus. 
The programs selected for::.analysis were evaluated solely in re-
lationship to their adequacy as mechanisms for the redistribution of 
income and their effectiveness in stimulating the consumption of de-
signated goods. In-kind programs have not been analyzed in terms of 
other goals. This narrow perspective omits some objectives which 
have been important to program advocates. rfuile the Food stamp Pro-
gram has not had explicit goals other than the transfer of income 
and the encouragement of food consumption, housing programs have been 
considerably broader i.l scope. For example, the ability of public 
ownership or management to upgrade neighborhoods when the structure of 
incentives in the private sector inhibits the necessary cooperation 
between private owners, has not been discussed. The efficacy of 
housing programs in facilitating the delivery of services to multi-
problem families and the success of housing authorities in providing 
unique accolllodations for the elderly and dis.abled has. not been asses-
sed. The contributions. of; housing programs. to int,ec;rration have also 
been ,ignored. In sum, all of th~ c;roals of in-kind t;ransf;er programs 
have not been considered and the conclusions regarding the effective-
ness of in-kind transfers are relevant only to the specific goals em-
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phasized in the analytical ~ramework. To the extent that in-kind 
transfers are primarily intended to redi~tribute income and alter the 
consumption patterns of the target population~ they were found to 
be inefficient and inequitable. 
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